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INTRODUCTION
The class action has come of age in America. With increasing
regularity, class litigation plays a central role in discussions about the-
ory, doctrine, and policy in the American civil justice system. The dy-
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I received excellent
feedback on an early version of this Article from the participants in the April 2006
Branstetter Litigation and Dispute Resolution Program at Vanderbilt University Law
School, particularly Myriam Gilles, Richard Nagareda, Erin O'Hara, Suzanna Sherry,
and Catherine Struve, for which I am most grateful. I also benefited from the com-
ments of members of the University of Pennsylvania Law School faculty when I pre-
sented a draft in workshop, and from discussions with Beth Hillman, Judith Resnik,
and Rhonda Wasserman. I am especially grateful for the generous attention that Steve
Burbank, Geoffrey Hazard, Sam Issacharoff, Cathy Sharkey, David Shapiro, Linda Sil-
berman, and Allan Stein provided at key junctures in this project. The attention
proved invaluable in helping to focus and clarify my thinking.
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namics of the class action lie at the heart of current debates over the
nature of the litigation process and the limits of adjudication in effec-
tuating social policy. Choice of law analysis has enjoyed a renaissance
as its significance to the question of class certification has become ap-
parent. Class litigation now frequently drives debates over tort reform
and the phenomenon of regulation through litigation. In these and
many other respects, we have entered a new dispensation: the era of
the nationwide class action. The passage of the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 (CAFA)l-the first occasion on which Congress has en-
acted a generally applicable legislative policy pertaining to aggregate
representative litigation 2-aptly punctuates that arrival.
The class action's ascendance to center stage, however, has not
always been accompanied by the development of a sophisticated doc-
trinal and analytical apparatus that is adequate to its needs. This is
particularly the case in the two important areas that will be my pri-
mary focus in this Article: the analysis of the content and impact of
federal jurisdictional policy when parallel class actions are filed in
state and federal courts, and the due process standards that govern
the various aspects of representative litigation. In the former case,
much of the discussion among courts and commentators has been
mired for too long in forms of analysis that are inapposite and inade-
quate. In the latter, the discussion has been riddled with outright mis-
takes and misunderstanding.
The enactment of CAFA offers an important occasion for revisit-
ing our treatment of these vital questions of federal jurisdictional pol-
icy and due process in representative litigation. This is so for several
reasons. First, the Act promises to move large numbers of nationwide
class actions into the federal courts.' This dramatic change in the al-
l Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2 Congress has enacted more narrowly targeted legislation pertaining to class ac-
tions in the field of securities litigation. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (imposing standards for securities
litigation in federal court); see also Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (extending the provisions of the PSLRA to state
court litigation).
3 The most recent interim report of the Federal Judicial Center indicates that the
rate of diversity class actions in the federal courts-including both original filings and
removals-increased by approximately 100% between the last calendar year before
CAFA was enacted and the twelve-month period between July 2005 and June 2006. See
THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE II, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS AcTION FAIRNESS
ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CON-
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location of class actions within the dual American court system will in-
crease the stress on the flawed doctrines that are currently available
for administering parallel class action proceedings and, at the same
time, provide a concomitant opportunity for achieving a more uni-
form and comprehensive restatement of those doctrines. Second, the
Act itself contains a serious flaw-ajurisdictional paradox, as I call it-
that promises to intensify further the need to rationalize the methods
available for administering multiforum class actions. To appreciate
the legislative impetus that CAFA provides for this larger project of
reexamination, it is necessary to understand the impact that the Act
has on the federal jurisdictional policies that govern class litigation
and the manner in which the Act operates in allocating class actions
to the federal forum.
CAFA operates in two basic modes. First, it dramatically expands
the ability of federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over class action
lawsuits by liberalizing the rules on citizenship and amount in contro-
versy that ordinarily constrain diversity jurisdiction.4 This expansion
of diversity jurisdiction, in turn, is an expression of the instinct that
lies at the Act's foundation: the belief that federal courts will apply
different and more restrained standards to the administration of class
actions than will state courts, thus providing greater confidence that
the interests of parties on both sides of the dispute will be protected
from abuse. The shift to the federal forum, in other words, is ex-
pected and intended to alter the outcome in class litigation based on
state law.
Second, the Act imposes limits on the forms of class action settle-
ment that may be approved once a class action is brought to the fed-
eral forum, singling out practices believed to be particularly prone to
FERENCE ADVISORY COMMrFTIEE ON CIVIL RULES 14 fig.3 (2007), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/rnles/CAFAThird_l n terim.pdf.
4 The changes to diversityjurisdiction are twofold. The statute loosens the normal
requirement of complete diversity, authorizing jurisdiction whenever any plaintiff is
diverse from any defendant; it also alters the ordinary rules on aggregation, authoriz-
ing jurisdiction over small-stakes claims provided that the total amount in controversy
in the proceeding exceeds $5,000,000. See CAFA § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2) (Supp.
V 2005). This change is subject to an abstention provision that limits its effects some-
what, giving the district court discretion to decline jurisdiction if a sufficient propor-
tion of the class and the "primary defendants" are all from the state in which the action
was originally filed, and instructing the district court to dismiss if a supermajority of
the class and at least one significant defendant are both from the forum state. See id.
§ 1332(d)(3)-(4). See generally LINDA J. SILBERMAN, ALLAN R. STEIN & TOBIAS B.
WOLFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORYAND PRAcTICE 1047-49 (2d ed. 2006) (describing
CAFA'sjurisdictional provisions).
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abuse and imposing certain reporting requirements before a settle-
ment may be approved. 5 All of these changes are effectuated against
the backdrop of a set of affirmative statements of policy contained in
the Act regarding the proper role of class actions-and, in particular,
the federal forum-in promoting the fair and efficient resolution of
claims by aggrieved plaintiffs.6 Modern federal class action practice,
in other words, is no longer purely a creature of the rulemaking proc-
ess and judicial innovation. It can now claim at least some of the
benefits of legitimacy that federal legislation confers.
One of the first orders of business in assessing the significance of
the Act will be to understand the change that it effects in the authority
structure governing the administration of federal class actions. Until
now, scholarly and judicial debates surrounding class litigation have
centered largely on second-order questions: what is the proper role of
judges in using aggregation to bring about substantive goals, and what
principles should guide them in that endeavor in the absence of an
affirmative congressional mandate or express statement of policy?
CAFA provides a long-deferred occasion to pose some first-order ques-
tions: what congressional policies toward federal jurisdiction can
CAFA fairly be understood to embrace, and how should those policies
affect the administration of representative litigation?
The answers to such first-order questions will necessarily be
shaped, in part, by the jurisdictional paradox that is embodied in the
statute. One of the primary stated purposes of CAFA is to protect ab-
sent class members from the faithless or collusive behavior of their
5 The most significant limitation on settlement involves coupon settlements. The
Act imposes strict constraints on the amount and the timing of the compensation that
attorneys may receive for negotiating coupon-based settlements for the class. See 28
U.S.C. § 1712 (Supp. V 2005). It also prohibits awards that treat class members in cer-
tain geographic locations more favorably (to prevent bounties) and makes it difficult
to secure approval of any class settlement that would require class members to pay
money in order to obtain a benefit. See id. §§ 1713-1714. Finally, the Act requires the
defendants to notify relevant state or federal authorities of any proposed class action
settlement and imposes a mandatory waiting period prior to any approval of a settle-
ment during which authorities may seek to intervene or object. See id. § 1715; see also
SILBERMAN, STEIN & WOLFF, supra note 4, at 1050-52 (describing these provisions).
6 See, e.g., CAFA § 2(a)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005) ("Class action
lawsuits are an important and valuable part of the legal system when they permit the
fair and efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties by allowing the
claims to be aggregated into a single action against a defendant that has allegedly
caused harm."); id. § 2(b)(1) (stating that a purpose of the Act is to "assure fair and
prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims").
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND DUE PROCESS
own class counsel.7 As has been extensively analyzed, aggregate litiga-
tion can create a serious misalignment between the interests of class
counsel and the interests of the absentees they represent, a mismatch
that in turn can lead class counsel to sacrifice the welfare of the class
in return for personal gain." The Act recites this problem as one of
the principal evils that it seeks to remedy and offers access to the fed-
eral forum as the solution. What it fails to do, however, is to make any
change to the gatekeepers who will control that access. More precisely,
the Act offers no mechanism by which absent class plaintiffs can act in-
dependently of class counsel to move their lawsuits into federal court.
The paradigmatic case of the faithless or collusive class counsel
takes the following basic form: Defendant has engaged in a course of
conduct that leaves it exposed to the threat of substantial liability. In
response, various lawyers have filed multiple overlapping class actions
in courts around the country, some purporting to represent the citi-
zens of a particular state or region, others attempting to represent all
7 See, e.g., id. § 2(a)-(b) (identifying protection of absent class members from mis-
treatment as a primary purpose of the Act, along with protection of defendants against
abusive litigation, safeguarding national economic interests, and preventing excessive
exercises of state power).
8 Among the more prominent expositions of this problem are John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995);
Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805 (1997); Susan P.
Koniak & George M. Cohen, "Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996); and
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
1 (1991).
9 The Act identifies the following findings among the primary reasons for its en-
actment:
(2) Over the past decade, there have been abuses of the class action device
that have-
(A) harmed class members with legitimate claims and defendants that
have acted responsibly;
(3) Class members often receive little or no benefit from class actions, and
are sometimes harmed, such as where-
(A) counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving class members with
coupons or other awards of little or no value;
(B) unjustified awards are made to certain plaintiffs at the expense of
other class members; and
(C) confusing notices are published that prevent class members from
being able to fully understand and effectively exercise their rights.
CAFA § 2(a)(2)-(3), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005).
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claimants nationwide. Defendant, apprehending a real threat of li-
ability exposure or major litigation costs, wishes to arrive at a settle-
ment that binds all claimants to a global release while keeping its
payment obligation at the lowest possible level.'0 For their part, the
competing class lawyers all have an incentive to arrive at a binding
resolution quickly in order to ensure that they will be awarded attor-
neys' fees before being preempted by a competitor lawsuit. The stage
is thus set for Defendant to shop for the lowest bidder by engaging in
some form of reverse auction, seeking lead counsel in one of the na-
tionwide proceedings who will settle the class claims at a price that
may seriously undervalue those claims, perhaps providing no mean-
ingful relief to class members at all, in return for receiving a lock on a
generous fee award.
The actual prevalence of suits in which class counsel exhibit such
malfeasance is a matter of dispute." Nonetheless, Congress enacted
CAFA on the basis of an express finding that such faithless or collusive
proceedings present a serious problem that occurs most frequently in
state court, and it offered expanded access to federal court as the
primary solution. 
2
10 As Professor Hensler has explained, "defendants facing large-scale exposure in
mass product defect litigation, once they recognize and can quantify that exposure,
will prefer a comprehensive settlement of all claims arising out of a single set of facts to
individual case-at-a-time litigation." Deborah R. Hensler, Bringing Shutts into theFuture:
Rethinking Protection of Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 585,
588 (2006).
11 Broad, comprehensive figures on class action practice are not readily available,
in part because of the lack of consistency among state court systems in collecting and
reporting data. See, e.g., Memorandum from Bob Niemic & Tom Willging, Fed. Judi-
cial Ctr., to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 3 (Sept. 9, 2002) available at
http://vw.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/AmChem.pdf/$file/AmChem.pdf (describ-
ing limits on the availability of state court data). As a consequence, much of the infor-
mation on state court abuses that has informed the debate has been anecdotal in na-
ture, and respected advocates disagree strongly about the extent to which the scope of
abuse has been accurately reported or, instead, overstated. Compare, e.g., NLJ Roundta-
ble: Class Action Fairness Act, NAT'L L.J., May 16, 2005, at 18, 18 (reproducing the re-
marks of Elizabeth Cabraser, arguing that "the notion that there were class action
abuses that cried out for the geographic or jurisdictional cure of transfer from state
court to the federal court system will be exposed as basically baseless"), with Susan P.
Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate Representa-
tion, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1787 (2004) (offering a much bleaker account of the rep-
resentation received by absentees).
12 Professor Issacharoff takes this observation much further, suggesting that CAFA
envisions the transfer into federal court of all national consumer class actions, and
perhaps all national class actions under most state law regimes:
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But how are class members to gain access to a federal forum in
such a case? When original federal subject matter jurisdiction exists
over a dispute, the ordinary methods of gaining access to federal court
are well established. For a plaintiff, the ordinary route is to file the
lawsuit in federal court in the first instance. For a defendant in a case
that has been filed in state court, the ordinary route is to remove the
suit to the federal forum. In class action litigation, the routes into
federal court remain the same but the relevant actors change, with the
role of class counsel becoming central to the choice of forum for
plaintiffs. But an absent class member has no power to direct class
counsel to select the federal forum in the first instance-indeed, as a
formal matter, "absent class members" do not exist as such until a pu-
tative class proceeding is filed-and even named class plaintiffs play
almost no role in strategic decision making in all but the most unusual
of proceedings. As a consequence, neither of the established methods
of invoking the federal forum is generally available to absentees. It is
class counsel (and defendants), rather than class members, that serve
as the gatekeepers for access to the federal forum in a class action
proceeding. If class counsel are as self-regarding as the Act assumes,
however, they clearly cannot be relied upon to file suit in a court that
[T]he concern about creating a dominion of exclusive federal oversight...
raise[s] the question of what should serve as the baseline for measuring fed-
eral court fidelity to preexisting legal treatment. If federal courts are to be the
only game in town for national market consumer cases, it is difficult to argue
that they should handle them the way all other courts do. There are simply
no other courts in the game anymore.
Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the
Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1839, 1864 (2006); see also id. at 1865
("There is more than a touch of irony in holding fast to a doctrine honoring state
autonomy in the context of a statute that takes away precisely the power of state courts
to adjudicate nationwide class actions."); id. ("Congress has taken state courts out of
the mix altogether.").
Professor Issacharoff's characterization may be largely correct with respect to class
actions that are filed with the expectation that they will or may be adjudicated, since in
most cases either class counsel or the defendant, considering the matter ex ante, will
likely see some significant benefit to invoking the federal forum. His observation
clearly does not hold true in settlement-only class actions, as the reverse auction sce-
nario makes clear. Professor Burbank levies a similar criticism. See Stephen B. Bur-
bank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM.
L. REv. 1924, 1940-43 (2006).
The question remains whether the decision of class counsel and defendant to keep
a settlement action in state court is always indicative of the kind of malfeasance that
this Article examines, or whether class counsel and defendant might both choose to
keep a settlement action in state court even in the absence of any sacrifice of the class
members' interests. I take up that question briefly in Part ll.A.3, infra.
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promises to police their actions more closely.1 3 They will eschew the
federal forum and file in a hospitable state court in the first instance.
Neither can the defendant be counted upon to remove the case to a
more protective federal court, since, by hypothesis, the defendant is
counting upon the permissive standards of the state court to carry out
its plan to bind the entire class to a bargain-basement settlement.
1 4
Because Congress chose a framework for class action reform that ex-
panded voluntary access to a protective federal forum but still pre-
served the power of state courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction, it
was necessary to craft the means of access to federal court in a manner
that would be responsive to the types of malfeasance that the Act
aimed to combat. But Congress did not do so. Instead, it left the
choice of access to federal court in the hands of the very actors from
whom class members might require protection.
In order for a case of this type to receive the benefit of a protec-
tive federal forum, absent class members would need an independent
13 The conventional wisdom that federal courts are stricter than state courts in
administering class certification does not always hold true. In some state courts, judi-
cial skepticism and constraining precedents make federal court a more attractive op-
tion for class plaintiffs. In New York, for example, state law prohibits the use of the
class action to aggregate claims for statutory penalties or minimum recoveries, unless
the law creating the penalty specifically provides for recovery via class action. See N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 901 (b) (McKinney 2006) ("Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or
a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class
action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or im-
posed by statute may not be maintained as a class action."); Rudgayzer & Gratt v. Cape
Canaveral Tour & Travel, Inc., 799 N.Y.S.2d 795, 796 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding
that C.P.L.R. 901(b) prohibits class action under the federal Telephone Consumer
Protection Act); cf. Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement
Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1885-88 & n.57
(2006) (discussing C.P.L.R. § 901 (b) and the "amplification effect" that it seeks to re-
dress). Even so, the suggestion that faithless class counsel will ordinarily seek to file
suit in state court is an acceptable generalization. Class counsel will usually have the
opportunity to shop for a highly permissive state forum in suits against large corporate
entities-an option made possible by the frequent amenability of such entities to gen-
eral jurisdiction around the country.
14 Professors Kahan and Silberman (among others) make this point in their im-
portant treatment of collateral attacks. See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The In-
adequate Search for "Adequacy" in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73
N.Y.U. L. REv. 765, 776 (1998) ("[B]oth class counsel and defendant may prefer a fo-
rum that rubberstamps any settlement they reach."); see also, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial
Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002) (PosnerJ.) ("The ineffectual lawyers are
happy to sell out a class they anyway can't do much for in exchange for generous at-
torneys' fees, and the defendants are happy to pay generous attorneys' fees since all
they care about is the bottom line-the sum of the settlement and the attorneys' fees-
and not the allocation of money between the two categories of expense.").
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND DUE PROCESS
means of invoking the federal forum without the acquiescence of class
counsel. For the first six years of its eight-year journey through Con-
gress, the Act contained a mechanism that might have solved this
gatekeeper problem: a provision that would have empowered absen-
tees to remove class actions filed in state court, without the approval
of class counsel or defendant. 5 That provision was excised from the
Senate version of the bill in late 2003, however, and stayed out when
the conference committee produced the final version that the Presi-
dent signed in February 2005.16 As a consequence, and despite its ex-
press statements of concern for the welfare of absentees, there ap-
pears to be a danger that CAFA will operate almost exclusively to the
benefit of class action defendants in its most immediate applications.
There do exist other mechanisms by which absent class members
might seek protection from collusion, faithless behavior, or incompe-
tence in such cases. Early in the proceedings, competing class counsel
can file a parallel class action in federal court and attempt to secure
an antisuit injunction to halt the state court litigation. At the close of
a federal class action, the court can consider issuing an injunction to
prevent duplicative litigation in contravention of the court's judg-
ment-a possibility that is most likely to be significant, and has pro-
voked the most controversy, in the situation exemplified by Judge
15 In the Senate, the provision last appeared in the version of the bill that was
placed on the calendar on October 17, 2003. The relevant portions read:
IN GENERAL-A class action may be removed to a district court of the
United States in accordance with this chapter, without regard to whether any
defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought, except that
such action may be removed-
(1) by any defendant without the consent of all defendants; or
(2) by any plaintiff class member who is not a named or representative
class member without the consent of all members of such class.
S. 1751, 108th Cong. § 5(a) (2003). Absent plaintiffs were given thirty days to remove
an action from the time that they received notice, "through service or otherwise, of the
initial written notice of the class action." Id.
if See S. REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., 108TH CONG., S.2062-THE CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT 3 (2004) (noting the deletion of a provision allowing plaintiffs to remove
class actions); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (Supp. V 2005) (containing no provision for
removal by absent class plaintiffs); S. 2062, 108th Cong. § 5(a) (Feb. 11, 2004) (same).
The deletion, which occasioned little comment in the legislative record, was justi-
fied at the time as a necessary step for preventing rogue class members from extorting
payments from defendants and class counsel, the stated concern being that they might
threaten to disrupt ongoing state court proceedings through the guerilla use of re-
moval. See S. REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., supra, at 3-5. 1 discuss the cogency of this
concern, and the virtues of various mechanisms for policing malfeasance in state court
proceedings, in Part II, infra.
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Easterbrook's opinion for the Seventh Circuit in Bridgestone/Firestone
II, where the federal court denied class certification and then prohib-
ited further attempts to certify the same class in any other court by is-
suing an injunction to enforce its denial of certification.' 7 Finally, if a
state class action that was marred by collusion or malfeasance produces
a final judgment on the merits without any prior interdiction by a fed-
eral court, members of the class may attempt to seek relief from that
judgment in a collateral challenge, usually alleging a lack of adequate
representation in the initial proceeding as the basis of the attack.
This Article will use these alternative mechanisms by which the ju-
risdictional paradox of CAFA may be addressed as the occasion for re-
visiting certain basic questions ofjurisdictional policy and due process
that have received inadequate treatment in the emerging era of the
nationwide class action. It begins, in Part I, with the issue of federal
jurisdictional policy and examines the possibility of interdicting ongo-
ing state court proceedings by filing a parallel class action in federal
court and obtaining an antisuit injunction. The All Writs Act 8 and
the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) 1 9 together provide the primary statutory
authority for injunctions aimed at protecting federal courtjurisdiction
from threats posed by ongoing or anticipated state lawsuits, along with
the primary limitations upon the issuance of such orders. Those limi-
tations, which have frequently been defined through clumsy analogies
to in rem jurisdiction, have generally prevented any injunctive inter-
vention until a complex federal proceeding has reached an advanced
stage. This unsatisfying approach to injunctions under the AIA has
developed, for the most part, in anticipation of cases where federal
subject matter jurisdiction will rest upon all-purpose jurisdictional
statutes-provisions that are general in their scope, generic in their
function, and enacted against a broad presumption that state courts
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims, providing little
guidance as to the specific policies that the grant of jurisdiction is de-
signed to promote. CAFA, in contrast, includes a targeted grant ofju-
risdiction that both justifies and requires more focused analysis under
the AIA. CAFA presents an apt occasion to reconsider the unsatisfac-
tory approach to the AIA that has predominated in the administration
of antisuit injunctions in complex disputes. If the policies embodied
17 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bridgestone/Firestone
II), 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003).
18 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
19 Id. § 2283.
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in its jurisdictional provisions are given their proper effect, CAFA will
authorize much earlier federal injunctive intervention in those cases
that exhibit indicia of the malfeasance or collusion that the statute was
designed to combat.
In Part II, the Article takes up the question of due process in class
litigation and examines the power that a federal court possesses to at-
tach finality and preemptive effect to a denial of class certification
once it has adjudicated the certification question. In claiming broad
authority for federal courts to prevent any relitigation of a denial of
certification, the court in Bridgestone/Firestone II challenged widely ac-
cepted assumptions about preclusion doctrine, finality, formal party
status, and the limits that the Rules Enabling Act imposes upon the
authority of federal courts.2 ° Indeed, it is surprising how little serious
scholarly attention that decision has received thus far, given the radi-
cal nature of its holding. Nonetheless, as I will argue, a proper under-
standing of the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum v.
Shutts, along with its largely unacknowledged antecedent, Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust,'2 2 leads to the conclusion that federal
courts do sometimes have the power to enforce a denial of certifica-
tion against an entire class, particularly where the order enjoys the
imprimatur of a statute like CAFA. Such an order, which has the ef-
fect of denying one particular remedial avenue to the members of a
class, generally entails a lesser alteration in legal position or status
than does the final adjudication of an absentee's underlying claim.
Under the approach to due process and representative litigation that
the Court employed in Shutts and Mullane, a federal court can enforce
a properly crafted denial of certification through the issuance of an
antisLit injunction without providing individualized process to every
class member. Neither the Federal Rules nor the Constitution prohib-
its that outcome.
Part III then moves to the aftermath of state court litigation and
takes up the ongoing debate over collateral attacks upon class action
judgments. Ijoin here with those who approach the collateral attack
question systemically, rather than with extravagant formalism. That
systemic approach is aided by the prescriptions in the earlier sections
of this Article, which help to clarify the opportunities that class mem-
bers have in various types of lawsuits to protect their interests from in-
20 See id. § 2072(b).
21 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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competence or malfeasance. The absent-plaintiff removal provision
that was excised from CAFA would have provided one such opportu-
nity, and its absence can legitimately be pointed to by proponents of
collateral attack as a point in their favor. But the net impact of CAFA
will not provide comfort to those proponents. The forms of interdic-
tion that I advocate in Parts I and II through the expanded use of the
antisuit injunction offer a superior approach to the protection of class
members' interests in cases of possible malfeasance, from both a for-
mal and a systemic perspective. When such an injunction is both
available and likely to be effective but competing counsel choose not
to pursue it, the case for prohibiting collateral attacks in subsequent
proceedings becomes much stronger. If the prescriptions set forth in
this Article are not embraced, however, then the case for collateral at-
tack will continue to retain some of its current vitality.
I. INTERDICTING STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS: TARGETED GRANTS
OFJURISDICTION AND THE ANTISUIT INJUNCTION
The failure of CAFA to solve the gatekeeper problem will be felt
most directly when putative class counsel file settlement-only actions
in state court for the apparent purpose of arriving at a cheap settle-
ment with defendants so as to preempt other actual or potential class
proceedings and be the first to secure a fee. Unable to force the state
lawsuit into federal court directly, absentees or competing counsel
who become aware of such proceedings might file a new action in
federal court (if a parallel federal action is not pending already) and
seek to enjoin the allegedly improper state lawsuit from moving for-
ward. Any such attempt would have to pass muster under the AIA,
which imposes broad limitations on antisuit injunctions. Nonetheless,
as I will argue, the targeted extension of jurisdiction contained in
CAFA provides an independent justification for bringing such protec-
tive antisuit orders outside the AIA's categorical prohibition.
That argument will be structured around one basic proposition-
that the line of inquiry under the AIA that has centered on the Act's
"expressly authorized" provision has been fundamentally misdirected.
In identifying the "expressly authorized" language as the source of the
governing standard for inquiries into the propriety of an antisuit in-
junction aimed at effectuating the congressional policies bound up in
a federal statutory scheme, the Supreme Court in Mitchum v. Foster
"2 3
23 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
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made a wrong turn that strained the statutory language and has led to
an ineffective and unsustainable jurisprudence under the Act. That
unsustainability has become particularly apparent in the current era
of nationwide complex litigation, as I discuss below. The line of in-
quiry that the language of the AIA properly invites is one that would
focus on the policies that Congress has expressed in its jurisdictional
statutes for making a federal forum available, asking when an injunc-
tion may be necessary "in aid of" that jurisdiction to effectuate the
policies bound up in the jurisdictional grant. This is particularly the
case in those situations where Congress has enacted a specialized pro-
vision that extends a targeted grant of jurisdiction for a particular
class of cases. CAFA is such a provision, and it offers an important op-
portunity to reexamine Mitchum v. Foster and reframe the AIA inquiry.
A. The Anti-Injunction Act in an Era of Nationwide Complex Litigation
The current state of the law governing the ability of federal courts
to enjoin parallel state court proceedings is an unattractive mess. The
reason for this mess is relatively straightforward. The permissible
scope of federal injunctions directed at state proceedings is codified
in the AIA, styled as a series of exceptions to a general prohibition
24against antisuit orders. The exception that would seem to be most
pertinent to parallel or competing lawsuits in state and federal court is
the clause authorizing federal courts to issue injunctions "in aid of
[their] jurisdiction." When the Supreme Court has analyzed the ef-
fect of that provision, however, it has generally behaved as though the
only jurisdictional policies that ever need to be considered are those
contained in general-purpose jurisdictional statutes like 28 U.S.C.
25§ 1331 and § 1332(a). Those statutes, in turn, operate against a
24 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
25 One of the most striking examples of this tendency to focus only on generic ju-
risdictional concerns may be found in Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v.
Richman Bros., the Court's first AIA decision following the 1948 Act, in which it said the
following in rejecting a request for an antisuit injunction to give effect to a grant of
exclusive federal jurisdiction under the Taft-Hartley Act:
The assumption upon which the argument [that a grant of exclusive federal
jurisdiction might warrant broad intervention tinder the AIA] proceeds is that
federal rights will not be adequately protected in the state courts, and the
"gap" complained of is impatience with the appellate process if states go
wrong. But during more than half of our history Congress, in establishing the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, in the main relied on the adequacy of
the state judicial systems to enforce federal rights, subject to review by this
Court.
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broad principle of concurrent jurisdiction according to which state
courts are presumed to be adequate and appropriate tribunals for theS 26
adjudication of federal claims. As a consequence, when parallel fed-
eral and state litigation occurs, courts and commentators seeking to
define the contours of a federal court's power to issue an antisuit in-
junction often appear to face a stark choice. One option is to con-
clude that federal courts possess the authority to enjoin parallel state
court proceedings whenever such proceedings threaten to disrupt or
preempt an ongoing federal action, despite the background principle
of concurrentjurisdiction. Although several distinguished commenta-
tors have embraced this broad approach to the AIA, 7 the position
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 518 (1955).
As the Court saw it, Amalgamated Clothing involved the "rather subtle line of demarca-
tion between exclusive federal and allowable state jurisdiction over labor problems," id.
at 519, and not a clear usurpation of federal exclusive jurisdiction by a state tribunal.
The case was also made more complicated by the fact that the primary authority to en-
force the provisions of the Act lay with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
not private plaintiffs, and that the NLRB did possess jurisdiction to enjoin state pro-
ceedings. Thus, when the Court was specifically asked to analyze the AIA's "in aid
ofjurisdiction" language in the case, it briskly dismissed the argument, explaining:
Under no circumstances has the District Court jurisdiction to enforce rights
and duties which call for recognition by the [NLRB]. Such nonexistentjuris-
diction therefore cannot be aided.... Since the very presupposition of this
proceeding is that jurisdiction of the subject matter of which the employer
complained was in the Board and not in the state court, any aid that is needed
to protect jurisdiction is the aid which the Board may need .... Such aid only
the Board could seek ....
Id. at 519-20; see also Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977) (plural-
ity opinion) (explaining, in a case involving an exclusively federal antitrust claim, that
the Court "ha[s] never viewed parallel in personam actions as interfering with the juris-
diction of either court").
26 As the Court has put it, "The Act, which has existed in some form since 1793, is
a necessary concomitant of the Framers' decision to authorize, and Congress' decision
to implement, a dual system of federal and state courts." Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon
Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988) (citation omitted) (interpreting the AIA's "protect or
effectuate"' language narrowly in deference to the concurrent jurisdiction principle);
see also Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970)
("In short, the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this case, and
neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in
both courts."); id. at 296 ("[L]ower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in
direct review of state court decisions.").
To clarify, when I use the term "federal claims" in the text above, I mean any claim
that could potentially be filed as an original matter in federal court, not merely claims
that arise under federal law.
27 Most notable among these commentators is Professor Redish, who has argued
for a system of "zero tolerance." See Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Fed-
eral Court Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75
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faces resistance from the long-standing interpretation of the Act as
embodying a strong preference for avoiding federal interference with
state court proceedings, even at the cost of duplicative suits and
wasted effort.28 In the alternative, one can conclude that the exis-
tence of parallel federal and state actions, without more, never pro-
vides support for the issuance of a preemptive federal injunction-a
narrow interpretation of the Act that gives powerful voice to the pre-
cept of concurrent jurisdiction but, in so doing, appears to leave fed-
eral courts largely powerless to prevent state court subversion of their
efforts in compelling cases .
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1347, 1349 (2000). Professor Redish's model "would require that
in every instance the assertion of federal jurisdiction automatically precludes the con-
tinued conduct of the parallel state litigation, while the refusal of a federal court to
enjoin such state litigation would automatically lead to the federal court's abstention."
Id.; see also Diane P. Wood, Fine-TuningJudicial Federalism: A Proposal for Reform of the
Anti-Injunction Act, 1990 BYU L. REV. 289, 319-20 (calling for reform of the AIA in or-
der to permit federal courts to enjoin state proceedings whenever necessary to prevent
irreparable harm to party interests, so long as they take state prerogatives into ac-
count).
28 See, e.g., Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 297 ("Any doubts as to the propriety of a fed-
eral injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permit-
ting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the contro-
versy."); Amalgamated Clothing, 348 U.S. at 514 (opining that it is "clear beyond cavil
that the prohibition [of the AlA] is not to be whittled away byjudicial improvisation");
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922) ("[An in personam action brought
in state court] does not tend to impair or defeat thejurisdiction of the court in which a
prior action for the same cause is pending. Each court is free to proceed in its own
way and in its own time, without reference to the proceedings in the other court.").
I will be calling into question the broad application that many courts and com-
mentators have given to this rhetoric. Professor Redish has done the same, and quite
sharply so, rejecting as incorrect and ill-considered the Court's interpretation of the
AIA as broadly tolerating the inefficiency of parallel state-federal litigation. Observing
that such inefficiency is inconsistent with other levers of litigation policy that aim to
prevent relitigation and wasted effort, Professor Redish writes:
This counterintuitive and often inefficient result flows not from a carefully
considered legislative orjjudicial choice following a thorough examination of
all relevant competing social, political, and constitutional considerations. It
flows, rather, from a wholly coincidental and unintended combination of
common law and statutory jurisdictional doctrines, each of which focuses my-
opically upon differentjurisdictional galaxies far, far away from each other.
Redish, supra note 27, at 1348. 1 am broadly sympathetic with these observations.
Nonetheless, I find the consistent core of interpretive practice surrounding the AIA-
to which Congress appears to have acquiesced in its 1948 revision, even if somewhat
carelessly so-more difficult to dismiss in those cases where federal jurisdiction is
based on a general-purpose statute.
29 Timothy Kerr gives a good summary of the problem in a recent article. See
Timothy Kerr, Cleaning Up One Mess To Create Another: Duplicative Class Actions, Federal
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The language and reasoning of the Supreme Court's AIA deci-
sions have tended to favor the narrower interpretation. This was par-
ticularly the case in the early years following the 1948 amendments
that produced the modem version of the Act. 3° Most notably-and, as
I will argue, erroneously-the Court has given little weight to the deci-
sion by Congress to reserve certain claims to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal courts, adopting a narrow interpretation of the AIA's
"in aid ofjurisdiction" language even in cases where the congression-
ally expressed federal interest in avoiding state interference seems
most acute. In essence, the Court has moved toward imposing unilat-
eral disarmament upon federal courts since those early years in almost
all cases involving ongoing federal and state parallel proceedings.
That trend, if followed faithfully, would require striking a balance
in AIA jurisprudence that many lower federal courts have found in-
adequate in the modern era of nationwide complex litigation, where
extensive parallel proceedings are becoming increasingly common.
As courts and commentators have exhaustively demonstrated, almost
any high-stakes class action can produce incentives on the part of
competing class counsel to file multiple lawsuits in an attempt to be
the first to arrive at a remunerative settlement or to circumvent the
scrutiny of a skeptical forum. In such cases, unilateral jurisdictional
disarmament by the federal courts is not sustainable. Indeed, the
early Supreme Court decisions that have been interpreted to require
Courts'Injunctive Power, and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 218,
224-28 (2006).
30 The 1948 revisions to the AIA operated to overrule the decision of the Supreme
Court in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941). Prior to Toucey, the
Court had crafted various exceptions to the apparently unyielding prohibition of the
AIA, including an exception permitting federal courts to enjoin state court proceed-
ings that sought to relitigate issues already decided in a federal judgment. The Court
overruled its precedents and disapproved this practice in Toucey. The 1948 revisions
explicitly reinstated the relitigation exception and added the "in aid of jurisdiction"
language. For the standard account of this doctrinal history, see Martin H. Redish, The
Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 717 (1977).
A "Reviser's Note" accompanying the amendment, which explains that the revi-
sions "restore[] the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the
Toucey decision," 28 U.S.C. § 2283 Reviser's Note (1948), is often read as suggesting a
narrow ambit for the new amendments, reinstating the specific exceptions that had
been recognized at the time, but authorizing no further interpretive growth. This nar-
row reading clearly is not the best one. The Note indicates that the amendments re-
store the basic law "as generally understood and interpreted" prior to Toucey. Id. It is
restoring the interpretive practice that preceded that decision, under which the Court
crafted sensible exceptions to the Act's broad prohibition, not merely the particular
repertoire of exceptions that Toucey had disapproved.
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such disarmament are particularly ill-suited to provide guidance in
modern complex cases. Those decisions offer little more by way of
explanation for their approach to the AIA than vague invocations of
federalism values-maxims that are particularly poorly suited to de-
scribing the interest of any single state in the emerging dispensation
31of nationwide class actions with national economic implications.
These perceived inadequacies have led many lower federal courts
to draw upon the limited vocabulary that the Supreme Court has
made available in order to push against the limits of the doctrine.
The result has been an unsatisfying reliance upon the inapt analogies
and anachronisms that characterize AIA doctrine in high-stakes repre-
sentative litigation today.
Under the current state of the doctrine, two related avenues are
available to lower federal courts to interdict state court proceedings
that threaten to preempt ongoing federal litigation. The primary
avenue derives from the distinction that the Court has drawn between
in rem and in personam actions. The Court articulated the distinc-
tion in Kline v. Burke Construction Co., finding that state proceedings
that threaten to deprive a federal court of formal or physical custody
over a legal res constitute an exception to the broad prohibition of
the AIA, but that the threat of preempting an in personam action,
without more, never does. 2 Following the 1948 amendments to the
statute, which added the "in aid ofjurisdiction" exception, the Court
has apparently preserved this formal distinction, both authorizing in-
junctions in support of in rem actions and discouraging injunctions
where the claims before the court are in personam. 3 In complex class
action proceedings, almost all of which involve claims that are in per-
sonam in nature, this rigidity threatens to leave federal courts wholly
disarmed when state judges demonstrate a willingness to disrupt fed-
eral efforts to coordinate proceedings from multiple jurisdictions so as
to achieve an appropriate and comprehensive resolution. Using the
tools available to them, some lower federal courts have responded to
these threats by analogizing their efforts at coordinating complex
cases to the creation of a judicial res. In an early and influential ex-
31 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,
53 UCLA L. REv. 1353, 1416 (2006) (analyzing features of modern class action practice
that have national economic implications despite being based on state law).
32 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922).
33 See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 64142 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (appearing to reaffirm Kline's sharp distinction between in rem and in per-
sonam actions in the administration of the "in aid ofjurisdiction" exception).
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ample of this maneuver, the Second Circuit authorized a district court
to issue an antisuit injunction in In re Baldwin-United Corp., where the
court "had before it a class action proceeding so far advanced that it
was the virtual equivalent of a res over which the district judge re-
quired full control."0
4
In a second and related caveat, the Supreme Court has allowed for
the possibility that "some federal injunctive relief may be necessary to
prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court's consid-
eration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal
court's flexibility and authority to decide that case.' 5 The Court has
never issued a ruling in which it has given affirmative meaning to this
dictum, and the import of the pronouncement is not self-evident.
(Why, for example, is federal jurisdiction compromised by a state
judgment that threatens a federal court's "flexibility" in resolving one
component of a complex proceeding late in the game, but not by a
state judgment that threatens to preempt the entire federal proceed-
ing from the very start?) Nonetheless, lower courts have seized upon
this language to bolster the in rem analogy and have issued antisuit
injunctions when a federal court's efforts to resolve a multijurisdic-
tional proceeding have reached an advanced phase, often detailing
the obstacles that state court orders would pose to the coordination of
the many different factions and interest groups in complex settlement
proceedings as evidence of a threat to the court's "flexibility.''6
These instances of judicial innovation are not inherently objec-
tionable. Lower federal courts have been given the task of administer-
ing resource-intensive, complex proceedings with little statutory or
Supreme Court guidance, and they have often come up with sensible
ways around the waste and manipulation that unilateral federal disar-
34 In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 1985); see also id. at 337
(explaining that "the need to enjoin conflicting state proceedings [when a complex
federal proceeding is on the verge of settlement] arises because the jurisdiction of a
mulidistrict court is analogous to that of a court in an in rem action or in a school de-
segregation case, where it is intolerable to have conflicting orders from different
courts" (internal quotation marks omitted)). In re Baldwin involved an interpretation
of the All Writs Act's authorization for the issuance of writs by federal courts "in aid of
their respective jurisdictions," 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (2000), rather than the related lan-
guage in the AIA. As noted above, the two passages have been interpreted in tandem,
and In re Baldwin is regularly cited as authority in AIA cases.
35 Ad. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970).
The Third Circuit, in particular, has produced a highly developed set of doc-
trines in this regard. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 282 F.3d 220, 234-39
(3d Cir. 2002) (setting forth detailed factors for consideration in the issuance of an
AIA injunction).
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mament would otherwise entail. 7 If not objectionable, however, these
solutions are deeply analytically unsatisfying. The analogy to in rem
proceedings is palpably a product of an earlier era. The occasions
when it actually applies in the mode originally intended are few, 8 and
it is far from clear why such cases should be the particular beneficiar-
ies of solicitude under the AIA in any event.39 Likewise, any effort to
develop and apply a standard under the "in aid ofjurisdiction" excep-
tion requires an account of the values that the exception aims to pre-
serve and the circumstances that implicate those values. The Court's
references to flexibility and authority in Atlantic Coast Line hardly sat-
isfy that need. In general, this important area of federal-state relations
has unfolded without the benefit of the careful jurisdictional equili-
bration (to borrow Professor Burbank's term40 ) that is necessary in
balancing the intersecting forces of jurisdiction, choice of law, and
41preclusion in complex multijurisdictional litigation.
37 See generally Andrew S. Weinstein, Note, Avoiding the Race to ResJudicata: Federal
Antisuil Injunctions of Competing State Class Actions, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1085 (2000) (de-
scribing methods employed by lower federal courts to avoid waste and strategic behav-
ior and advocating more aggressive injunctive intervention).
38 The rare exceptions prove the rule. See, e.g.,James v. Bellotti, 733 F.2d 989, 993
(Ist Cir. 1984) (recognizing the authority of federal district courts to enjoin any form
of state proceeding, "whether purporting to exercise concurrentjurisdiction in rem or
in personam," that would interfere with district court's disposition of Indian land claim
cases (citations omitted)).
39 Ascribing great doctrinal or constitutional significance to the in rem quality of a
proceeding is inconsistent with the established modern trend toward analyzing the
impact of judicial actions upon individual or state interests, regardless of the form of
the proceeding in which those actions are taken. The Court embraced this proposi-
tion in a little-noticed passage in the Mullane case and later made it the centerpiece of
its analysis in the watershed case, Shaffer v. Heitner. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950) (holding that the formal in rem quality of
trust accounting does not control personal jurisdiction analysis); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (stating that all exercises of personal jurisdiction, including
in in rem actions, must satisfy the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe and
its progeny). See also Redish, supra note 27, at 1359 (criticizing the Court's distinction
between in rem and in personam cases in AIA doctrine as "little more than a meta-
physical relic of a very different epistemological age" that "no longer plays a significant
role, even in its originating context of personal jurisdiction").
40 See Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and
Progress in National Law, 49 AM.J. COMP. L. 203 (2001).
41 Professor Redish is certainly correct when he describes this area of federal juris-
diction law as suffering from "a kind of doctrinal myopia." Redish, supra note 27, at
1347; see also id. ("The product of such [poorly coordinated, case-by-case] doctrinal
development, not surprisingly, is often a doctrinal synthesis that either defies common
sense, ignores or undermines sound policies of federalism or litigation practice, or
both.").
2008] 2053
2054 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWPREVIEW [Vol. 156:2035
B. Targeted Jurisdiction and the Anti-Injunction Act
A doctrinal readjustment is clearly needed, and CAFA provides an
apt occasion for undertaking that readjustment. There is a partial so-
lution that would be uncontroversial in most other areas of law and
should be uncontroversial here, once the shackles of inertia are cast
off. It is simply this: statutory grants of federal court jurisdiction em-
body congressional policies, just as statutes containing liability rules or
regulations of primary conduct do. This fact, which is surely unexcep-
tionable as an abstract proposition, finds little expression in the pre-
sent landscape of AIA doctrine. That is where a change is needed. It
is necessary to begin inquiring much more actively into the congres-
sional policies bound up in statutes authorizing federal jurisdiction and
to administer the exception to the AIA for antisuit injunctions "in aid of
[a federal court's] jurisdiction" with explicit reference to those congres-
sional policies. It is necessary, in other words, to recognize a principle
of targeted jurisdiction in the administration of AIA injunctions.
Looking to jurisdictional provisions as embodiments of particular-
ized congressional policies is a familiar and established practice in the
American legal tradition. Indeed, many of the Supreme Court's most
important early constitutional rulings arose from disputes over federal
subject matter jurisdiction and included several in which the Court in-
terpreted Article III itself to pronounce upon weighty and disputa-
42
tious issues. z The earliest jurisdictional statutes played a similar role.
42 Two examples stand out most strikingly. In Chisholn v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793), the majority found in the state diversity prong of Article III an intention to
abrogate any immunity from suit that states might have retained following nationhood
in their roles as quasi-sovereigns-an alteration in status that several members of the
Court identified as part of a larger repudiation of the concept of royal sovereign pre-
rogatives that was inconsistent with a democratic system of government. See id. at 469-
73 (holding that state sovereignty does not require sovereign immunity). Sixty-four
years later, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), the majority under-
took a perversely similar interpretive exercise, this time finding antidemocratic princi-
ples of white supremacy to be inherent in Article III's citizen diversity prong and hence
to exclude black people entirely from invoking that element of federal court jurisdic-
tion. See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 314 (1816) (interpret-
ing the definition of "judicial power" in Article III of the Constitution to define the
powers and purpose of the federal judiciary in our coordinate system of government in
a dispute over section 25 of the Judiciary Act); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 (6 Wheat.) U.S.
264, 378-80 (1821) (reaffirming the power and purposes of Supreme Court appellate
review even in light of the Eleventh Amendment); Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 760 (1824) (giving broad interpretation to the Article
III extension of judicial power to cases "arising under" federal law and thereby rein-
forcing the power of Congress to establish a national bank); cf Marbury v. Madison, 5
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Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the predecessor to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257) authorized appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States
from state court judgments only where a federal claim of right had
been denied below, and not when such a claim had been upheld, sug-
gesting that the policy underlying the jurisdictional grant was to pre-
vent the subversion of federal interests rather than to exercise a gen-
eral supervisory power over state court pronouncements on federal
law of the type that the Court now employs to ensure correctness and
43uniformity of interpretation. That same foundational statute con-
tained what we now call the Alien Tort Claims Act,44 a jurisdictional
provision that the Supreme Court has found to embody a congres-
sional intent that federal courts should take cognizance of certain un-
enumerated causes of action under international law.4  During the
height of the Swift v. Tyson era, of course, access to the federal courts
translated directly to predictable impacts on the rule of decision that
would govern a dispute, and congressional debates over the possible
elimination of diversity jurisdiction were infused with an awareness of
the regulatory consequences of federal jurisdiction, as Edward Purcell
details in his important study of the origins of Erie.46 Professor
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (using a dispute over the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to articulate the principle ofjudicial review).
43 Section 25 read, in pertinent part:
And be it further enacted, That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the
highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could
be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an
authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their
validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an author-
ity exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the
constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour
of such their validity, or where is drawn in question the construction of any
clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held un-
der the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or
exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under such clause of the
said Constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-examined and re-
versed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of
error ....
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (footnote omitted).
44 Id. § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
45 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004) (holding that Congress
intended to empower courts to articulate and enforce "a relatively modest set of ac-
tions alleging violations of the law of nations").
46 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION:
ERE, THEJUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 77-91 (2000) (discussing congressional debates in the 1920s and
1930s over the elimination of diversity jurisdiction as a progressive reform); see also id.
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Wechsler stated the point succinctly over fifty years ago: "A grant of
jurisdiction is, in short, one mode by which the Congress may assert its
regulatory powers. 47
All of this is unexceptional. Professor Wechsler's important ana-
lytical heuristic, like all statements that become canonical, now sounds
entirely prosaic. And yet, this essential mode by which Congress as-
serts its regulatory powers has not yet found coherent expression in
the administration of the ALA.
In the case of generic jurisdictional statutes like 28 U.S.C. § 1331
and § 1332(a), the Supreme Court has held that the general policies
embodied in such provisions-providing a competent and hospitable
forum for federal claims (in the case of federal question jurisdiction),
and protecting out-of-staters from the danger of parochialism or in-
adequate tribunals that they had no voice in creating (in the case of
diversity)-are insufficient to warrant broad antisuit injunctions that
would displace the background principle of concurrent jurisdiction in
the state courts. It is at least arguably true that Congress's apparent
acquiescence in these propositions in its 1948 amendment of the AIA
warrants a conservative approach to the Act in this limited respect
(that is, where jurisdiction rests entirely upon one of the generic pro-
visions), since, as the plurality complained in Vendo, there would oth-
erwise be a danger that the generic federal jurisdictional provisions
could render the highly specific limitations of the AIA a "dead let-
ter., 4 Hence my acknowledgement at the start of this Section that the
alteration I propose to AIA doctrine only represents a partial revision:
it would not alter the administration of injunctions where only a ge-
neric provision supports federal jurisdiction.
In the case of more targeted and specialized jurisdictional grants,
however, the complaint of the plurality in Vendo loses its force. It is
both appropriate and desirable for federal courts to ask how the spe-
cific policies that Congress has sought to promote when it shapes fed-
eral jurisdiction in particular classes of claims might be undermined
by parallel state court proceedings, warranting the issuance of an anti-
suit injunction in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction. As Professor
Wechsler observed, Congress often creates targeted exercises of federal
jurisdiction when it apprehends that "state remedies may be too uncer-
at 19-26 (describing congressional attitudes toward expanding the federal courts and
altering their structure in response to the increased caseloads of Prohibition).
47 Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 225 (1948).
48 Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 638-39 (1977).
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tain, slow, or ineffective ... in particular situations"49-apprehensions,
Wechsler suggested, that could be equally well answered by the authori-
zation of original federal jurisdiction or by what he termed the "analo-
gous" use of antisuit injunctions to protect thatjurisdiction.0
In modern practice, one of the clearest examples of targeted ju-
risdiction is the decision by Congress to vest adjudicatory jurisdiction
over a claim exclusively in the federal courts. A grant of exclusive ju-
risdiction expresses the explicit intention of Congress that a particular
claim not be adjudicated in the state courts, and it strongly implies a
policy of preventing state court proceedings from interfering with the
exercise ofjurisdiction by the federal forum that Congress has deter-
mined to be vital to the effectuation of federal interests.5 In the pre-
clusion context, of course, the Supreme Court has held that even this
strong policy interest is not sufficient to overcome the express com-
mand of the Full Faith and Credit Act, which requires federal courts
to give effect to the valid final judgments of state courts, even when
those judgments include a settled release of exclusively federal
52claims. When a state proceeding is still ongoing and preclusion has
not attached, however, the ALA's "in aid ofjurisdiction" proviso ex-
pressly invites federal courts to take these jurisdictional policies into
account when determining whether interdiction of the state proceed-
ings is appropriate.
A few federal courts have accepted that invitation and interpreted
a grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction in a comprehensive statutory
scheme as conferring broad authorization to issue an antisuit injunc-
tion in aid of jurisdiction, often simply ignoring the Supreme Court's
discouraging dicta on the issue in cases like Vendo and Amalgamated
Clothing.53 Other courts, though unwilling to break ranks so dramati-
49 Wechsler, supra note 47, at 229.
50 Id. at 229 & n.65. Professor Wechsler made this observation with specific refer-
ence to the relitigation problem that was most actively under discussion at the time in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Toucey. Id.
51 In a narrow and odd line of cases, the Supreme Court has given strong voice to
this proposition by identifying statutes in which Congress's expressed desire to pre-
empt state law is so "complete" that it warrants an exception to the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule and authorizes removal on the basis of a preemption defense. See Beneficial
Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6-8 (2003) (describing the development of the
complete preemption doctrine).
52 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516
U.S. 367, 374 (1996) ("Further, § 1738 is not irrelevant simply because the judgment in
question might work to bar the litigation of exclusively federal claims.").
53 See, e.g., Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 54 F.3d 535, 540 (9th Cir.
1994, amended 1995) (noting that where federal law provides for exclusive jurisdiction
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cally, have moderated the impact of Vendo and Amalgamated Clothing by
finding that federal courts retain authority to issue antisuit injunctions
in order to prevent the frustration of federal jurisdiction in particular
cases, even if the grant of exclusive jurisdiction cannot be read to au-
thorize such injunctions on a categorical basis. 54 These holdings con-
stitute significant movement in the right direction.
Indeed, in the particular context of exclusive federal jurisdiction,
a complementary set of observations may be made about the proper
shape of Younger abstention, the judge-made doctrine that sometimes
calls for a stay of federal proceedings to avoid interference with an
ongoing state court action.5 While the Supreme Court has not yet
had occasion to rule on the issue, several appeals courts have held that
over claims, "state court proceedings [on those claims are] in derogation of federal
jurisdiction" and a federal antisuit injunction is "necessary to preserve federal jurisdic-
tion"); see also, e.g., AT&T Mgmt. Pension Plan v. Tucker, 902 F. Supp. 1168, 1173
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (interpreting a grant of exclusive jurisdiction over ERISA claims, and
statutory authorization for injunctive relief against "any act or practice" that violates
ERISA provisions, as together satisfying AlA exceptions relating to jurisdiction and ex-
press authorization); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1151-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(arriving at similar conclusion as to ERISA and antisuit orders, but resting solely on
AIA exception for "expressly authorized" injunctions).
The plurality's skepticism in Vendo over the relevance of a grant of exclusive juris-
diction to the issuance of an AIA injunction, in particular, is entitled to limited prece-
dential weight. That opinion conspicuously represented the views of only three mem-
bers of the Court. Six members of the Court found that the statute at issue in that case
(the Clayton Act) contained an express exception to the AlA's prohibition and did not
reach the exclusive jurisdiction question. See Vendo, 433 U.S. at 643-44 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the Clayton Act contains an express ex-
ception to the AIA but holding that an injunction was inappropriate in the case at bar,
hence joining the plurality's disposition, albeit "for reasons that differ significandy"); id.
at 660 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that agreement of six Justices on express ex-
ception under the Clayton Act "establishes that proposition as the law for the future").
M See, e.g., 1975 Salaried Ret. Plan for Eligible Employees of Crucible, Inc. v. No-
bers, 968 F.2d 401, 407-08 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that exclusive federal jurisdiction is
relevant to the availability of an AIA injunction, but that the Supreme Court's discour-
aging statements limit federal district courts to determining whether an antisuit in-
junction is necessary to prevent frustration of the court's jurisdiction in "the very case
before it").
;5 As Professor Redish has trenchantly pointed out, the Supreme Court has not
developed its AIA and abstention doctrines in harmony, nor even fostered an active
dialogtie between the two, despite their obvious connection:
At no point has the Court ever considered the problem of duplicative litiga-
tion from a holistic perspective. Instead, it has developed its Anti-Injunction
Act interpretation ... without regard to its abstention analysis, and it has de-
veloped its abstention analysis without any meaningful discussion of the rele-
vance of its Anti-Injunction Act construction.
Redish, supra note 27, at 1360.
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Younger 6 abstention is inappropriate where the federal court has been
granted exclusive jurisdiction over the claim it is adjudicating."'
These courts have generally framed their rulings on the issue in prac-
tical terms: Younger abstention aims to permit a state court to resolve
claims that are concurrently raised in federal and state proceedings,
and that aim generally will not be served by abstention where federal
jurisdiction over the claim is exclusive. But it is a simple matter of se-
mantic focus to reframe that pragmatic conclusion as a description of
the regulatory policies bound up in the grant of exclusive federal ju-
risdiction, as indeed some courts have done. 8
More broadly, this focus on jurisdictional policies invites a reex-
amination of the specialized jurisdictional provisions that Congress
has included in many federal statutory schemes, particularly those that
predated Congress's elimination of the amount-in-controversy re-
quirement for the general federal question statute. 59 In one of his
more memorable but less well-chosen turns of phrase, Judge Posner
has dismissed these provisions as "so many beached whales" and pro-
claimed them to be redundant.6 ° At the time of their enactment,
however, such provisions often evidenced an intent on the part of
56 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
57 See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Entrepreneurs of Am. v. Angoff, 58 F.3d 1266, 1271 (8th
Cir. 1995) ("There is no need for abstention unless the state and federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction of an issue or case."); Sycuan Band, 54 F.3d at 541 (finding that
the grant of exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts obviated Younger abstention);
Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 967 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that abstention applies "only
where concurrent federal state jurisdiction exists"); see also Silberkleit v. Kantrowitz,
713 F.2d 433, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that, where no special abstention doc-
trine applies, abstention under Colorado River's "wise judicial administration" doctrine
is inappropriate in claims subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction); cf Arizona v. San
Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 559-60 (1983) (noting that a stay of a federal suit
would "clear[ly]" be "improper" under Colorado River where "there was no jurisdiction
in the concurrent state actions to adjudicate the claims at issue in the federal suits").
58 See, e.g., Sycuan Band, 54 F.3d at 540-41 (recognizing the availability of an anti-
suit injunction and the inapplicability of Younger abstention as complementary expres-
sions of congressional purpose in grants of exclusive federal jurisdiction). Sycuan Band
involved the rights of an Indian tribe, and subsequent courts have interpreted its hold-
ing and that of similar cases as giving voice to the distinctive congressional purpose of
protecting Indian rights that is embodied in the grant of exclusive jurisdiction over
such claims. See, e.g., Bowen v. Doyle, 880 F. Supp. 99, 130-31 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (em-
phasizing the importance of "the well-established rules protecting Indian tribes' inter-
ests in their sovereignty and property, and the primacy of federal authority in Indian
affairs" in considering AIA injunctions).
59 See Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 to eliminate the amount-in-controversy requirement).
60 Winstead v.J.C. Penney Co., 933 F.2d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 1991).
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Congress to ensure that an effective federal forum be available for the
full and comprehensive vindication of the statutory scheme of which
they were a part.6 ' That was surely true, for example, in the case of
the civil rights jurisdictional provision (one of the statutes thatJudge
Posner breezily dismissed), which was enacted at a time when there
was no general federal question jurisdictional statute at all.
It is particularly appropriate to recall the Court's treatment of the
civil rights statutes at this juncture, for the inquiry I advocate into tar-
geted jurisdiction levies a broadside challenge to the approach
adopted by the Court in Mitchum v. Foster. The Mitchum Court held
that antisuit injunctions can sometimes issue in § 1983 civil rights ac-
tions, despite the broad prohibition of the AIA.63 In justifying that
outcome, the Court fixed upon the AIA's "expressly authorized" ex-
ception, finding that this language encouraged an examination of the
overall purposes of a statutory scheme in determining when an anti-
suit injunction is warranted.
64
Although the unanimous result in the case was clearly correct, the
Court's reasoning in Mitchum has always occupied an uneasy position
in AIA doctrine. The proposition upon which the Court rested its
holding-that an antisuit injunction is warranted if "an Act of Con-
gress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a fed-
eral court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay
of a state court proceeding"6;5-is attractive in the abstract, but it fits
uncomfortably into a statutory provision allowing injunctions only
where "expressly authorized by Act of Congress.,
66
The Mitchum Court would have done much better to refer to the
specialized grant of jurisdiction that accompanies the civil rights stat-
ute in describing the particular imperative for preserving a federal fo-
rum in a § 1983 action-to focus, in other words, upon the jurisdic-
61 See, e.g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105-07 (1977) (interpreting the statute
eliminating the amount-in-controversy requirement in federal question actions
brought against federal agencies as defining jurisdicional policy in the agency context,
to the exclusion of arguments about implied purposes contained in the APA itself).
62 Winstead, 933 F.2d at 580.
63 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (defining the inquiry and finding the
"expressly authorized" exception satisfied in the case of § 1983 actions).
64 Id. at 237-38.
65 Id. at 238.
66 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 27, at 1357-58 (describing the Court's treatment of
the "expressly authorized" exception in Mitchum as "unjustifiably broad" and suggest-
ing that much of the work that the Court has assigned to that provision would fit better
into an analysis ofjurisdictional policy).
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tional policies that Congress enacted when it created the civil rights
cause of action, policies that sometimes require the aid of the federal
courts for their effectuation.6' Professor Mishkin performed a similar
type of analysis in the noted article that he wrote in response to the
1948 revision of the jurisdictional code, wherein he scrutinized the
special removal provisions that were preserved and expanded in the
681
revisions for suits brought against federal officers. Professor
Wechsler did likewise, commenting on a draft of the same provision be-
67 The Court readily recognized the interplay between the two provisions when it
construed the jurisdictional statute, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1343, to reach actions
brought against state officials in Puerto Rico:
The federal civil rights legislation, with which we are here concerned, was
enacted nearly 30 years before the conflict with Spain and the resulting estab-
lishment of the ties between Puerto Rico and the United States. Both
§ 1343(3) and § 1983 have their origin in the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20,
1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. That statute contained not only the substantive provi-
sion protecting against "the deprivation of an , rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution" by any person acting under color of state law,
but, as well, the jurisdictional provision authorizing a proceeding for the en-
forcement of those rights "to be prosectted in the several district or circuit
courts of the United States." Jurisdiction was not independently defined; it
was given simply to enforce the substantive rights created by the statute. The
two aspects, seemingly, were deemed to coincide.
Exam'g Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 581-82
(1976) (footnote omitted).
In that instance, the grant of jurisdiction aimed to prevent overenforcement of
legal norms against government officials, rather than underenforcement. More spe-
cifically, as Professor Mishkin observed, the apparent purpose of Congress in expand-
ing removal jurisdiction for that highly prioritized class of cases was to provide a tribu-
nal that would produce reliable and unbiased resolutions of contested factual disputes:
The importance of trying factual issues in the federal courts tends to be
highlighted by the continuance of specific jurisdictional grants to the district
courts in situations where reliance on the Supreme Court would mean at most
a negligible increase in the latter's business. Consider, for example, the provi-
sions for removal to a federal trial forum of civil actions or criminal prosecu-
tions brought in a state court against a federal officer for acts done under
color of office. The possibility of misconstruing the national law involved in
these cases would not, at least in present times, seem to require their trial in a
federal tribunal; Supreme Court policing of that law would apparently be suf-
ficient and feasible on the few occasions on which such cases arise nowadays.
Yet in the 1948 revision of Title 28, United States Code, this head of trial ju-
risdiction was not only retained but extended. That action certainly implies
the existence of some consideration in addition to a desire for the uniform
construction of national law.
PaulJ. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" In the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 172
(1953) (footnotes omitted).
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fore its enactment.69 Thus, my argument here may be understood as a
call to relocate and revitalize the Mitchum inquiry, which has been re-
ceived with disfavor, turning to the "in aid ofjurisdiction" provision to
refocus our attention on targeted grants ofjurisdiction and the particu-
lar role of the federal forum as a replacement for the more nebulous
and roofless inquiry into the overall purposes of a statutory scheme.
This change in approach will also allow us to recover the distinct
function that the "expressly authorized" exception to the AIA should
serve in the administration of the Act-a function that was occluded
when the Mitchum Court pressed that language into service to do work
that should have been defined in terms of jurisdictional policy. The
AIA imposes a broad prohibition on the issuance of most antisuit in-
junctions against state proceedings. But even when the AIA's broad
prohibition is inapplicable and one of the exceptions obtains, the cir-
cumstances under which an antisuit injunction should issue are lim-
ited.70 Such injunctions, like any form of equitable relief, require the
petitioner to show that he would have no adequate remedy at law
from a threatened harm in the absence of an injunction, that the pub-
lic interest would be well served by such intervention, and that the pe-
titioner has not engaged in untoward behavior that would render the
court's intervention unjust."1 Where courts are empowered to award
injunctive relief, they have jealously guarded their prerogative to ad-
minister such relief with flexibility and discretion, 2 and have fre-
quently exercised their authority cautiously, lest an injunction prove
difficult to administer or enforce.73
The AIA's "expressly authorized" exception invites a more cate-
gorical approach to identifying the circumstances under which a court
should issue an antisuit injunction once the bare availability of such
an order has been established. It suggests, for example, that express
69 Wechsler, supra note 47, at 220-21.
70 Recall Justice Blackmun's separate opinion in Vendo, for example. SeeVendo Co.
v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 643 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (finding
that an antisuit injunction, though not categorically prohibited, was inappropriate in
the case at bar).
71 See DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 51-55 (1990)
(discussing the nature of and requirements for an injunction).
72 See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (adopting a narrow in-
terpretation of a federal statute so as to avoid a construction that would have imposed
constraints upon the equitable discretion of the federal court).
73 See generally SCHOENBROD ETAL., supra note 71 at 97-100 (discussing the issue of
enforceability and exploring concerns that often lead judges to craft injunctions nar-
rowly and with caution).
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statutory authorization for an injunction may sometimes embody a
legislative determination that certain forms of injunctive relief are
presumptively in the public interest, or that a court should tip the
scale of equity in favor of broad injunctive intervention in order to en-
sure that the overall purposes of a statutory scheme are fully realized.
The "in aid ofjurisdiction" exception, in contrast, invites more case-
specific questions about the propriety of injunctive relief, with a par-
ticular focus on the distinctive role of the federal forum whose juris-
diction has been invoked.
The federal interpleader provisions provide an apt illustration of
these principles. The purpose of an interpleader action is to permit
an insurer or other stakeholder to join multiple claimants with poten-
tially conflicting claims into a single coercive action in order to obtain
a consistent and comprehensive resolution of those claims that will
protect the stakeholder from duplicative liability. To invoke the pro-
cedure, the stakeholder deposits the contested stake with the court
(money representing the full extent of coverage in an insurance pol-
icy, for example, or a unique piece of property), and the claimants
then assert their claims in a single proceeding so that the claims can
be resolved simultaneously. In service of these purposes, Congress has
enacted two statutory provisions. 4 First, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 defines the
parameters of an action "of interpleader or in the nature of inter-
pleader" and sets forth the basic procedures for invoking it. It also
loosens the requirements for diversity jurisdiction in such an action,
authorizing federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over interpleader
claims whenever minimal diversity exists between at least two of the
potential claimants.7 v  Section 2361 then empowers district courts to
enjoin potential claimants from "instituting or prosecuting" any com-
peting action for the contested stake in state or federal court and pro-
vides guidance as to the types of orders that the court should consider
issuing. This antisuit provision is one of "those very few statutes" that
the Supreme Court has recognized as an explicit exception to the
74 Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provides forjoinder of an
interpleader action, but the provision is largely superfluous in light of the statutory
provisions-except, perhaps, in the unusual case where the claimants in an inter-
pleader action would exhibit complete diversity with the stakeholder but no diversity
among themselves. See generally SILBERMAN, STEIN & WOLFF, supra note 4, at 978-79
(discussing Rule 22 in light of statutory interpleader provisions).
75 See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (2000).
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AIA. The current provision, an expanded version of an earlier stat-
ute, was added in the wake of the 1948 amendment to the Act.7
Even under a conservative approach, it seems clear that the AIA
would not have foreclosed antisuit injunctions altogether in federal
interpleader practice, even without the "expressly authorized" excep-
tion of § 2361. In the first instance, an interpleader proceeding is an
action in rem and should ordinarily merit a straightforward applica-
tion of the formalistic in rem exception described earlier in this sec-
tion. Moreover, § 1335 itself should be understood as providing an
independently sufficient basis for issuing antisuit injunctions in aid of
a district court's interpleader jurisdiction. The statute creates a tar-
geted expansion of the court's original jurisdiction in service of a spe-
cifically enumerated goal. That goal requires that district courts have
the authority to issue antisuit injunctions against competing state ac-
tions, since the purpose of Congress in extending specialized inter-
pleader jurisdiction would often be frustrated if the federal suit could
not be exclusive and comprehensive. Section 1335 is thus a grant of
targeted jurisdiction that is distinct from the background landscape of
ordinary diversity, and any antisuit injunction that constitutes a neces-
sary and proper tool for the effectuation of that jurisdictional policy is
an injunction in aid of the district court's jurisdiction. Under either
approach, the AIA would seem to pose no categorical obstacle to an
antisuit injunction, so why did Congress feel the need to add § 2361?
76 Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 640 (1977); see also Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 234 n.14 (1972) (noting the ability of a district court to prevent
suits affecting an interpleading action).
77 Compare Law of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1335, 62 Stat. 931 (reflecting the
changes made by the amendment), with Law of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 117, 63 Stat.
105 (broadening the statute to include suits "in the nature of interpleader" and to in-
clude cases "prosecuted" under § 1335).
Interpleader already constituted a recognized and express exception under the
AIA at the time the Toucey decision was handed down. See Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,
314 U.S. 118, 134-35 (1941) (discussing the Interpleader Act of 1926 and the express
provision for injunctions); see also Interpleader Act of 1926, ch. 273, § 2, 44 Stat. 416
("Notwithstanding any provision of the Judicial Code to the contrary, [a federal dis-
trict] court shall have power to issue its process for all such claimants and to issue an
order of injunction against each of them, enjoining them from instituting or prosecut-
ing any suit or proceeding in any State court or in any other Federal court ... ").
That statute amended a previous version that was more vague in the authority it
granted district courts to issue antisuit injunctions. See Interpleader Act of 1917, 39
Stat. 929 (repealed 1926) (providing that a district court in an interpleader action
"shall have the power to make such orders and decrees as may be suitable and proper
and to issue the necessary writs usual and customary in such cases for the purpose of
carrying out such orders and decrees").
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One answer might be that Congress thought it necessary to act
with an abundance of caution when it amended the jurisdictional
code following the Toucey decision in order to ensure that antisuit in-
junctions would not be categorically prohibited. There is probably
some truth in that explanation. ;s But § 2361 also performs other
functions. After expressly authorizing antisuit injunctions against
competing state lawsuits, the statute goes on to provide that the dis-
trict court "shall hear and determine the case, and may discharge the
plaintiff from further liability, make the injunction permanent, and
make all appropriate orders to enforce its judgment.', 79  The first
phrase appears to supersede any abstention doctrines that might oth-
erwise be thought to apply. The next three phrases invite the district
court to employ its injunctive powers broadly for the complete effec-
tuation of the interpleader scheme-and thus have they been inter-
preted."o
Accordingly, the difference between the "expressly authorized"
inquiry and targeted jurisdictional analysis "in aid of jurisdiction" lies
not only in the types of congressional policies for which one might
search in a statutory scheme but also in the types of authorization and
guidance that one should expect to find there. In the former case,
the search for express authorization implies the possibility of a more
categorical mandate. In the latter, the search for jurisdictional poli-
cies invites a more case-by-case approach to the administration of anti-
suit orders.8 ' The fact that, in the event, antisuit injunction practice
78 In its first major decision on the AIA following the 1948 amendment, the Court
suggested that the express exception in the 1948 interpleader statute was recodified
and expanded in order to bring interpleader clearly within the new exception to the
AIA. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 514
(1955) ("In lieu of the bankruptcy exception of [the old version of the AIA], Congress
substituted a generalized phrase [in the 1948 amendment] covering all exceptions,
such as that of the [amended] Interpleader Act, to be found in federal statutes." (cita-
tion omitted)).
79 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2000).
80 See, e.g., Francis I. du Pont & Co. v. Sheen, 324 F.2d 3, 4-5 (3d Cir. 1963) (rely-
ing upon § 2361's invitation to "make the injunction permanent" in issuing a broad,
permanent antisuit injunction); id. at 5 (interpreting compliance with interpleader
procedures by the stakeholder as presumptive indication of responsible behavior as
warranting an antistit injunction to prevent harassment).
81 In Vendo, for example, the sequence of events in the lower courts appears to
suggest that the parties who were seeking an antisuit injunction to effectuate the grant
of exclusive jurisdiction over federal antitrust claims deliberately sat on their rights,
attempting to pursue every possible avenue in state court before seeking a federal or-
der to interdict enforcement of the state judgment. See Vendo, 433 U.S. at 628-29
("During the entire nine-year course of the state-court litigation, respondents' antitrust
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under § 1983 has often borne a greater resemblance to the latter type
of inquiry than the former is yet another indication that the Court
chose the wrong basis for its landmark holding in Mitchum v. Foster.
C. The Class Action Fairness Act and the Interdiction of Collusive Suits
In asking whether and under what circumstances a federal court
can use its injunctive powers to interdict collusive state court proceed-
ings under CAFA, it is thus necessary to determine the nature of the
specialized jurisdictional provision that Congress has enacted. What
policies did Congress codify with its targeted expansion of federal di-
versity jurisdiction, and how should those jurisdictional policies find
expression in the administration of class actions governed by the Act?
In answering these questions, it will be useful once again to return to
the period surrounding the 1948 amendments to the AIA and to re-
call one of the leading disputes over the power of Congress to effectu-
ate remedial policies in the federal courts that was taking place at that
time: the debate over the doctrine of protective jurisdiction. That
debate provides guidance in discerning the jurisdictional policies that
CAFA embodies.
Modern commentators have begun to raise sharp questions about
the constitutionality of CAFA's expansion of diversity jurisdiction to
include minimally diverse suits. The Act's change in jurisdictional
policy will frequently have the effect of taking independent claims that
would fail to satisfy the requirements of diversity if considered in isola-
tion and sweeping them into federal court through the device of ex-
pansive joinder. On the only occasion on which the Supreme Court
has expressly validated such an expansion of diversity jurisdiction,
when it upheld minimal diversity under the federal interpleader stat-
ute, the nondiverse claims that were swept into federal court unques-
tionably constituted part of a single Article III "case" or "controversy"
in the strictest sense: the resolution of any one claim over the con-
suit in the District Court was, in the words of the Court of Appeals, allowed to lie
'dormant.' But the day after [all avenues of appeal were exhausted in the state pro-
ceedings], respondents moved in District Court for a preliminary injunction against
collection of the Illinoisjudgment." (citation omitted)). A more proper basis for deny-
ing relief in that case might thus have been that the course of behavior followed by the
party seeking the antisuit injunction failed to satisfy ordinary requirements for the in-
tervention of equity. But see id. at 662-65 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (offering an account
of litigation delays in Illinois courts and strategic considerations that suggest an in-
nocuous interpretation of this period of delay).
82 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
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tested stake in an interpleader action would necessarily affect the reso-
lution of the competing claims.s3  That characteristic will often be
lacking in minimally diverse suits brought into the federal courts un-
der CAFA, particularly those proceeding under Rule 23(b) (3). It may
also be difficult in some 23(b) (3) damages actions to argue that the
nondiverse claims in the action share a constitutionally sufficient
"common nucleus of operative fact,,8 4 if such a showing is required.
Unless the diversity clause in Article III is read to track whateverjoin-
der policies Congress enacts in the class action context, free from any
independent constraint as to what constitutes a proper "case" or "con-
troversy" under the Clause-an analytically unsatisfying proposition-
it may be that CAFA will have to answer serious Article III challenges.' 5
83 The Court adopted this "logical relationship" approach in Moore v. New York Cot-
ton Exchange, finding that jurisdiction is permissible-over a counterclaim, in that
case-where "[e]ssential facts alleged by [the claimant with the independent federal
claim] enter into and constitute in part the cause of action set forth in the [jurisdic-
tionally insufficient claim]." 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926).
84 See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (holding
that federal jurisdiction over pendent state claims is constitutionally permissible where
they share a "common nucleus of operative fact" with the federal claim). Consider, for
example, the asbestos cases. To be sure, asbestos claimants share elements of com-
monality in the scientific proof of general causation tying their injuries to asbestos ex-
posure. But the circumstances surrounding an individual's exposure and the extent of
her damages will generally share little or no factual nexus with the circumstances of
other claimants. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626-30 (3d
Cir. 1996) (detailing the vast array of individual circumstances that characterize asbes-
tos exposure and the concomitant difficulty of establishing commonality and pre-
dominance in class certification), affd in part and modified in part sub nom. Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). If diversity jurisdiction over such a case
depended upon satisfying the Gibbs standard, it is far from clear that the federal courts
would have power to resolve it.
Even in cases involving a denial of certification, as in Georgine, note the important
difference between a dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction and an order resolving
the certification issue and denying class treatment. In the one case, the federal courts
disclaim any power to adjudicate. In the other, they issue an order forbidding the
case, as filed, to proceed as a class. This difference takes on added significance in light
of the analysis in Part III of this Article.
85 Professor Floyd has offered one such challenge in a thorough article. See C.
Douglas Floyd, The Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613, 652-71 (2004) (dis-
cussing the minimal diversity provisions of the proposed Class Action Fairness Act). I
must admit that I find his discussion of the issue unsatisfying in some ways. Floyd ar-
ticulates his arguments about CAFA and minimal jurisdiction primarily as an exercise
in discerning the purposes ascribed to the Diversity Clause by "the Framers of the Con-
stitution." Id. at 652. Whatever views the Framers may have held about the purpose of
the Diversity Clause, they lived within a legal arena in which the legislative authority of
states and the adjudicatory authority of courts were both conceptualized in strictly ter-
ritorial terms. The broad extension of statutory and adjudicatory jurisdiction by states
that sometimes characterizes modern class action litigation was not a problem that an
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Such challenges, in turn, may provoke a return to the disputes
over the doctrine of "protective jurisdiction" that the Court left unre-
solved in the 1950s. As it has generally been used, the term "protec-
tive jurisdiction" refers to the possibility that Congress might have the
power to extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the ap-
parent limits of Article III in service of important regulatory policies.
The doctrine has most frequently been discussed in relation to federal
statutory schemes in which Congress appears to have authorized cer-
tain claims to be heard in federal court, without regard to diversity,
but has not imposed a federal rule of decision that would mark the
claim as arising under federal law, instead permitting state law to gov-
ern. If Congress could employ its Article I powers to preempt state
law and impose a federal rule of decision in such cases, the argument
frequently goes, it should, a fortiori, enjoy the power to leave the state
rule of decision in place (or to adopt the state rule by reference) but
remove state claims to the protective arena of a federal forum.
8 6
The issue of protective jurisdiction arose most prominently in con-
junction with the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which appeared to author-
ize federal jurisdiction over certain classes of nondiverse labor dis-
87
putes without imposing a federal rule of decision. Several eminent
commentators indicated their approval of the protective jurisdiction
doctrine at the time,"" though the Supreme Court avoided the issue by
eighteenth-century lawyer would have had any reason to consider. From this fact, one
could fairly say that the Framers did not have the expansive joinder scenarios of CAFA
affirmatively in mind when they drafted the Diversity Clause, but that says little about
the propriety of Congress's decision to invoke the Clause today to respond to a new
problem. Assessing the constitutionality of CAFA in light of a late-eighteenth-century
conception of the forms and function of litigation thus seems particularly inapposite.
86 But cf Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507-09 (1900) (interpreting
a federal "arising under" jurisdictional statute not to reach federal land grant claims
where federal law arguably "creates" a cause of action but leaves state law in place to
provide the rule of decision).
87 See 61 Stat. 156 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)) (allowing for suits in federal
court "without regard to the citizenship of the parties"). See generally Carole E. Gold-
berg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 542, 559-
64 (1983) (describing the Taft-Hartley Act and the debate over protective jurisdiction
that it provoked).
88 See Mishkin, supra note 68, at 191-93 (arguing that Article III allows for "protec-
tive" jurisdiction); Wechsler, supra note 47, at 224-25 (adopting Marshall's view that
federal jurisdiction should extend "to every case that might involve an issue under fed-
eral law").
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finding that Taft-Hartley in fact authorized the creation of substantive
federal common law in the area of collective bargaining disputes.
I will not engage here with the constitutional disputes surround-
ing protective jurisdiction. Rather, my purpose in invoking the term
is to call to mind the broadly recognized precept that underlay the
heated debate over that doctrine in the 1950s: that the central func-
tion of certain extensions of federal jurisdiction is to protect specific,
congressionally favored values and interests, even in the absence of a
federal rule of decision. Professor Mishkin put the point succinctly:
[When Congress enacts a specialized jurisdictional provision that seeks
to] bring to a national tribunal cases where no construction or enforce-
ment of federal law is required-that is, where the substantive law is not
national, but state ... [-such a statute] could not be aimed at vindicat-
ing federally created fights; by hypothesis, none would be involved.
Rather, the purpose of such jurisdiction would be the protection of some
congressionally favored interest by exploiting the institutional differ-
ences between the federal and state courts. Even in wholly "local" cases,
those variations between the national and state judiciaries would tend to
be reflected in their treatment of the evidence in the case before them. 90
Without inquiring into the outer bounds of Article III, or Con-
gress's power to extend those boundaries through its Article I powers,
the protective jurisdiction debate reminds us that Congress sometimes
acts to shape federal jurisdiction in order to protect vital interests that
will benefit from the particular features of a federal forum, even in
the absence of a federally created rule of decision for the dispute.'
The minimal diversity provision of § 1332(d) operates in a man-
ner similar to a grant of protective jurisdiction. It identifies a class of
89 Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957);
see also Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Puipose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6-14 (1957) (criticizing Lincoln Mills
for using federal common law as a means of avoiding the difficult questions surround-
ing protective jurisdiction, though allowing for the possibility that protective jurisdic-
tion might be appropriate).
90 Mishkin, supra note 68, at 184; see also Wechsler, supra note 47, at 224-25
("Where, for example, Congress by the commerce power can declare as federal law
that contracts of a given kind are valid and enforceable, it must be free to take the
lesser step of drawing suits upon such contracts to the district courts without displace-
ment of the states as sources of the operative, substantive law.").
91 Professor Goldberg-Ambrose makes similar observations in her treatment of the
protective jurisdiction debate. See, e.g., Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 87, at 569 ("It is
instructive to observe how federal jurisdiction by itself can become an instrument of
federal policy insofar as it permits the use of federal rather than state procedures."); id.
at 569-72 (discussing how jurisdictional statutes can be used as tools for effectuating
substantive policies).
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cases in which Congress apprehends a distinct federal interest--cases,
that is, that may inflict broad commercial harms or threaten to un-
dermine confidence in the national judicial system when mishandled.
Rather than preempting state law and imposing a federal rule of deci-
sion, Congress has chosen to protect the federal interest in this class
of cases by expanding access to the federal forum, which Congress be-
lieves to be reliably more diligent in the administration of class pro-
ceedings. One of the primary aims of the Act's jurisdictional provi-
sion is to prevent collusive or faithless state court litigation from
compromising the federal interest in responsible adjudication of ab-
sentees' claims.92
Thus, when absent class members and competing counsel file suit
in federal court and seek to enjoin what they believe to be a collusive
state court proceeding, they are invoking the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral court for the very purpose for which it was created. An antisuit
injunction in such a case operates directly in aid of the federal court's
exercise of protective jurisdiction. In overcoming the categorical
prohibition of the AIA, no showing should be required that a federal
proceeding under CAFA has reached such an advanced stage that it
effectively constitutes a "res," is in danger of having its "flexibility"
compromised, or satisfies any of the other legal fictions that have
characterized AIA doctrine in complex litigation. Indeed, in many in-
stances, a federal proceeding seeking to interdict malfeasance or col-
lusion by class counsel will be filed only after the state proceeding is
underway. These distinctions are not disqualifying. The policies
bound up in CAFA's jurisdictional provision permit the federal court to
escape the categorical prohibition of the AIA without resorting to the
fictions that might be necessary in a case that depended entirely upon a
generic jurisdictional provision for entrance to the federal forum.
To say that CAFA's jurisdictional provision exempts these cases
from the categorical prohibition of the AIA is not to say that an anti-
suit injunction will automatically be appropriate. As is always the case
with requests for preliminary injunctive relief, it will be necessary for
the federal petitioners to demonstrate an imminent danger of irrepa-
92 See CAFA § 2(a)(2)-(3), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005) (summarizing
the purposes of the Act). Professor Issacharoff makes a similar "greater-includes-the-
lesser" observation in describing CAFA, arguing that the case for uniform federal
choice of law rules is bolstered by the power that Congress presumably has to impose
national standards for most forms of common law commercial liability. See Issacharoff,
supra note 12, at 1867.
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rable harm. 93 It will also be incumbent upon the petitioners to dem-
onstrate how the allegedly offending state class proceeding (or state
class counsel) implicates the jurisdictional purposes of the Act. In this
connection, it is appropriate to recall the discussion in the last Section
concerning the different functions that are served by the provisions of
the AIA dealing with "expressly authorized" injunctions and those "in
aid ofjurisdiction.
9 4
Had CAFA included an express authorization for antisuit injunc-
tions similar to the provisions contained in the interpleader and
bankruptcy statutes, federal courts would be justified in issuing such
orders freely to ensure the prerogatives of the federal forum-
perhaps even automatically, as in the case of the automatic statutory
stay of competing proceedings that is one of the hallmarks of bank-
ruptcy litigation. 95 As in those other contexts, the express authoriza-
tion would raise a presumption that the requirements for equitable
relief are satisfied.
When petitioners must demonstrate that an injunction operates
"in aid of [the federal court's] jurisdiction," in contrast, a more case-
specific inquiry is needed. The federal petitioners in a CAFA proceed-
ing should be required to show that they are threatened with the type
of harm that the Act's jurisdictional provision was designed to pre-
vent-a state proceeding tainted by collusion or malfeasance-and
that there is a concomitant need for an antisuit injunction to prevent
that harm. In order to administer such requests, the federal courts, in
turn, will need to identify the indicia of collusion or malfeasance that
may warrant an injunction. Structural features of the lawsuit (for ex-
ample, a settlement that aims to release claims that the forum would
have no power to adjudicate even though other, more suitable fora
are available), the larger litigation context (for example, a suit filed
in an unlikely or inconvenient forum for the apparent purpose of ex-
ploiting permissive local standards), and the actual course of the
events or negotiations that gave rise to the state court action are all
93 Cf Wood, supra note 27, at 319-20 (describing the general principles embodied
in ALA doctrine).
!4 See supra Part 1.B.
95 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
06 See, e.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235, 1248-51 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn,
179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing the structural danger of malfeasance in cases
where class counsel appear to be using a state court proceeding as a vehicle for gener-
ating a classwide settlement that will release exclusively federal claims); see also infra
text accompanying notes 245-246 (discussing the propriety of an antisuit injunction in
the Epstein litigation).
2008] 2071
2072 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 156: 2035
likely to constitute important elements of that inquiry. When the fed-
eral court concludes that the state proceeding threatens to impose the
kind of harm that Congress aimed to combat by expanding the court's
jurisdiction under CAFA, 97 then an antisuit injunction in aid of the
Act's jurisdiction will often be justified.
Finally, one's view about the threshold that a petitioner should
have to satisfy in requesting such an injunction may be influenced by
one's normative assessment of CAFA's jurisdictional provision. Al-
though the primary focus of this Article is the proper theoretical and
methodological approach to the Act and not its desirability as a policy
reform, the normative question will have an inevitable bearing upon
the shape of these newly articulated doctrines. I share Professor Bur-
bank's concern that the Act's use of an aggregation rule for satisfying
the amount-in-controversy requirement coupled with its poorly
crafted abstention provisions is likely to result in many disputes that
are essentially local in nature being taken from the control of states
and moved into federal court.98 Important questions of substantive
state policy-from the principles that should govern the adjudication
of negative-value claims to the proper approach to choice of law in
aggregate litigation-may become the near-exclusive province of fed-
eral judges in cases governed by CAFA. That result is particularly dif-
ficult to defend in those cases that only implicate the interests of one
or two states in any meaningful way. In cases where the exercise of
federal jurisdiction appears unmoored from the Act's animating pur-
poses or where an antisuit injunction would otherwise be harmful to
federalism values without adequate justification, those circumstances
call for a stronger showing of malfeasance before a court issues an in-
junction in aid of its jurisdiction under CAFA.
97 Or, put another way, if the court is convinced that the absentees would surely
remove to the federal forum were they able to do so.
98 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context:
A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1527-28 (2008) ("It suffices to note that
none of the exceptions permits a state court to retain (if the defendant chooses to re-
move) a class action brought on behalf solely of the citizens of that state, alleging inju-
ries sustained in the state as a result of the in-state activities of an out-of-state corpora-
tion doing substantial business in the state. Such a case is, therefore, defined as of
'national importance."' (emphasis omitted)); see also SILBERMAN, STEIN & WAOLFF, supra
note 4, at 1052-53 (questioning the propriety of federal jurisdiction in a similar scenario).
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II. ENFORCING DENIALS OF CERTIFICATION: SHLUTS,
DUE PROCESS, AND THE A-NTl-ISUIT INJUNCTION
A second major question that will arise under CAFA concerns the
power of a federal court to enforce its own denial of certification
when class counsel make subsequent attempts to seek certification in
more hospitable fora. The issue can arise both in cases where diligent
class counsel believe in good faith that certification is in the best in-
terests of their clients and in cases where class counsel are acting less
faithfully toward their clients, perhaps in some form of de facto collu-
sion with defendants in a settlement-only proceeding. If the Act
achieves its stated goal of moving large numbers of class actions into
federal court, both types of cases can be expected to arise with greater
frequency, and those actors with an incentive to defend an original
denial of certification can be expected to invoke the injunctive powers
of the federal courts to prevent their opponents from taking extra
bites at the apple. As with the interdiction of ongoing competing class
actions explored in Part I, CAFA provides the occasion for a major ana-
lytical reassessment to determine how best to resolve such disputes.
The problem, in short, is as follows: When class counsel fail to ob-
tain certification of a desired class in an initial forum (F), they will
sometimes select another representative plaintiff (to avoid the most
obvious preclusion problems that the original named plaintiff might
otherwise encounter) and seek certification of the same class in an-
other court, typically in another jurisdiction. In a settlement class ac-
tion, where class counsel and defendants both desire certification,
there may be a joint incentive on the part of both sides to try their
luck in multiple successive fora until they succeed in securing an or-
der of certification.' Whether the certification proceedings in F, are
adversarial or cooperative in nature, those actors who believe that
their interests would be better served by a denial of certification-
The most frequently cited example of this phenomenon is the General Motors
pick-tip truck litigation. The named plaintiffs and defendant in that case obtained a
certification order for a nationwide class action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
that was reversed on appeal by the Third Circuit, which ruled that certification of a na-
tionwide class was inappropriate. The parties then moved their litigation to the state
courts of Louisiana, which certified the class, approved the settlement, and entered a
final judgment. Objecting class members returned to the original federal forum, seek-
ing an injunction to prevent Louisiana's interference with the original denial of certi-
fication, but the Third Circuit held that the AIA prohibited such an order. See In re
Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 137-40
(3d Cir. 1998) (GM III) (detailing the history of the litigation and denying the re-
quested injunction).
2008] 2073
2074 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 156: 2035
typically the defendant in most litigated class actions and dissenting
class members represented by competing counsel in most settlement
proceedings-may seek to prevent the proponents of the class from
attempting such serial lawsuits by obtaining an antisuit injunction to
enforce the original denial of certification, thereby preempting fur-
ther suits. This was the issue before the Seventh Circuit in the In re
Bridgestone/Firestone II litigation, resulting in Judge Easterbrool's much
noted opinion.'0 ° For present purposes, I will focus attention on those
cases where F was a federal forum and, hence, where it is a federal
court that is asked to issue an order enforcing its original denial of
certification.
Where attempts at multiple certification proceedings arise in con-
junction with settlement, and particularly where a proposed settle-
ment is marked by collusion or otherwise fails to protect the interests
of the class faithfully, CAFA's policy of protecting the interests of class
members appears to be directly implicated. 1 Yet the failure of the
Act to provide for removal by absent class members in state court pro-
ceedings once again impedes the effectuation of that policy. Consider
the situation that exists when class counsel file a successive attempt at
certification. Were the second case filed in federal court, the federal
district judge would presumably be likely to defer to the earlier deci-
sion of her federal colleague and deny the certification request.
When class counsel file their second case in state court, however, the
successive certification issue will only come before a federal judge if
the case is removed-an option that lies within the exclusive control
of the defendant. Thus, when the party seeking to resist certification
is an absent class member-or, in cases where the defendant would
resist certification, when the plaintiff is able to make the second law-
suit nonremovable-the resisting party must ask the federal court that
hosted the original lawsuit to enjoin the subsequent state court pro-
ceedings. As before, this method of interdiction implicates the provi-
sions of the AIA. More precisely, such an antisuit injunction will likely
proceed under the AIA's exception for orders issued "to protect or ef-
fectuate [a federal court's] judgments."'12
1o0 In re Bridgestone/Firestone Tires Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bridgestone/Firestone II),
333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003).
101 See CAFA §§ 2(a) (3)-(3) (a), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005) (finding
that class members often receive little benefit from certain types of class settlement
and placing limitations on coupon settlements and other disfavored practices).
102 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). A denial of certification does not itself constitute a
final judgment in the formal sense of the term, since the named plaintiffs theoretically
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Even before the provisions of the AIA come into play, however, an
antisuit injunction aimed at enforcing a denial of certification must
answer a formal analytical objection. Absent class members, by defini-
tion, are never made full parties to an action in which certification is
denied. Such individuals generally do not receive any form of notice
regarding the proceeding, and certainly not the individual notice and
opportunity to opt out that a 23(b) (3) action would require if certifi-
cation were granted. When a federal court issues an antisuit injunc-
tion to enforce the denial of certification against absent members of a
putative class, it appears that the court is binding the class members to
the results of a proceeding to which they were never formally joined as
parties, in which they were never in privity with parties, and for which
they never received any form of individualized process. Some com-
mentators have concluded that this fact alone prohibits antisuit in-
junctions aimed at enforcing a denial of certification. 103
This formal objection is both overstated and misconceived. While
Judge Easterbrook's analysis in Bridgestone/Firestone II was unsatisfying
(and that opinion remains the only serious judicial pronouncement
on the issue), the Seventh Circuit was correct in its core holding:
there is no categorical obstacle to the issuance of an antisuit order by
a federal court seeking to prevent serial relitigation of the same certi-
fication question by members of the same plaintiff class. Further-
more, in cases where the policies underlying CAFA are implicated by
retain the option of proceeding with their individual claims. See id. §§ 1291-1292 (set-
ting forth the final judgment rule and exceptions for certain interlocutory appeals);
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469-70 (1978) (rejecting the "death knell"
theory for immediate appeals of denials of certification). Nonetheless, such orders are
effectively final for most purposes, and have been treated as such. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(f) (providing for immediate discretionary appeals of certification orders); cf
28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2000) (authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules that
"define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under sec-
tion 1291 of this title"); Bridgestone/Firestone II, 333 F.3d at 767 ("'[F]or purposes of is-
sue preclusion .... "final judgment" includes any prior adjudication of an issue in an-
other action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive
effect.' Our decision that no nationwide class is tenable is 'sufficiently firm' for this
purpose." (quoting RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OFJUDGMEN-rS § 13 (1982)). The Third
Circuit has ruled that a denial of certification is not a stIfficiently final order to trigger
the AIA's "protect or effectuate" exception. See, e.g., GM 111, 134 F.3d at 146 ("[D]enial
of class certification tinder these circumstances lacks sufficient finality to be entitled to
preclusive effect."). This is one of many incorrect rulings in this important line of
Third Circuit cases, as I will argue later in this Section.
103 Timothy Kerr offers a good account of the due process objection. See Kerr, su-
pra note 29, at 240-43.
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the requested injunction, the Act lends additional weight to the con-
siderations that may counsel in favor of issuing such an antisuit order.
In order to analyze these questions accurately, it is necessary to
delve deeply into two important issues that are often poorly under-
stood: the correct interpretation of the Supreme Court's procedural
due process analysis in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts,10 4 and the proper
treatment of remedial doctrines like class certification in multijuris-
dictional disputes. The analysis that follows ultimately distills down to
the following conclusions: first, Shutts requires a degree of procedural
due process in class proceedings that varies with the extent to which a
court proposes to place class members at risk of an alteration in their
legal position; and second, the alteration in legal position that attends
the enforcement of a denial of certification is usually not great
enough to demand the issuance of individualized process to absent
class members. That being so, the objection that class members must
be made formal parties through service of individual process before
an antisuit injunction can bind them is usually misplaced. Rule 23,
CAFA, and the All Writs Act together provide sufficient authorization
for the issuance of such injunctions in appropriate cases.
A. Understanding Shutts
The persistent confusion surrounding the meaning of the Court's
opinion in Shutts is attributable, at least in part, to the persistently
confusing manner in which the Court has invoked the Due Process
Clause in its discussions of personal jurisdiction. Understanding
Shutts requires a clear grasp of the distinction between "procedural
due process" in its most commonly used sense and the "due process"
doctrine associated with personal jurisdiction, along with a clear grasp
of how both concepts are deployed in Shutts itself. The general failure
on the part of courts and commentators to distinguish between these
two concepts in assessing the doctrinal implications of Shutts is forgiv-
able, since the Shutts Court exhibits the same fallacy at various points
in its own analysis. 0°5 The common account of Shutts's holding-that
class members in an action for damages can never come within the
power of a court without first receiving individualized notice and an
104 72 U.S. 797 (1985).
105 See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning
of the Millennium?, 7 TUL.J. INT'L & COMp. L. 111, 117-18 (1999) (describing the origins
of this confusion in the Court's International Shoe opinion).
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opportunity to opt out-is oversimplified and has led to inaccurate
and misleading conclusions. 106
The decision in Shutts grew out of a class action, brought in Kan-
sas state court, that resulted in an award of interest on certain royalty
payments from natural gas leases that the defendant had withheld
from the plaintiff customers in conjunction with a rate regulation
scheme.' 0' On appeal, the losing defendants raised two constitutional
challenges to the award, one involving the power of the state court to
apply Kansas law to the entire dispute (which produced an important
ruling on choice of law that is not relevant here), and one involving
the procedures employed by the lower courts in certifying the class.'0 t
As to the second issue, the defendant focused specifically on the state
106 Professor (nowJudge) Wood has referred to this as the "extreme reading" of
Shutts. See Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatoy Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597,
605-06 (1987). If anything, Professor Wood's early account of the potential for mis-
reading Shutts understated the case.
107 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799-801. Because the plaintiffs in Shutts sought damages
based on a statutorily determined interest rate, their cause of action is frequently char-
acterized as an action at law in discussions of the case. In fact, however, the Kansas
Supreme Court had relied on equitable principles of tnjust enrichment in determin-
ing, in an earlier case involving the same parties, that leaseholders were entitled to in-
terest on withheld royalty payments. See Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 567 P.2d
1292, 1298 (Kan. 1977) (describing the plaintiffs' damages theory in terms of unjust
enrichment); id. at 1321 (holding "on equitable principles" that plaintiffs are entitled
interest payments). In a much-noted footnote, the Shutts Court expressly limited its
holding to "class actions which seek to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly
or predominately for money judgments." Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811 n.3. The Court itself
contributed to this potential confusion in the text immediately preceding this footnote
when it offered the ambiguous observation that its holding described the procedures
that a state like Kansas must employ if it "wishes to bind an absent plaintiff concerning
a claim for money damages or similar relief at law." Id. at 811 (emphasis added).
108 Out of necessity, I gloss over much complexity in saying that the Court's choice
of law ruling is "not relevant" to the present discussion. At a netadoctrinal level, limits
on choice of law and on personal jurisdiction operate in a complementary fashion in
restricting the range of burdens and outcomes that people can expect to encounter as
a result of their primary activities. Professor Silberman's work has explored this rela-
tionship most profitably. See, e.g., Linda Silberman, Reflections on Burnhan v. Superior
Court: Toward Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction and Implications for Choice of Law, 22 RUT-
GERS L.J. 569, 583-90 (1991). In most cases, relatively strict constitutional rules on per-
sonal jurisdiction operate to counterbalance relatively lax constitutional standards on
choice of law. This limits the range of fora in which a plaintiff can bring suit and, indi-
rectly thereby, the range of state laws that are likely to apply to the dispute (given the
conventional wisdom that most state courts prefer to apply the law of the forum). In
Shutts, this relationship was reversed: the permissive rule that the Court adopted on
personal jurisdiction counterbalanced with a stricter constitutional standard on the
choice of applicable law. As with man)' standards, however, this one has proven highly
malleable, giving rise to some of the adventuresome nationwide state court class ac-
tions that are one of the stated targets of CAFA.
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court's treatment of plaintiffs from outside the state. The question
presented was one of personal jurisdiction:
[Petitioner contended] that the "opt-out" notice [that was sent] to ab-
sent class members, which forced them to return the request for exclu-
sion in order to avoid the suit, was insufficient to bind class members
who were not residents of Kansas or who did not possess "minimum con-
tacts" with Kansas.1 09
Although this description of the posture of the Shutts appeal is
likely familiar to anyone who studied the case in law school, its signifi-
cance has never been fully explored in the literature. If the Court's
analysis of the Kansas opt-out notice in Shutts relates entirely to the
state court's power over "class members who were not residents of
Kansas or who did not possess 'minimum contacts' with Kansas," as
the Court suggests, that would seem to imply two propositions. First,
it implies that the holding of Shutts concerning the constitutional re-
quirements of notice and opt-out rights does not necessarily apply to
class members over whom the court has clear constitutional power to
exercise personal jurisdiction on some other theory. Second, it im-
plies that the analysis of notice and opt-out rights contained in Shutts
bears solely on the issue of personal jurisdiction and should be under-
stood exclusively in that context, with no necessary implications for
broader questions of "procedural due process."
The first of these propositions is clearly correct. As I will ex-
plain-and as courts and commentators regularly fail to appreciate-
the doctrinal holding in Shutts has no direct application in those cases
where a court has the power to exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction over
absent class members without having to resort to a solicitation of con-
sent through the issuance of individualized opt-out notice. ° That
109 Shutts, 427 U.S. at 802.
110 Professors Miller and Crump made this basic observation in their early account
of the Shutts decision, although they offered very little in the way of further analysis to
explore its implications:
If all class members have an affiliation with the forum, the court can compel
appearance, and the inference of consent is unnecessary. Notice and an op-
portunity to be heard probably still would be required as independent due
process guarantees, but the right to opt out presumably could be denied. It is
even conceivable that cheaper notice, such as the substitutes provided by
some state class action rules, would be acceptable in an action in which tradi-
tional jurisdictional requirements are met.
Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions
After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE LJ. 1, 31-32 (1986) (internal citations
omitted); see also David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE
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category of cases includes state court actions in which all members of
the class are residents of the forum state."' It also includes federal
court actions in which the district court possesses express authority to
issue nationwide service of process " ' or is not otherwise bound by the
default territorial limits on service of the summons and complaint that
are imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a matter of
policy (rather than as a constitutional mandate)."3  This is not to say
that "anything goes" in such cases. But it does mean that the doctrinal
holding of Shutts regarding the power of a class action court is not
strictly applicable when the certifying court has an independent basis
for exercising territorial jurisdiction over putative class members.
This conclusion begs additional questions: just what limitations
does the Due Process Clause impose upon the procedures that a court
can employ in certifying a class action when jurisdiction is not an is-
sue, and what, if anything, does Shutts have to say on the matter? The
second, deliberately provocative proposition outlined above suggests
one possible answer to these questions: that all the analysis contained
in Shutts concerning what the Due Process Clause "requires" in class
litigation is focused solely on the question of personal jurisdiction and
should be understood exclusively in those terms, with no immediate
DAME L. REv. 913, 954-55 (1998) (suggesting that the holding of Shutts relating to opt-
out notice "may well be limited.., to cases in which the members of the class are be-
yond the territorial jurisdiction of the forum"); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in
Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 787 (2005) (making the basic point in
the context of preclusion analysis).
H See, e.g., Jahn ex rel. Jahn v. ORCR, Inc., 92 P.3d 984, 988-91 (Colo. 2004) (en
banc) (erroneously reading Shutts and other authorities to stand for the proposition
that class actions certified pursuant to Rule 23(b) (2) can never have claim-preclusive
effects on damages claims because of their failure to provide opt-out rights, even
though class members were all in-state residents).
112 See, e.g., Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897-99 (7th Cir. 1999)
(suggesting that 23(b)(2) class actions cannot compromise damages claims through
preclusive effect, despite the presence of a nationwide service provision in a federal
statute that eliminates personal jurisdiction problems).
113 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1) (A) establishes the default territorial
limits on service of a summons to establish jurisdiction:
(1) Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal ju-
risdiction over a defendant:
(A) who is subject to thejurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in
the state where the district court is located ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (1) (A); cf. FED. R. CR,. P. 4(k)(1)(C) (service of summons is effec-
tive to establish jurisdiction "when authorized by a federal statute"); FED. R. CIV. P.
4.1 (b) ("An order committing a person for civil contempt of a decree or injunction
issued to enforce federal law may be served and enforced in any district.").
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bearing on the procedures that a court may constitutionally employ
during certification when jurisdiction is not an issue. "4 Although this
second proposition is implied by the manner in which the Court
frames its opinion, it is ultimately unsustainable. Those who have
read Shutts to speak directly to matters of "procedural due process"
outside the context of personal jurisdiction have been guilty of care-
lessness, but they have not been entirely unjustified in their approach,
for the opinion is, in fact, about more than just personal jurisdiction.
Properly understood, Shutts adumbrates a general analytical framework
for the constitutional requirements of due process in class or aggregate
litigation. It simply uses the confusing and idiosyncratic "due process"
doctrine of personal jurisdiction as the occasion for the exercise.
1. Shutts and the Role of "Consent"
As the avalanche of scholarship on the subject can attest, personal
jurisdiction has never fit comfortably into the standard paradigms of
"due process" analysis. The modern formulation of the doctrine pur-
ports to be concerned primarily with preventing courts from imposing
substantively unfair burdens upon defendants-that is, from imposing
a level of litigation expense or inconvenience that the Court deems
unwarranted in light of the defendant's level of deliberate contact (or
lack thereof) with the forum state." 5 On its face, this purpose has lit-
114 Professor Monaghan is most forceful in staking out this position in his article
discussing antisuit injunctions and the collateral attack question. See Henry Paul
Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 1148 (1998). Monaghan insists that "Shutts was all about the condi-
tions necessary for the existence of in personam jurisdiction sufficient to preclude the
claims of absent, nonresident class members" and that the decision had no bearing
upon more traditional notions of procedural due process. Id. at 1162; see also, e.g., id. at
1167-68 ("[W]e must clearly identify what Shutts is about: the existence of in personam
jurisdiction sufficient to preclude the substantive claims of nonresident class members.");
id. at 1166 (arguing the same point). As will become apparent, I disagree with Professor
Monaghan's approach, which I believe elides much of importance in Shutts.
11 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) ("The pur-
pose of [the International Shoe test] is to protect a defendant from the travail of defend-
ing in a distant forum, unless the defendant's contacts with the forum make it just to
force him to defend there."); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)
(reframing the personal jurisdiction inquiry in terms of the "traditional conception of
fair play and substantial justice"). The extent of a court's adjudicatory jurisdiction also
has a profound de facto impact on the law that is likely to apply in multijurisdictional
disputes. See Silberman, supra note 108, at 589-90 (explaining that permissive or vague
personal jurisdiction standards, combined with permissive choice of law standards,
lead to ex ante uncertainty as to the law that is likely to apply to primary activity if a
dispute arises).
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tle to do with the concerns for reliability, accuracy, individualized con-
sideration and impartiality that are generally identified as the core
concerns of procedural due process. Only rarely have the Court's
personal jurisdiction opinions attempted to tie their analysis back to
these more prosaic procedural values." 6 At the same time, the Court
has exhibited a fetishistic concern with state boundaries and a tin ear
to the realities of inconvenience in its personal jurisdiction cases that
have called into question the descriptive accuracy of even this "fair
play and substantial justice" doctrine, suggesting at least an equal con-
cern with federalism values and the limits on one state's ability to ex-
ercise extraterritorial authority at the expense of another. Yet, when
the Court finally offered an explicit articulation of this proposition in
its post-International Shoe cases, dramatically proclaiming that the Due
Process Clause may impose limits on personal jurisdiction even in the
absence of any actual inconvenience or harm to defendants,'" it then
quickly retreated from that bold statement, returning to the position
that due process limits on personal jurisdiction are "ultimately" about
the individual rights of parties, even when the doctrine prohibits ex-
ercises ofjurisdiction that do not appear to impose any of the individ-
ual burdens with which the doctrine professes concern."8 Thus, at
the very least, we must begin by recognizing that any broad pro-
nouncements concerning the requirements of "due process" that ap-
IN The Court has occasionally suggested, usually by negative implication, that
forcing a defendant to respond in a highly inconvenient forum might impede its abil-
ity to develop evidence and secure the testimony of witnesses, in derogation of the
concern for accuracy and equal treatment, or might even lead a defendant to choose
to default rather than to appear, with obvious adverse consequences for the value of
individual participation and the overall integrity of the proceedings. See, e.g., McGee v.
Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957) ("Of course there may be inconvenience to
the insurer if it is held amendable to suit in California where it had this contract but
certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process. There is no contention
that respondent did not have adequate notice of the suit or sufficient time to prepare
its defenses and appear." (citations omitted)). Such concerns are very much the ex-
ception and do not drive the personal jurisdiction doctrine.
"7 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) ("Even
if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to liti-
gate before the tribunals of another State . . . , the Due Process Clause, acting as an
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power
to render a valid judgment.").
its See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
n.10 (1982) ("The restriction on state sovereign power described in liorld-Wide Volks-
wagen Corp .... must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest
preserved by the Due Process Clause."). The Shutts Court conspicuously reiterated this
proposition when describing the purposes underlying the personal jurisdiction doc-
trine. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807.
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pear in an analysis focused on personal jurisdiction may not translate
directly to any other procedural context and may have little bearing
on the requirements of due process in other areas.
And the Court's analysis in Shutts was unquestionably focused on
personal jurisdiction. 'The Court emphasized throughout the opinion
that its due process analysis was aimed specifically at assessing the ex-
tent of a state court's power to exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state
class members. It framed the due process issue as one of personal ju-
risdiction in its introductory section, "9 identified consent as the the-
ory of jurisdiction that it would analyze in the section devoted to the
issue, 12" and then proceeded to conduct most of its analysis exclusively
with reference to its personal jurisdiction precedents.'' 1 Indeed, the
only non-personaljurisdiction case that the Court relied on in any
substantial fashion is the seminal class action case of Hansberry v. Lee-
a fact that I will return to shortly.122
Nonetheless, Shutts does speak to broader procedural values. It is
in the Court's treatment of the question of consent that one can dis-
cern the opinion's more expansive analytical implications.
Various approaches to the question of consent have always played
a significant role in the Court's personal jurisdiction analysis. In dif-
ferent contexts, the Court has framed at least three such approaches,
which I will describe here using the terms simple consent, procedural con-
119 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 802 ("[Petitioner] first asserted that the Kansas trial court
did not possess personal jurisdiction over absent plaintiff class members as required by
International Shoe Co. v. Washington and similar cases." (citation omitted)); id. ("Related
to this first claim was petitioner's contention that the 'opt-out' notice to absent class
members... was insufficient to bind class members who were not residents of Kan-
sas....").
120 See id. at 806 ("Reduced to its essentials, petitioner's argument is that unless
out-of-state plaintiffs affirmatively consent, the Kansas courts may not exert jurisdiction
over their claims.").
121 See id. at 806-08 (discussing purposes underlying personal jurisdiction doctrine,
as articulated in International Shoe and other cases); id. at 808 (accentuating the Court's
earlier reliance on Pennoyer v. Neff 95 U.S. 714 (1877), in the key class action prece-
dent of Hansbeny v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)); id. at 809-12 (discussing lesser burdens on
class action plaintiffs, as compared to defendants, as a key factor in defining the level
of "protection from state-court jurisdiction" that the Fourteenth Amendment affords
absentees); id. at 812-13 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984),
and reiterating that its analysis concerns actual or constructive consent to the adjudica-
toryjurisdiction of the court).
122 See id. at 808 & n.1, 812. The Court also invokes Mullane's due process standard
for notice once, and it drops a desultory "cf" cite to its opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), in discussing the issues of small-stakes class actions and
individualized notice. Id. at 812.
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sent, and implied or constructive consent. One of the keys to understand-
ing the due process analysis in Shutts lies in recognizing that the con-
sent typically embodied in the notice and opt-out procedure, which
the Court attempted to characterize as some hybrid of simple and
procedural consent, is better understood as a form of constructive
consent that is justified by the presence of other internal procedural
protections like those that were present in the Kansas class action pro-
ceeding.
In a simple consent case, a party affirmatively chooses to be subject
to the territorial jurisdiction of a court. Simple consent is most fre-
quently exemplified by the act of an ordinary plaintiff bringing suit in
a particular court, whereby she manifests simple consent to submit
her claim to the jurisdiction of that court.121 A defendant can also
manifest simple consent to a court's jurisdiction, either through af-
firmatively declining to contest the issue or by explicitly assenting,
whether at the time of suit 124 or through signing a choice of forum
clause in a contract beforehand (though the latter are sometimes con-. 125
tested when a dispute actually arises). In a similar vein, the defen-
dant energy company in Shutts unsuccessfully argued that a strong ex-
pression of simple consent in the form of an "opt-in" requirement for
absent class members was a constitutional necessity if a state court
wished to bind out-of-state absentees to a class proceeding. 2" The
term "simple consent," then, describes those situations where it may
properly be said that a party has made a voluntary and autonomous
choice to be subject to a court's adjudicatory jurisdiction.
In a case of procedural consent, a court deems certain actions taken
by a party in the course of the litigation to constitute the effective ex-
pression of a willingness to be bound by the court's adjudicatory au-
thority, even if that is not what the party desired or intended. The
123 See, e.g., Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779 (noting that a plaintiff can invoke the jurisdic-
tion of the state court and consent to have her claims decided there, irrespective of her
lack of contacts with the forum).
124 See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
703 (1982) ("Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an
individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived."); McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (stating the same rule).
2 5 See, e.g., Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (finding a choice-
of-forum clause enforceable, even though neither the plaintiff nor the defendant had
any contacts with the chosen forum).
126 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12; see also id. at 803-06 (holding that the defendant has
standing to invoke the rights of the plaintiffs due to the distinctive procedural posture
of a class action).
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most obvious example here, of course, is a defendant's failure to raise
a timely objection to personal jurisdiction, which will generally be
deemed a waiver of that defense even if the defendant later insists that
she had no intent to submit to the court's jurisdiction.' 27 The Su-
preme Court has given wide berth to state courts in defining the con-
ditions of procedural consent, upholding rules that force plaintiffs
who have invoked the jurisdiction of a court to respond to unrelated
counterclaims over which the court might otherwise have no power,128
and rules denying defendants any opportunity to make a "special ap-
pearance" to contest jurisdiction, effectively requiring them either to
submit to a court's jurisdiction in responding to a complaint or else to
take a default and challenge jurisdiction collaterally. 29 Thus, "proce-
dural consent" describes those situations where a judicial system
places obligations on a party who has interacted or actively engaged
with that court (for example, by making an appearance, even if only
for the purpose of contesting jurisdiction) and who then fails to satisfy
those obligations, justifying the court in treating that failure as a
waiver ofjurisdictional objections.
Finally, the implied or constructive consent cases describe situations
in which the extralitigation behavior of a party, or other strong policy
considerations, are treated as conferring the equivalent of the party's
"consent" to have a dispute resolved in the jurisdiction. This is the
type of consent argument that has generally received the most atten-
127 See, e.g., FED. R. CIR. P. 12(h)(1) (specifying conditions under which a defense
of lack ofjurisdiction over a person is waived); see also, e.g., Continental Bank, N.A. v.
Meyer, 10 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming a finding that the course of
litigation conduct pursued by the defendant constituted a waiver of personal jurisdic-
tion); Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 538-39 (8th Cir. 1990) (same).
128 In the key case on the point, the Court said the following with respect to juris-
diction over independent counterclaims:
There is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent a state from
adopting a procedure by which a judgment in personam may be rendered in a
cross-action against a plaintiff in its courts, upon service of process or of ap-
propriate pleading upon his attorney of record. The plaintiff having, by his
voluntary act in demanding justice from the defendant, submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court, there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in
treating him as being there for all purposes for which justice to the defendant
requires his presence. It is the price which the state may exact as the condi-
tion of opening its courts to the plaintiff.
Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938).
12 SeeYork v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1890) (ruling that a state may adopt a sys-
tem that declines to offer the opportunity to make a special appearance and treats
even an appearance solely to contest jurisdiction as a procedural consent that waives
the defense).
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tion in discussions of personal jurisdiction, since it was one of the
primary juridical categories under which courts authorized extraterri-
torial service of process by states under the territoriality regime of
Pennoyer, until the sea change brought about by the Court's decision
in International Shoe.13° Since International Shoe, it has been clear that
such instances of implied or constructive consent must ordinarily be
consistent with the idiosyncratic due process analysis that the Court
has gone on to articulate in this field. 131 Still, this form of "consent"
continues to perform some important explanatory work, particularly
in cases of general jurisdiction, where the citizenship, residence, or
activities of a defendant may be taken to constitute a constructive
manifestation of the defendant's willingness or obligation to answer to
any suit in that jurisdiction, as justified by the benefits that permanent
residence confers.132 Importantly, in a case of implied or constructive
consent, unlike one of simple or procedural consent, a party may have
taken no action that could meaningfully be described as a voluntary,
autonomous choice to be subjected to a particular court's jurisdiction
or to be affiliated with that court in any way. Rather, "consent" serves
as a marker in these cases for what is essentially a policy determination
that certain types of parties should be subject to jurisdiction for cer-
tain types of claims.
130 See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (finding out-of-state ser-
vice on a nonresident motorist to be a sufficient basis for establishing jurisdiction on
the basis of implied consent, since the motorist could assertedly have been excluded
from the roads of the state altogether had he declined to give his consent); see also Int'l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318-20 (1945) (characterizing this notion of
consent as a "legal fiction" and refraining the analysis in terms of fairness and substan-
tial justice).
131 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (holding that all exercises of
personal jurisdiction, whatever their form or pedigree, must satisfy the minimum con-
tacts standard set forth in International Shoe). But cf Burnham v. Superior Court, 495
U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that the International Shoe standard is
limited to the extraterritorial exercises ofjurisdiction and has no application to a state's
exercise of sovereign authority over people or property located within its borders).
132 See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448-49 (1952)
(upholding the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in Ohio
where in-state activities were extensive and foreign offices were shut down due to for-
eign occupation, making Ohio the only available forum); Goforit Entm't LLC v. Digi-
Media.com L.P., 513 F. Stipp. 2d 1325, 1331-33 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (relying upon this fea-
ture of Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), to distinguish between various concepts
of "citizenship" in determining the proper treatment of a limited liability partnership);
see also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,438-39 (1932) (holding that amenabil-
ity to a suit in one's country of citizenship flows directly from the relationship between
the citizen and the sovereign); United States v. Lansky, 496 F.2d 1063, 1067-68 (5th
Cir. 1974) (reaffirming the Blackmerdoctrine).
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Using this taxonomy as our heuristic, which form of "consent"
analysis does the Court claim to be performing in Shutts when it up-
holds the power of state courts to bind out-of-state absentees? The an-
swer to that question reveals one of the key sources of confusion in
the Shutts decision. The Court characterizes its jurisdictional analysis
as a combination of simple and procedural consent. It asserts, in
other words, that the issuance of an opt-out notice in a class action
creates a state of affairs in which a class member who does not execute
the opt-out form can be understood either to have made a meaningful
and voluntary choice to be bound by the proceedings or else to have
exhibited a level of inattention or neglect that can reasonably be in-
terpreted as a waiver of objections. To the extent that this proposition
should be understood as the true, animating spirit of the opinion-a
proposition that I will challenge shortly-the Court's conclusion rests
upon an astonishing and anomalous fact about the Shutts litigation
and an aggressive assumption made in reliance upon that fact.
The astonishing fact concerns the rate at which class members
executed opt-out forms in the Shutts litigation and exempted them-
selves from the class. The Court reports that 3400 of the 31,500 class
members to whom notice was successfully delivered "'opted out' of
the class by returning the request for exclusion."1 3 1 In other words,
approximately 11% of all those to whom notice was delivered chose to
execute the opt-out form, in an action in which "[t]he average claim
of each royalty owner for interest on the suspended royalties was
$100.', 34 That figure is breathtakingly high, particularly in an action
that appears to have involved only negative-value claims. 1 3  By way of
133 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 801 (1985). Specifically, the
Court reported that the certified class ultimately consisted of 28,100 members, with
3400 of the original 33,000 executing the opt-out form and 1500 being excluded be-
cause notice could not be delivered to them successfully. This makes a total of 31,500
to whom notice was actually delivered, of whom 3400, or about 10.8%, executed opt-
out forms. Id. If one were to assume that 33,000, 3400, and 1500 are rounded num-
bers, which seems likely, then 11% is the most precise percentage of opt-outs that one
could legitimately report.
134 Id.
135 While there was variation in the interest amounts to which each class member
would be entitled in the action, depending upon the value of the royalties they owned,
those variations do not appear to have been so large that owners at the top of the curve
would have possessed economically viable individual claims. The point is addressed
briefly in the opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court, which reproduces the following
finding made by the trial court during certification: "The claims of plaintiffs are typi-
cal of the claims of all the members of the class except that each owner may be entitled
to a different amount of interest and the interest to each owner, if allowed, would be too small
to enable each to file a separate action." Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 679 P.2d 1159,
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comparison, Professors Eisenberg and Miller have performed a far-
reaching empirical study in which they conclude that class members
generally opt out at a rate of less then 1% across all cases and about
0.2% in small-stakes or negative-value consumer class actions. Even
highly personalized, high-value mass tort and employment cases pro-. 136
duce mean opt-out rates of only 4.6% and 2.2%, respectively.
Other, less comprehensive empirical studies have arrived at figures
that are comparable or smaller still. 137 To say that the Shutts litigation
was an outlier when it comes to the rate at which class members with
negative-value claims opted out is a vast understatement. The case was
a freak. 13
8
The anomalous nature of these opt-out figures appears to be
completely lost upon the Court in Shutts-or, alternatively, the Court
made a deliberate choice to ignore the anomaly in rendering its deci-
sion. Whatever the explanation, the Court treats the opt-out rate in
Shutts as typical of class actions generally and, hence, as reliable evi-
dence of the manner in which a notice and opt-out procedure will
generally operate in all cases. "[S]uch results," the Court proclaims,
referring to the 3400 opt-outs, "show that the 'opt out' procedure
1166 (Kan. 1984), rev'd in part, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (emphasis added). Even allowing
for the possibility that the trial court was speaking somewhat imprecisely here, it is
clear that there was no material number of class members with substantial claims.
136 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1529, 1532 (2004).
The authors report similar results in assessing the rate at which class members appear
at fairness hearings to object to proposed settlements:
Only in commercial cases does the objection rate rise to nontrivial levels, but
this case type has only four cases in the sample. No other case type displays a
mean objection rate of even 5 percent of class members. Like opt-outs, objec-
tors are rare and this result varies little across the vast majority of case types.
Id. at 1549.
137 THOMAS E. WILLGING, LAURAL L. HOOPER & ROBERTJ. NIEMEC, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL
REPORT TO TI-E ADviSORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 10 (1996) ("Across all four dis-
tricts, the median percentage of members who opted out of a settlement was either
0.1% or 0.2% of the total membership of the class ... ").
M One is left to wonder what the cause was for this astonishing level of engage-
ment among class members. I have been unable to find any obvious explanation.
Class members may have been unusually attentive to the litigation given their likely
awareness of the underlying dispute about royalties that preceded the Shutts case. But
still, why should negative-value claimants opt out when they could not afford to pursue
their own actions, especially given that the earlier Shutts decision seemingly made vic-
tory a sure thing in the second litigation so long as the case could be certified?
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provided by Kansas is by no means pro forma' as a means of securing
simple or procedural consent." 9
This distorted view of the practical operation of opt-out notice
then leads the Court to make its aggressive assumption. Having con-
cluded that notice and opt-out generally provide a meaningful and re-
liable opportunity for the exercise of autonomous consent, the Court
concludes that
the Constitution does not require more to protect what must be the
somewhat rare species of class member who is unwilling to execute an
,opt out' form, but whose claim is nonetheless so important that he can-
not be presumed to consent to being a member of the class by his failure
1401
to do so.
The Court assumes, in other words, that it is generally appropriate
to treat the notice and opt-out procedure as one that elicits a mean-
ingful expression of simple consent from class members ("unwilling to
execute an 'opt out' form""14 ) or, at least, as one that generally causes
the class member to become engaged with the proceedings in a suffi-
ciently active manner that it is appropriate to treat a failure to re-
spond as a waiver of objections and, hence, as procedural consent
("presumed to consent to being a member of the class by his failure to
do so"142).
As a purely descriptive matter, these assumptions are simply un-
tenable. It is true that the miniscule opt-out rates found by Professors
Eisenberg and Miller do not alone indicate a lack of voluntary action,
since one might make the assumption that many class members, if put
to the choice, would elect to permit class counsel to litigate their
claims, particularly if those claims cannot be economically litigated on
an individual basis. However, when coupled with our common ex-
perience with the increasing proliferation of class action mass mail-
ings, these figures undermine the plausibility of any assumption of
mass voluntary choice and instead suggest a very different reality in
the significance and impact of opt-out notice. The vast majority of
class members in negative-value or small-stakes class actions will not
even know that they possess a potential claim. Unlike in the case of a
personal injury or other serious individual harm-where claimants
will already be focused upon the fact of their injury, making the
139 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 813.
140 Id.
41 Id. (emphasis added).
42 Id. (emphasis added).
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chances greater that a mailing relating to the injury may catch their
attention 143-the mailing in a small-stakes class action is unlikely to be
any more salient than the ubiquitous junk-mail marketing materials
that we all receive regularly, dressing commercial solicitations up as
checks, "urgent notices," or opportunities for unlikely sweepstakes
jackpots.144 Class action notices are not delivered by process servers,
after all; they are sent through the post, often in bulk mailings. '" The
fact that such notices, by definition, do not refer to the circumstances
of individual recipients in the text of the notice makes it all the more
unlikely that the mailings will engage the attention of recipients in a
143 Even in such high-stakes cases, one should be cautious in making assumptions
about the level of consent or other state of mind that an individual exhibits by failing
to execute an opt out. For any but the most sophisticated or trained person, the prac-
tical and legal implications of an opt-out notice may be utterly opaque. See, e.g., Debra
Lyn Bassett, Implied "Consent" to Personal Jurisdiction in Transnational Class Litigation,
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 619, 626-28 (detailing these and other limitations on class ac-
tion notice). As I have argued elsewhere:
While it is probably true that most individuals who suffer serious injury or
harm would consider pursuing litigation on their own, it is quite another mat-
ter to assume breezily that all those individuals will in fact exercise their right
to opt out and hence require no further consideration by the certifying court.
Many people do not pay attention to the notices that they receive, and some
people who do receive a notice may make unwise or uninformed decisions, ei-
ther from a failure to understand the consequences of not opting out or from
a simple lack of good judgment.
Wolff, supra note 110, at 775 n.174.
144 Professor Monaghan makes a similar observation. See Monaghan, supra note
114, at 1185 ("Indeed, it is[] beyond the experience or expectation of reasonable citi-
zens that the failure to respond to what looks like a slightly unusual piece ofjunk mail
constitutes assent to the solicitation .... " (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits ofJudicial Rulemak-
ing: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 461, 467-68 (1997))).
145, One can draw a useful comparison to the efforts that counsel make in high-
stakes class litigation to contact individual class members. Whether it is class counsel
or competing lawyers doing the work (which will vary with the structure and posture of
the proceeding), attorneys in high-stakes class actions often create websites, undertake
elaborate advertising campaigns, and make individual contact (where permissible) in
order to ensure the highest possible level of voluntary participation or exclusion from
such proceedings. See, e.g., Asbestos Class Action, http://asbestosclassaction.100491.fi-ee-
press-release.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2008); Official Pennsylvania and NewJersey Fen
Phen Class Action Website, http://www.leflaw.net/fenphen/01311999.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2008); cf KENNITH R. FEINBERG, Wi-AT Is LIFE WORTI? THE UNPRECE-
DENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/1I, at 48-63 (2005) (detailing the
elaborate efforts that were required to communticate with known victims of the defin-
ing tragedy of the present generation in order to give confidence that victims were
making informed decisions about their participation in the compensation fund).
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manner sufficient for a finding of procedural consent through waiver,
much less that recipients will form a state of mind that could be de-
scribed as simple and voluntary consent.146
But the Shutts Court does not rely solely upon its description of
the notice and opt-out procedures, or its implicit and flawed assump-
tion that the efficacy of that procedure in the Kansas litigation was
typical, in justifying the conclusion that out-of-state absentees can be
bound to a state-court proceeding. It also devotes a large portion of
its discussion to the other procedural protections that Kansas,
like most jurisdictions, promises to absentees in modern class action
proceedings. It is in these sections that the true analytical engine of
the opinion may be found. Indeed, it is these sections that contain
some of the most familiar passages of the opinion, including the
Court's extended discussion of Hansberry v. Lee and its description of
the cosseted absent class plaintiff who "may sit back and allow the liti-
gation to run its course, content in knowing that there are safeguards
provided for his protection."147  This extended discussion focuses
upon two basic concepts.
First, the Court emphasizes its belief that a class action proceeding
threatens to alter the legal position of absent class plaintiffs to a much
lesser extent than an individual lawsuit does the legal position of a de-
fendant. Thus, the Court explains, a typical defendant faces the risk
of an open-ended damages judgment or a coercive order enforced by
the contempt power, the possibility of greater preclusion conse-
quences, and the potential threat of being assessed costs and fees.148
An absent class plaintiff, in contrast, faces only the loss of a potential
cause of action-a cognizable property right, to be sure, but a less in-
vasive and expansive form of burden than that faced by the typical in-
dividual defendant, particularly when the claim is one that the absent
class plaintiff could not realistically pursue through individual litiga-
146 Professors Eisenberg and Miller agree:
The results reported above also undermine the idea that absent class members
may be taken to consent to the court's jurisdiction over their person by virtue of
their failure to opt out of the action. The overwhelming inaction displayed by
class members in the reported cases suggests that a class member's failure to opt
out should not readily be equated to an affirmative consent to jurisdiction.
Common sense indicates that apathy, not decision, is the basis for inaction.
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 136, at 1561.
147 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808-11.
148 Id. at 808.
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tion.149 Second, the Court reiterates the requirement from Hansberry
that the interests of absent class members must be adequately repre-
sented "at all times"' 0 by the named plaintiff (and her counsel) in any
class proceeding-the requirement that predominated in the Court's
discussions of the binding effects of class action proceedings earlier in
the twentieth century.151
But what do these familiar features of class litigation have to do
with the question of consent? To be sure, the requirement of opt-out
notice does preserve the opportunity for highly motivated and atten-
tive class members to manifest their unwillingness to participate in the
proceedings, an opportunity that might be particularly important in
litigation involving high-stakes claims. But that is the exceptional
case, not the norm. One might also posit that a class member whose
interests were implicated only to a modest extent and who was aware
that the named plaintiff and class counsel share a duty to represent
her interests would be willing to consent more readily, if asked. And,
indeed, the Court conspicuously weaves the discourse of consent into
the passages describing these procedural protections-as, for exam-
ple, when it proclaims that class members are presumed to "know"
that a proceeding is underway and that safeguards are in place to pro-
tect them.15 But, however sensible these propositions may sound as a
matter of class action policy, none of them is a description of the ac-
tual, simple consent of class members in the typical case, nor even of
the form of procedural consent that might arise from an actual affilia-
tion or active engagement between class members and the litigation.
149 Id. at 809-11. The Court's reasoning becomes much more problematic in the
case of personal injuries or other high-value claims. A claim for personal injuries may
well be the single most valuable asset that some class members own, even discounting
for the possibility that individual litigation will fail to produce any recovery. What is
more, individuals who have suffered serious injury will typically have a much greater
level of personal and psychic investment in the disposition of their claims, making the
due process concern for individualized consideration and treatment all the more
acute-a species of concern that generally finds expression in the "superiority" prong
of a certification analysis, when it finds expression at all. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. To-
bacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding "[t]he most compelling rationale
for finding superiority in a class action-the existence of a negative value suit-...
missing" in a case with high-value claims); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (making a similar finding).
150 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43, 45 (1940)).
151 See Shapiro, supra note 110, at 937-38 (discussing Hansbeny and Supreme Tribe of
Ben-Hurv. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921)).
15'2 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810.
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Rather, these features of class litigation bear upon the question of
constructive consent. That is, they bear upon the policy determina-
tion that class members should be bound by the proceeding as if they
had "consented" (or consciously passed up the opportunity to object)
because the Court believes that, given the type of claim at issue and
the mechanisms in place for its resolution, some set of core values-
deterrence, fairness, efficiency, even-handed administration of similar
claims-will be well served by that legal fiction. 153 In Shutts itself, the
legal fiction of constructive consent in class action proceedings is mo-
tivated primarily by the Court's concern that state courts should con-
tinue to have the power to entertain nationwide class actions, a power
that the Court fears would be eviscerated by a requirement for a genu-
ine expression of simple consent through the "opt-in" procedure that
the petitioners sought.14 That fiction is justified by a procedural due
process calculus according to which the Court assesses the alteration
in legal position with which class members are threatened and meas-
ures that threat against the degree of confidence the proceeding of-
fers that the interests of class members will be adequately protected
even in the absence of individual participation. This is essentially a
specialized application of the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge calculus. 
155
When the threatened alteration in legal position is modest and the
proceeding provides a high level of confidence that the interests of
class members will be protected through other means, then a lesser
degree of individualized process is adequate, validating the weak form
of constructive consent that is frequently the limit of what opt-out no-
tice can provide.
Once we recognize that the "consent" that Shutts relies upon in
authorizing state court jurisdiction over out-of-state absentees is a
form of constructive consent motivated by substantive policy concerns,
rather than a description of actual autonomous choices that class
members are likely to make, the Court's reliance upon the internal
procedural safeguards of the proceeding as a justification for ratchet-
ing down the necessary level of "consent" acquires much broader sig-
153 Cf. Shapiro, supra note 110, at 924-27 (discussing deterrence as a justification
supporting certain legal fictions in the administration of class action litigation).
154 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 813-14.
155 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 33249 (1976) (holding that, as a general
matter, a claim that due process requires a certain adjudicatory procedure should be
analyzed by measuring the state's interest in proceeding without the requested proce-
dure against the likely effect of the procedure on the accuracy, reliability, and fairness
of the proceeding in which the complainant's interests have been placed at risk).
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nificance. Although the doctrinal holding that results from the
Court's analysis of the procedural safeguards in Shutts is not strictly
applicable to cases in which jurisdiction is not an issue, the Court's
analysis is still highly relevant to such cases. It reveals a method, how-
ever clumsily expressed through the language of personal jurisdiction,
that has broader application in specifying the constitutional limits and
requirements for the procedures employed in representative litigation.
One might argue that this effort to discern a general constitu-
tional method for representative due process analysis from Shutts re-
quires one to impose upon the opinion as much as one gleans from it,
given the confusion that the Court itself displays about the relation-
ship between jurisdictional and procedural due process issues. For
example, late in the opinion, the Courtjustifies its rejection of the de-
fendant's proposed "opt-in" requirement in part by explaining that
such a rule "would require the invalidation of scores of state statutes
and of the class-action provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
156
This is just plain wrong. The federal courts can exercise personal ju-
risdiction over parties throughout the territory of the United States
when authorized to do so by rule or statute, whether the underlying
cause of action is based on federal or state law.";7 They would not be
limited by a constitutional holding regarding the jurisdictional reach
of state courts where a Federal Rule (here, Rule 23) provides an alter-
native to Rule 4 in attaching jurisdiction and issuing notice. The
Court is confusing the jurisdictional and due process implications of
156 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 813-14 (emphasis added).
157 An increasing number of federal statutory causes of action include provisions
authorizing nationwide service of process, as does the interpleader statute, which ex-
tends to claims based ol state law. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) (2000) (authorizing
nationwide service of process in federal securities actions); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2361
(2000) (authorizing nationwide service of process in statutory interpleader actions);
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (1) (C) (authorizing service of process for any person subject to the
federal interpleader statute). And, of course, Rule 4(k)(2) authorizes worldwide ser-
vice of process on federal question claims as a backup option when a plaintiff could
not otherwise sue the defendant in any state, provided that the defendant has suffi-
cient aggregate contacts with the nation as a whole. See, e.g., Graduate Mgmt. Admis-
sion Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 596-600 (E.D. Va. 2003) (applying Rule
4(k) (2)). Federal appeals courts have uniformly upheld the constitutionality of these
provisions. See, e.g., Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 369-70 (3d Cir. 2002)
(embracing the "national contacts" standard for federal nationwide service provision
and citing cases from other circuits that have reached a similar result). The Supreme
Court has never addressed the issue squarely, though it has assumed arguendo the
propriety of nationwide service in issuing a holding that disfavored interpretations of
federal statutes that would find such service provisions to exist by implication. Omni
Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., 484 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1987).
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its own analysis. It is not unduly harsh to say that the Shutts Court shot
from the hip a bit in discussing the procedural features of class pro-
ceedings, and it did not always keep the issues ofjurisdiction and pro-
cedural due process straight.
Thus, in order to provide a convincing account of the proper im-
pact of Shutts upon the broader constitutional parameters of represen-
tative litigation, one must skirt the line between interpreting what is
actually there and discerning what the Court would have said had it
been more careful. That being so, it is useful to ask whether the con-
stitutional methodology described above is consistent, even continu-
ous, with earlier approaches that the Court has embraced when pre-
sented with similar problems. Such continuity would give greater
confidence that a "revisionist" reading of the constitutional methodol-
ogy in Shutts-one that corrects for the opinion's slippage between ju-
risdiction and procedural due process-can properly claim a place in
the broader analytical landscape of modern representative litigation.
2. The Mullane Antecedent
And, indeed, the method for the constitutional analysis of class ac-
tion procedures that is revealed by a corrected understanding of Shutts
has an important and largely unacknowledged antecedent: the
Court's landmark 1950 opinion in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co."58 While there are some important differences, the Mullane
opinion can profitably be thought of as a mirror image of the opinion
in Shutts in many respects-a decision addressing the power of a state
court to bind absent plaintiffs to a comprehensive adjudication, but
focusing primarily upon the "pure" procedural due process rights of
the absentees and addressing the question of jurisdiction over out-of-
state absentees in only a perfunctory manner. The complementary
nature of the two cases has been largely ignored in the literature, per-
haps owing to the fact that the Shutts Court itself rather surprisingly
failed to note the relationship between the two, despite its citation to
Mullane for more prosaic propositions involving personal jurisdiction
and notice. 159
158 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
159 Professor Shapiro touches upon this observation without exploring it at length.
See Shapiro, supra note 110, at 937 (acknowledging the broader and more flexible no-
tions of due process in Mullane); see also, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,John L. Gedid &
Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. RET.
1849, 1945-46 (1998) (discussing the adequacy of representation requirement and ob-
serving that "[e]ncouraging or requiring notice to absentee class members was one
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Mullane involved a New York regulatory scheme for the admini-
stration and disposition of trust accounts. New York law authorized
the establishment of a common trust fund, administered by a fiduciary
trustee that was required to make a periodic accounting before the
Surrogate's Court to answer for any possible mismanagement or waste
of fund assets. In this mandatory accounting proceeding, the court
appointed two special guardians, one to represent the interests of in-
come beneficiaries and the other to represent those interested in the
principal."O Aside from the appointment of the special guardians to
protect their interests, trust beneficiaries received no individualized
form of process and were given notice of the proceedings only
through publication in local newspapers (a requirement that the Su-
preme Court described as "[no] more than a feint")."" A constitu-
tional challenge to the regulations placed two questions before the
Supreme Court: whether the courts of New York had the jurisdic-
tional power to adjudicate the interests of beneficiaries and potential
beneficiaries who were not present or domiciled in the State; and, if
so, whether due process required that some or all of them receive indi-
vidualized notice and an opportunity to participate in the proceedings.
The equitable proceeding authorized under this New York bank-
ing law scheme, which was a lineal descendant of the type of proceed-
ing that served as one of the precursors for the modern class action,
obvious device, and the Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. and Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts later embraced this approach" (footnotes omitted)). But
even Professor Shapiro, who clearly hopes to make use of Mullane in articulating a
more flexible constitutional jurisprudence of representative litigation, nonetheless
makes a point of noting that Mullane was "not in form a class action." Shapiro, supra
note 110, at 937 n.61. The observation is technically correct, but it is a distracting re-
minder, as it seems to reinforce the view that Mullane operated in a separate juridical
category and so has limited direct relevance to the administration of formal class ac-
tions. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319 (approving notice only to some identifiable benefi-
ciaries because "[t]he individual interest does not stand alone but is identical with that
of a class"). A good note in the Texas Law Review acknowledges some of the important
parallels between Shutts and Mullane, though it treats the analytical significance of
those parallels only lightly. See Kurt A. Schwarz, Note, Due Process and Equitable Relief in
State Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 68 TEX. L. REV. 415,
430-31 (1989).
10 It bears noting that the interests of these two groups were in fact adverse par-
ties in the Supreme Court appeal: the guardian for the income beneficiaries (Mul-
lane) was the sole appellant challenging the judgment of the New York Court of Ap-
peals, and the guardian for the principal beneficiaries (Vaughn) joined the trust
company in defending the judgment. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 310 (identifying the
guardians and their respective roles in the appeal).
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315; see also id. at 307-10 (describing the manner in which
notice was required to be, and was, given).
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bore many important similarities to the class action in Shutts that
would follow it thirty-five years later. Both proceedings involved the
potential extinguishment of claims for monetary damages possessed
by a class of plaintiffs with an interest in an investment. In both, the
only interests of class members that were placed in jeopardy were their
potential monetary claims; absentees were otherwise not in danger of
adverse consequences from the proceeding.' 2 In both, the governing
law provided for the appointment of fiduciaries who were tasked with
protecting the interests of the class (the special guardians, in Mullane;
the named plaintiff and class counsel, in Shutts) . And the policy
concern that animated the statutory scheme under review in Mullane
was similar to the concern animating the Court's analysis in Shutts: a
desire to ensure the viable administration of small-stakes assets on be-
half of stakeholders in a cost-effective manner, including a viable re-
covery method for small-stakes claims when disputes arose. 64 To be
sure, there were formal differences between the two. Some of the
trust beneficiaries in Mullane (though far from all) voluntarily chose
to pool their assets and throw in their lot with a class of similarly situ-
ated investors, while the class in Shutts consisted of individual investors
who likely had no antecedent expectation that their interests might be
162 At least, that was the assumption under which both Courts operated. Neither
considered the broader potential implications of preclusion doctrine for the interests
of class members. See generally Wolff, supra note 110, at 722 (discussing the potential
impact of the preclusion doctrine on the unlitigated claims of class members).
1 The trustee in Mullane also bore a fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiaries, but,
as the Court points out, the special circumstance of the accounting places the trustee
temporarily at odds with the beneficiaries and hence requires the intercession of a
representative loyal only to the latter. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316 ("[T]hese benefici-
aries do have a resident fiduciary as caretaker of their interest ... [b]ut it is their care-
taker who in the accounting becomes their adversary.").
164 As the court writes in Mullane:
Common trust fund legislation is addressed to a problem appropriate for
state action. Mounting overheads have made administration of small trusts
undesirable to corporate trustees. In order that donors and testators of mod-
erately sized trusts may not be denied the service of corporate fiduciaries,
[many jurisdictions] have permitted pooling small trust estates into one fund
for investment administration.
Id. at 307-08.
In Shutts, the Court exhibits an unfortunate lack of attention to the source of the
substantive policies that inform its analysis, apparently assuming that any of the laws
that might be applied to the proceeding on remand would take the same view about
the particular desirability of aggregating small-stakes claims. That is probably a safe
assumption, but the careless treatment of the issue is particularly inapt in light of the
Court's holding on choice of law in the same decision.
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adjudicated collectively. And the representative proceeding in Shutts
unfolded under the rubric of class certification, while Mullane in-
volved an equitable accounting conducted by appointed guardians-a
procedure, as the Mullane Court indicated, that had roots in historic
in rem practice.'" But these differences in form were considerably
less significant than the functional similarities between the proceed-
ings. In both, a state court sought to entertain a representative suit in
order to adjudicate the claims of a large number of in-state and out-of-
state plaintiffs, appointing a presumptively adequate representative to
champion the interests at stake; and in both, the Court considered the
dual questions of the state's power to exercise jurisdiction over the
out-of-state claims and the level of individualized process that was due
to class members.
On the issue of jurisdiction, the Mullane Court had little to say.
After rejecting the bank's attempt to rely upon the in rem qualities of
the action as a basis for binding out-of-state beneficiaries, the Court
nonetheless upheld New York's jurisdictional power to entertain the
multistate action, offering the following passage as the entirety of its
analysis:
It is sufficient to observe that, whatever the technical definition of its
chosen procedure, the interest of each state in providing means to close
trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the
supervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to estab-
lish beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all
claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full
opportunity to appear and be heard.
Personal jurisdiction was in a state of flux at this point in time-
International Shoe having been decided just five years earlier 67 -and
the Court may have been reluctant to use the idiosyncratic context of
a trust accounting to break new doctrinal ground in that arena (which
would have been necessary here, since the Court had yet to apply In-
ternational Shoe to an individual, noncorporate person). Rather, the
165 See id. at 311-13 (discussing the in rem pedigree of trust accountings and find-
ing that such formal classifications do not control the question of a state's power to
administer such a scheme).
I [d. at 313.
7 nt'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
168 As it turned out, however, the Court did just that eight years later in Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254-55 (1958), resolving a complicated trust dispute involving
competing judgments from Florida and Delaware courts with a holding on personal
jurisdiction to which it would later give much broader application by incorporating it
into its first major decision on jurisdiction and products liability. See World-Wide
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Mullane Court was most interested in the procedural protections that
were required in a representative action.
As with Shutts, the central holding of Mullane is frequently invoked
but often poorly understood. The "procedural" issue before the
Court in Mullane involved two aspects of the constitutional require-
ment of notice-what type of notice due process requires, and who
must receive it. As to the first question, the Court articulated its oft-
quoted standard that due process requires the issuance of notice that
is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise in-
terested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an op-
portunity to present their objections"-notice "such as one desirous of
actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accom-
plish" that end.1 69 This describes the type of notice that the Court
found due process to require, when notice is called for. As to who
must receive notice in a representative action like the one before it,
however, the Mullane Court gave a more complex and nuanced answer.
As is well known, the Court found that the failure of the New York
regulatory scheme to provide individual process to any of the known
present beneficiaries rendered the program constitutionally infirm. 
70
Some of those beneficiaries, at least, had a constitutional entitlement
to personal notice-some, but not all. In fact, the Court identified
three categories of beneficiaries in Mullane whom the Surrogate Court
could bind to the proceeding without providing individualized notice:
(1) unknown beneficiaries who could not be discovered with reason-
able effort; (2) beneficiaries who were known or discoverable but who
possessed only future or contingent interests in the trust; and (3)
known present beneficiaries for whom providing personal service
would impose great expense or cause undue delay.1 7 1 In each case,
the Court mapped its conclusion that individual process was not re-
quired onto a distinctive concern that informed its due process ap-
proach: (1) the practical administrability of the state's regulatory
scheme; (2) the qualified or conditional nature of the class member's
interest; and (3) the presence of an adequate representative with
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (applying the principle from
Hanson). Surprisingly, the Hanson majority does not even address the personal juris-
diction holding in Mullane (though Justice Black invokes it favorably in dissent), per-
haps further indicating the limited precedential significance of that part of the opin-
ion. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 260-61 (BlackJ., dissenting).
169 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15.
170 Id. at 319.
171 Id. at 317-19.
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closely aligned interests who could be relied upon to press arguments
to the benefit of similarly situated absentees. 
172
The Court's concern over administrability revived the familiar im-
perative of the traditional in rem proceeding, in which the state's in-
terest in achieving a comprehensive and stable adjudication of peo-
ple's rights in disputed property authorizes a more expansive exercise
ofjudicial authority."7' The same imperative led the Mullane Court to
conclude that a state's interest in making collective trust instruments
available to its citizens justifies dispensing with individualized process
in cases where a strict notice requirement might otherwise make a
comprehensive adjudication impossible.174 That holding has particu-
lar significance in light of the Court's finding, earlier in the opinion,
that a state's formal designation of trust proceedings as in rem or in
personam in nature has no relevance to the jurisdictional analysis' 
75
The more permissive due process treatment of unknown beneficiaries
in Mullane rested upon an assessment of state interests and practical
impacts, rather than those qualities of the trust device that resemble a
legal res in form. Note also that the state interest that does the work
here-the requirement that adjudication be comprehensive if it is to
be efficacious-is similarly implicated in many class actions brought
under Rule 23(b) (1) or (b) (2). Mullane clearly lends support to the
proposition, made needlessly uncertain by confusion over the mean-
ing of Shutts, that individualized process in the form of notice and opt-
out rights is not always a constitutional requirement in injunctive or
limited-fund proceedings.
As to the second concern, Mullane invites an analysis of "the char-
acter of the proceeding and the nature of the interests.., involved"
when asking whether individualized process is necessary." 6 The less
definite, concrete, and extant a person's property interest, the less ur-
gent is the need for providing individualized process to absentees,
particularly when the proceeding is structured so as to provide addi-
tional assurance that those interests will be safeguarded in the class
member's absence. Although not making the point explicit, the
172 Id.
173 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877) (discussing the "larger and more
general" idea of in remn jurisdiction as a means of reaching property owned by the par-
ties to allow for comprehensive adjudication).
174 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317-18 ("[W]e have no doubt that such impracticable
and extended searches are not required in the name of due process.").
175 Id. at 312-13.
176 Id. at 317.
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Court suggested a sliding-scale approach to the analysis, with those in-
terests that "are so remote as to be ephemeral" requiring no individu-
alized process at all. 
77
Finally, in the portion of its holding that is least frequently dis-
cussed or appreciated, the Mullane Court emphasized a principle of
class representation in finding that even known, present beneficiaries
need not necessarily receive individualized process. The trustee had
argued that providing personal service to the "large number" of such
beneficiaries, some of whom resided "without [i.e., outside] the juris-
diction," would have been unduly expensive and delayed the admini-
stration of the fund beyond the point of usefulness."" In contrast to
its later decision in Eisen, where the Court interpreted Rule 23(b) (3)
to require individualized process for every class member in a small-
stakes damages actions even at the risk of crippling expense,1 7 9 the
Mullane Court concluded that, as a matter of due process, "no such
service is required under the circumstances. " 18 Rather, the Court ex-
plained:
This type of trust presupposes a large number of small interests. The in-
dividual interest does not stand alone but is identical with that of a class.
The rights of each in the integrity of the fund and the fidelity of the trus-
tee are shared by many other beneficiaries. Therefore notice reasonably
certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safe-
guard the interests of all, since any objection sustained would inure to
the benefit of all. '
8 1
Class representation, Mullane suggests, may sometimes be a
proper replacement for individualized process, provided that an ade-
quate population of potential objectors are invited to participate in
the proceeding.""
Taken together, these passages essentially offer a more thorough
exposition of the range of considerations that the Shutts Court em-
ployed in authorizing its lax form of constructive consent for state
177 Id.
178 Id. at 318-19.
179 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-76 (1974). Eisen is one of
the important occasions on which the Court misread its own opinion in Mullane, con-
flating the standard governing the type of notice required with the standard governing
who must be provided with notice in a class or representative proceeding.
180 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319.
181 Id.
182 See id. ("[N]otice reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in object-
ing is likely to safeguard the interests of all .... ").
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court jurisdiction over nationwide class actions. Recall that, under
our corrected understanding of Shutts, we have abandoned the fiction
that opt-out notice generally provokes any meaningful expression of
autonomous consent, and instead have recognized a form of construc-
tive consent as the basis of a state court's power to entertain a nation-
wide class action. That constructive consent is justified, under Shutts,
by (1) the imperative that comprehensive class actions remain a viable
option for the enforcement of state liability regimes, particularly in
the case of small-stakes claims; (2) the limited nature of the property
interests of absentees that are placed at risk in such a proceeding (and
by the presumed ability of class members to take steps such as enter-
ing an appearance or opting out to protect their interests, if they are
sufficiently motivated to monitor the litigation); and (3) the presence
of an adequate representative who is required "at all times [to] ade-
quately represent the interests of the absent class members." s18 3 The
analytical methodology revealed by a corrected reading of Shutts is
both consistent and continuous with the methodology employed by
the Court in Mullane, its closest constitutional antecedent.
B. Class Certification, Choice of Law, and Choice of Remedies
Under the Mullane/Shutts analytical methodology, then, we are in-
vited to ask: what is the nature and extent of the change in the legal
position of class members that is effectuated when a court issues a
preemptive injunction to enforce its own denial of certification? In
Mullane and Shutts themselves, the threatened change in legal position
was the extinguishment of a cause of action (one that likely had nega-
tive litigation value in the case of Mullane and clearly did in the case of
Shutts). The Mullane Court concluded that New York could perform a
comprehensive adjudication in the trust proceeding without provid-
ing individualized process to all class members, so long as enough of
the known present beneficiaries received individual notice to ensure
an opportunity for adequate objectors to participate in the proceed-
ings. In Shutts, the Court emphasized the limited nature of the threat
to class members' legal position as one of the primary factors authoriz-
ing the lesser form of constructive consent embodied in opt-out no-
tice, while also holding that Kansas's limited jurisdictional reach re-
183 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985); see also id. at 811-12
(describing various protections that allow a state to exercise jurisdiction over the claim
of an absent class action plaintiff without violating the Due Process Clause).
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quired that opt-out notice be provided to every class member.1 4 What
treatment should a federal court's issuance of an injunction to en-
force a denial of certification receive under these precedents, assum-
ing for the moment that territorial jurisdiction poses no barrier?1
8 5
The answer is that an antisuit injunction of the kind issued by the
court in Bridgestone/Firestone II constitutes a lesser alteration in position
or status than does the adjudication of an absentee's underlying claim
and should not require the issuance of individualized process to puta-
tive class members. When properly crafted, an injunction enforcing
the denial of certification entails the removal of a single remedial op-
tion from the litigation arsenal of an absentee. While this change in
position is not insignificant, such an injunction leaves the absentees'
legal claims uncompromised and will permit meaningful alternative
avenues for relief so long as the injunction is not overly broad. If an
injunction enforcing a denial of certification aims only to prohibit na-
tionwide proceedings, for example, it will leave open the opportunity
to bring statewide class actions that can still provide relief. If the in-
junction aims only to prohibit an omnibus class action that would
sweep in multiple and distinct injury-causing scenarios (like disparate
product lines in a defective products case), it will still permit more
targeted class actions that encompass a narrower array of claims. Pro-
vided that the injunction does not effectively foreclose any economi-
cally viable means of redress, class members need not be made formal
parties to the action through individualized process in order to be
bound by such an order.
In analyzing this question, it is useful to look at the treatment that
procedural and remedial options, like the availability of class certifica-
tion, receive in other contexts-in particular, the treatment of such
provisions in choice of law analysis and in the retroactivity of changes
to the law within a given jurisdiction. (To avoid confusion, through-
out the discussion that follows, I use the terms "remedy" and "reme-
dial options" to refer to the vehicles for enforcing a cause of action
within a lawsuit-the rules governing whether a class action or other
form ofjoinder is available, for example, or the doctrines that govern
how an injunction is administered-and not the measure of damages
184 See id. at 812 ("[T]he procedure followed by Kansas... with an explanation of
the right to 'opt out,' satisfies due process.").
185 This assumption will prove warranted, as I explain below. See infra text accom-
panying note 213.
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or other doctrines that bear upon the definition of the parties' rights
under the applicable liability scheme.)
In a dispute with multistate contacts, where choice of law ques-
tions might arise, a court will ordinarily apply its own procedures to
the dispute before it, even when it must apply the law of another ju-
risdiction in defining the rights and obligations of the parties. 11 The
procedures and remedial vehicles that a court makes available for pur-
suing relief are ordinarily not treated as a part of the "applicable law"
that must be subjected to choice of law analysis in determining the
parties' rights.18 7 The Supreme Court has validated this practice, hold-
ing that the use of local procedures in disputes governed by foreign
law is constitutionally permissible, even if the events giving rise to the
dispute have no connection with the forum.'s A state has a legitimate
administrative interest in applying its own procedures to a dispute, sat-
isfying the requirement of the Full Faith and Credit Clause; and-
more important for present purposes-litigants will not suffer hardship
or undue surprise from the application of forum procedure, even when
the forum otherwise has no connection to the events giving rise to the
dispute, thus satisfying the requirement of the Due Process Clause.
86 Both Restatements set forth this principle clearly. See RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 585 (1934) ("All matters of procedure are governed by the law of the
forum."); id. § 585 cmt. a ("Matters of procedure include access to courts, the condi-
tions of maintaining or barring action, the form of proceedings in court, the method
of proving a claim, the method of dealing with foreign law, and proceedings after
judgment."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLI(-r OF LAWS § 127 (1971) ("The local
law of the forum governs rules of pleading and the conduct of proceedings in court.");
id. § 127 cmt. a ("The local law of the forum governs, among other things.... the
joinder of causes of action .... "); see also, e.g., Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Turner, 228
S.E.2d 478, 483 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (applying North Carolina standards for adminis-
tering an injunction to a contract dispute governed by California law). Statutes of limi-
tations are the most prominent exception to this rule. Some states have enacted "bor-
rowing statutes" that apply the limitations period of the forum whose law will govern
the dispute if that forum considers its limitations period to constitute a substantive
constraint on the parties' rights and would want other jurisdictions to enforce that
constraint.
187 There are exceptions, of course. Laws that might be regarded as "procedural"
in common parlance can sometimes embody state interests that have legitimate force
in multistate disputes, and courts will sometimes look past the "procedural" designa-
tion to subject such provisions to interest-based choice of law analysis. See, e.g., Boyd
Rosene & Assocs., Inc. v. Kan. Mun. Gas Agency, 174 F.3d 1115, 1118-26 (10th Cir.
1999) (concluding that Oklahoma's approach to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws calls for the performance of a choice of law analysis on a provision regarding the
availability of attorneys' fees and finding an out-of-state rule applicable to the dispute).
188 See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778 n.10 (1984) (rec-
ognizing "traditional choice-of-law principles" according to which "the law of the fo-
rum State governs on matters of procedure").
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This proposition is grounded in a basic observation that captures
an important part of what we mean when we attempt to define the dis-
tinction between "substantive" and "procedural" provisions of law in
this context: litigants do not enjoy a strong ex ante reliance interest
in the application of any particular procedural or remedial vehicle for
the enforcement of their rights, even when they do possess a reliance
interest with respect to the liability regime that will define the content
of those rights. 8 9 This is not to say that the choice of procedures and
remedies in a dispute is insignificant. To the contrary, it is to be
hoped that the vital role that procedural and remedial vehicles can
play in determining the ability of litigants to give effect to their rights
now goes without saying in the American legal system.90 The point,
rather, is that our legal system treats even important procedural and
remedial doctrines as matters as to which individuals have no constitu-
tionally recognized prelitigation entitlement or expectation.
It is not only in multistate disputes that this is so. A similar princi-
ple holds true in the doctrine of retroactivity, where changes in pro-
cedural and remedial vehicles within a given jurisdiction, unlike
changes in the jurisdiction's liability rules, generally do not provoke
retroactivity analysis when applied to litigants whose liability-related
conduct took place under the old regime.' )" Questions of retroactivity
189 Professor Issacharoff makes a similar point in his discussion of statutes of limi-
tations and Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988):
The Court... [in Wortman] found that longstanding common law principles
would allow for the application of lex fori rather than lex loci to the determi-
nation of the statute of limitations for claims brought in Kansas, even if the
underlying dispute bore no relation to Kansas whatsoever. Accordingly, the
fact that Shutts liberalized personal jurisdiction for nationwide class actions
did not require, as a constitutional matter, trying the underlying claims as if
they were still in their home courts. Unlike the Guaranty Trust outcome-
determinative formalism of the early Erie line of cases, the Court in Wortman
drew a different line around whether the application of one or another deci-
sional rule violated preexisting substantive commitments.
Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 1863-64 (footnote omitted).
190 As the Supreme Court has memorably written, "[l]egal obligations that exist
but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the
grasp." De La Rama S.S. Co. v. United States, 344 U.S. 386, 390 (1953) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (quoting In reThe Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922)).
191 See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 275 (1994) ("Changes in
procedural rules may often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without
raising concerns about retroactivity."). For a discussion of circumstances in which the
procedure/substance distinction produces less clear answers in retroactivity analysis,
see David Frisch, Rational Retroactivity in a Commercial Context, 58 ALA. L. REV. 765, 785-
87 nn.101-06 (2007).
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and choice of law sometimes play out differently within these broad
constitutional parameters, with legal systems varying their treatment
of certain remedial issues as "procedural" or "substantive" for specific
policy reasons."" But the basic tenet is the same in both the multistate
and the purely domestic context: the right that a person possesses to
have some predictable liability standard govern his conduct, so that he
can modify his actions in light of that standard and avoid or control
the extent of his liability, does not include a right to expect any par-
ticular procedural or remedial vehicle to govern the adjudication of
his claims. Although such vehicles can have a significant impact on
the outcome of disputes and must satisfy the requirements of due
process in their own right, potential litigants generally have no en-
forceable ex ante interest in the application of any particular regime.
In this important respect, the foreclosing of one procedural or reme-
dial avenue for the effectuation of a claim is consistently treated as a
much less substantial alteration in legal position or status than the
resolution of the cause of action itself.
This is not to say that the Due Process Clause imposes no limits on
the ability of a federal court to foreclose procedural options for class
members. Mullane and Shutts provide guidance as to the process that
is due. First and foremost, a court in such a case must ensure ade-
quate representation and an adversarial presentation of the issues in
the proceeding if it intends to bind absentees to the result. In the
case of an injunction enforcing the denial of certification, this re-
quirement will likely be satisfied in most cases. The ordinary re-
quirements of equity would indicate that it is not appropriate to issue
an antisuit injunction to enforce a denial of certification unless coun-
sel are actively attempting to circumvent the court's order by filing
another proceeding and thus threatening harm that cannot be ade-
quately redressed at law. That being so, there will always be at least
one party who will have a strong incentive to advocate in favor of class
treatment and to contest vigorously the imposition of an antisuit in-
junction-perhaps more than one, if the defendant also desires certi-
fication in hopes of securing approval for a proposed settlement.
Due process also requires attention to the scope of any injunction
enforcing a denial of certification. In a negative-value or small-stakes
case, aggregate treatment is likely to be the only mechanism by which
192 See, e.g., Boyd Rosene, 174 F.3d at 1119-21 (finding that the treatment of an at-
torneys' fee provision as "procedural" by Oklahoma courts for retroactivity purposes
does not control the designation of the provision for choice of law purposes).
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class members can obtain a recovery. 19 In such a case, an injunction
that broadly prevents any subsequent class action on a body of claims
following a denial of certification would be the functional equivalent
of an adverse judgment extinguishing those claims. In many cases,
however, it will be possible to craft an order that enforces the denial
of certification in the original lawsuit without foreclosing the possibil-
ity that a more narrowly defined class action could properly be certi-
fied in a subsequent proceeding. The Seventh Circuit ultimately or-
dered the issuance of such a narrowly crafted injunction in
Bridgestone/Firestone 1.194 The two problems in that products liability
suit that rendered an omnibus class action impossible to certify were
the choice of law obstacles that resulted from its nationwide scope and
the lack of commonality that resulted from the effort to lump multi-
ple, nonidentical product lines into a single proceeding. A state-
wide class action that only attempted to litigate claims arising from in-
dividual or similar product lines would eliminate both problems. In
exempting such actions from the scope of the injunction, the Seventh
Circuit left open meaningful alternatives for aggregate relief and can-
not be said to have effectively extinguished the small-stakes claims.
In the language of Mullane and Shutts, such an injunction effectu-
ates a limited and attenuated alteration in the legal position of class
members-"attenuated" not in the sense that the relevance of the
change to the class members' claims is difficult to identify, but rather
in the sense that it involves an aspect of the administration of their
claims as to which they had no prelitigation expectation or reliance
interest. A proposed injunction of this type will ordinarily be opposed
by vigorous advocates with strong incentives to defeat it. And, as I dis-
cuss in the next section, an antisuit injunction prohibiting serial reliti-
gation of the certification question is consistent with class action poli-
cies that may properly be ascribed to Rule 23 and, now, CAFA.196 In
short, the widespread due process objections that greeted the Seventh
193 Enforcement by public authorities will sometimes be possible in theory, of
course, but in practice such enforcement is the exception even in those cases where
there is an agency tasked with enforcing the provisions of a particular statutory
scheme.
194 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bridgestone/lFirestone
HI), 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003).
195 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bridgestone/Firestone
1), 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the multiplicity of applicable
state laws renders a class action unmanageable); id. at 1018-19 (holding that the multi-
plicity of product lines captured in the class definition also prevents certification).
196 See infra notes 204-225 and accompanying text.
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Circuit's injunction enforcing an order denying certification, though
understandable, are simply misplaced.
As a final observation on the misplaced nature of these objections,
I note that there is an established feature of class litigation that al-
ready effectuates a change to the formal legal status of class members
in the absence of class certification and without the issuance of indi-
vidualized process. Under the rule from American Pipe & Construction
Co. v. Utah, a pending federal class action tolls the statute of limita-
tions on all the putative class members' claims following a denial of
certification, even though class members will typically receive no no-
tice or individualized process when certification is denied. 97 The
comparison here is not perfect. The change in legal position associ-
ated with the tolling doctrine might be described as operating only to
the benefit of class members, so that one could plausibly characterize
the rule as involving a change in the available remedial vehicles that
"binds" only the defendant.1 98 But that is not how the Court justified
its decision in American Pipe. Quite the opposite is the case.
American Pipe was one of the first major class action decisions
handed down by the Supreme Court following the 1966 amendment
197 See 414 U.S. 538, 561 (1974) (holding that the statute of limitations is tolled
following the denial of certification when putative class members seek to intervene in
an original action to press individual claims); see also Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S.
650, 662 (1983) (holding that, in the case of a § 1983 action where a federal statute
calls for a reference to state law for statute of limitations issues, the American Pipe toll-
ing rule must track state law unless doing so would undermine a federal interest);
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983) (extending American Pipe
to cases where putative class members file their own independent lawsuits following
the denial of certification rather than seeking to intervene in the original suit).
The potential relevance of the American Pipe rule only became clear to me when I
read a draft of Professor Wasserman's recent article on tolling in successive class ac-
tions, which contains a very fine exposition of American Pipe and the Rule 23 policies it
implicates. See Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe 7olling Rule and Succes-
sive Class Actions, 58 FLA. L. REv. 803 (2006). 1 thank Professor Wasserman for sharing
her work with me.
98 There is, I think, an argument to be made that the tolling rule imposes cogni-
zable burdens on class members as well. Participating in a lawsuit can carry immense
psychological costs, and the decision whether or not to initiate litigation can be a diffi-
cult and troubling one. While the repose that a statute of limitations offers is usually
identified as a benefit for defendants, I think it reasonable to believe that many poten-
tial plaintiffs-at least those who are aware that they possess potential claims and
would consider asserting those claims-also receive an important measure of psycho-
logical peace when they know for certain that the time to initiate litigation has passed,
and hence that they no longer need to revisit the difficult decision of whether to file a
claim. The American Pipe doctrine has the effect of delaying repose for these potential
plaintiffs as well.
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to Rule 23-it was decided earlier in the same term as Eisen-and the
Court took the occasion to clarify the difference between the new
Rule 23(b) (3) and the "spurious" class action that had preceded it.
Prior to the 1966 amendments, the Court explained, class actions for
damages generally had no mandatory binding effect on absentees but
rather constituted an "invitation to joinder" that class members could
accept or reject at any point in the proceedings. 99 This "one-way"
quality led to "recurrent... abuse" in that "members of the claimed
class could in some situations await developments in the trial-or even
final judgment on the merits-in order to determine whether partici-
pation would be favorable to their interests." 20 In response to that
potential unfairness, many courts treated potential class members as
nonparties for the purpose of determining whether the limitations
period had been satisfied, requiring them to eschew strategic behavior
and affirmatively join the action in order for their claims to be consid-
ered timely. The revision to Rule 23 eliminated that practice, and the
Court explained the change in legal framework in terms of the party
status of class members. With the filing of a class action under the
new Rule 23, the Court held, "the claimed members of the class
[stand] as parties to the suit until and unless they receive[] notice
thereof and [choose] not to continue" or until the suit is formally de-
nied certification.'O' That being so, the Court concluded, there is no
unfairness in holding that the statute of limitations is tolled as to all
potential class members from the moment of filing. The American Pipe
rule, in other words, is justified by two considerations: First, it rests on
the Court's understanding that potential class members become quasi-
parties subject to at least some changes in their legal position upon
the filing of a putative class action, even before the certification deci-
sion has been made or notice has been given. Second, it rests on the
Court's conclusion that tolling the limitations period for all class
202members effectuates the purposes underlying Rule 23.
199 Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 546-47 (quoting 3B JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.10[1], at 23-2603 (2d ed. Supp. 1973)).
200 Id. at 547.
201 Id. at 551.
202 See id. at 550-56. In American Pipe itself, the district court had determined that
the requirements of adequacy and typicality were satisfied but that the class was not
numerous enough to warrant certification. Id. at 543. That finding of adequacy and
typicality gave the Supreme Court greater comfort in treating the class members as
"parties" for purposes of the tolling rule (a consideration that would have been irrele-
vant had the tolling rule been viewed as "binding" only defendants). Id. at 550-53. As I
explain in the pages that follow, the satisfaction of a similar requirement with respect
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Once again, I do not wish to overstate the analytical significance
of American Pipe to the present discussion. One could have accounted
for the tolling rule without ascribing any quasi-party status to potential
class members in an uncertified proceeding, and, with the caveat dis-
cussed in the footnote above, it may be correct to describe tolling as
"binding" only the party that it most clearly disadvantages-the de-
fendant. Nonetheless, the analytical framework that the Court chose
in explaining its result in American Pipe supports the view that the fil-
ing of a putative class action attaches sufficient jurisdiction to the po-
tential absentees to alter the mix of remedial vehicles that are avail-
able for the pursuit of their claims, even prior to certification, and
that notice and individualized process are not always necessary to ef-
fect that alteration in their legal position. That treatment of the
tolling rule is fully consistent with the analysis offered above for the
use of antisuit injunctions to enforce a denial of certification.
C. Enforcement of Certification Denials Under the Class Action Fairness Act
With this constitutional framework in place, there remains only
the question of authorization: what source of authority empowers a
federal court "to protect or effectuate 2 0 4 a denial of certification, and
what is the scope of that authority? Once again, the jurisdictional
policies bound up in CAFA provide an important part of the answer,
clarifying and augmenting the power of the federal courts to issue
such injunctions.
As with the "in aid ofjurisdiction" provision,20 ' the Supreme Court
has generally given a narrow interpretation to the authority of federal
courts to enjoin state proceedings in order to effectuate their judg-
ments, limiting their power to the enforcement of a judgment's pre-
to the certification decision itself (i.e., a finding that there was an adequate representa-
tive urging certification upon the court) should be a prerequisite to any antisuit in-
junction enforcing a denial of certification. This feature of the American Pipe litigation
has not, however, been adopted by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases as a pre-
requisite for class members to enjoy the benefit of tolling. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal
Co., 462 U.S. at 348-354 (applying the American Pipe rule to a proceeding in which class
certification was denied for lack of adequacy, typicality, and numerosity).
203 Thus, Justice Scalia's strongly stated complaint to the contrary in his Devlin v.
Scardelletti dissent is, at the very least, overstated. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1,
16 n.1 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Not even petitioner... is willing to advance the
novel and surely erroneous argument that a nonnamed class member is a party to the
class-action litigation before the class is certified." (emphasis omitted)).
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
205 Id.
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clusive effect as to those issues and claims that were actually decided
in the federal proceeding.' °6 Once again, this narrow approach ex-
presses deference to the countervailing federalism interest according
to which class members are called to rely upon the willingness of state
courts to recognize appropriate defenses of merger or bar.
CAFA significantly upsets that countervailing federalism interest.
The Act presumes that state courts are not optimal fora in which to
adjudicate class actions that are national in scope, even when those
actions are based on state law. In debating the Act, Congress identi-
fied the particular danger that class counsel will make serial attempts
at certification by shopping for sympathetic state courts that will be
likely to disregard any preclusion defense following a previous denial
of certification. This is one of the forms of strategic behavior that the
Act expressly seeks to defeat. Enforcement of the finality of federal
court orders will sometimes be an essential tool in accomplishing that
purpose. Where that is so, CAFA appears to lend additional authority
to the federal courts to overcome any objections from federalism that
might otherwise suggest a limited scope for an injunction aimed at en-
forcing a denial of certification.0 7
In many instances, it will not be necessary to rely upon the
broader implications of CAFA to find authorization for the type of an-
tisuit order that the due process analysis in the last section suggests is
appropriate. An injunction that merely prohibits the particular class
configuration attempted in the initial federal proceeding while leav-
ing class members free to seek certification of a more narrowly tai-
lored lawsuit will generally comply with the Court's conservative ap-
proach to the "protect or effectuate" provision of the AIA and will
satisfy the due process standards explored above without the issuance
of individualized process. A broader antisuit injunction that would
foreclose all future aggregate treatment for any of the class members'
claims, in contrast, will often functionally extinguish the claims them-
206 See Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1988) (providing At-
lantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281 (1970), as
an example of how the relitigation exception "permit[s] a federal court to prevent state
litigation of an issue that previously was presented to and decided by the federal court").
207 Professor Issacharoff has made a much more aggressive argument in this vein,
urging a reading of CAFA that would authorize federal courts to jettison the doctrine
of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), and adopt their
own choice of law approach to nationwide state law disputes with an eye toward adopt-
ing a uniform liability standard to go along with the uniform treatment of certification
standards. See Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 1865-66. But see Burbank, supra note 12, at
194244 (rebutting Professor Issacharoffs position).
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selves, requiring a higher degree of individualized process to bind ab-
sentees in any event (effectively eliminating any authorization prob-
lem).
Suppose, however, that class counsel refile their lawsuit in the
court of a state that has expressly adopted a more permissive standard
of class certification than that contained in Federal Rule 23, such that
the first proceeding arguably has not "actually litigated" the issue
sought to be foreclosed in the second. Here, the added weight of
CAFA comes into play. The unavoidable import of CAFA, manifested
208in its findings and statements of purpose, its structure, and its legis-
lative history, is that class actions of national scope and importance
should be decided in a federal tribunal, according to federal certifica-
tion standards. While the Act stops short of directly preempting more
permissive certification standards in the state courts, it clearly elevates
the federal standard to a preferred status for covered cases. A federal
court's determination that a lawsuit is inappropriate for class treat-
ment should be understood as a final disposition on the certifiability
of that lawsuit-a decision with preemptive effect in any subsequente, . 209
proceedings that seek to pursue the same class configuration. Thus,
208 The Act's findings and purposes say the following about the proper treatment
of class actions of national scope:
(4) Abuses in class actions undermine the national judicial system, the free
flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as in-
tended by the framers of the United States Constitution, in that State and lo-
cal courts are-
(A) keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court;
(C) makingjudgments that impose their view of the law on other States
and bind the rights of the residents of those States.
CAFA § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005).
209 Denials of certification under CAFA thus warrant treatment under the AIA dif-
ferent from the treatment that the Court found appropriate for a dismissal on forum
non conveniens grounds, where the federal standard governs access to the federal fo-
rum without purporting to speak to the propriety of state courts providing a forum.
The Court gave a broader explanation for its oft-cited ruling on the relitigation excep-
tion, however, finding that an argument about the preemptive effect of federal forum
non conveniens doctrine in the maritime context was irrelevant to its analysis where
the preemption question was not litigated in the initial federal forum. See Chick Kam
Choo, 486 U.S. at 148-50; see also Kerr, supra note 29, at 239-40 (concluding that Chick
Kam Choo forecloses use of the relitigation exception in denial-of-certification cases).
The statutory framework of CAFA, and the clarified understanding of the sources of
preemptive atthority for federal judgments that the Court embraced in Semlek Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001), both warrant stepping away
from this feature of the Chick Kam Choo holding.
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even if a state does embrace more permissive standards of certifica-
tion, such that the attempt to refile and certify an identical suit in that
state arguably presents a "different issue" for decision than the one re-
solved in the earlier federal proceeding, the federal court may still use
its injunctive powers to prevent relitigation of the broader issue that it
has actually decided-namely, the certifiability of that lawsuit under
the federal standard that CAFA has determined to be appropriate for
covered cases of national importance.
One may consider this result an application of the caveat that the
Supreme Court offered when it ruled in Semtek International, Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp. that federal common law controls the preclusive
effect that will be exerted by the judgment of a federal court sitting in
diversity, but that ordinarily federal common law should select the
rule that would have applied to ajudgment rendered by a state court
in the same jurisdiction.2 '0 The Court characterized that result as a
proper expression of the policy of federal jurisdiction traditionally as-
sociated with the Erie doctrine, which aims to discourage forum shop-
ping between state and federal court as a means of obtaining a differ-
ent result. As a caveat to that holding, however, the Court allowed
that "[t]his federal reference to state law will not obtain ... in situa-
tions in which the state law is incompatible with federal interests.' 2 I
CAFA's targeted grant of jurisdiction expresses a federal interest in
having federal certification standards apply to class actions of national
scope and importance, while at the same time displacing the pre-
sumption against vertical forum shopping that informs Erie's state-
ment of values. Under Semtek, it is thus doubly appropriate to craft a
federal rule of preclusion for judgments under CAFA that attaches
preemptive force to the ruling of the federal court that a particular
class configuration should not be certified.
Finally, there are two questions relating to the territorial scope
and enforcement of an antisuit injunction that require attention:
what affirmative authorization does a federal court possess to apply
such an order to absentees around the country, and what procedures
must the court employ in enforcing its order?
The first question provides an occasion to clear up a frequent
source of confusion about the scope of a federal court's authority to
210 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09.
211 Id. at 509. As an example of such a situation, the Court posited a case where
"state law did not accord claim-preclusive effect to dismissals for willful violation of dis-
covery orders" and "federal courts' interest in the integrity of their own processes
might justify a contrary federal rule." Id.
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exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction within the territory of the United
States. As an arm of the federal sovereign, federal courts enjoy the
constitutional authority to exercise power over litigants anywhere in-
side the United States, provided that some affirmative source of posi-
tive federal law authorizes the exercise. Although the Supreme Court
itself has never opined on the issue directly, both Congress and the
lower federal courts have long operated on the assumption that the
federal courts can be empowered to exercise nationwide jurisdiction,
and the Supreme Court regularly assumes the correctness of that
proposition in cases where it might otherwise require analysis. Pro-
vided that some source of positive law authorizes the attachment of
jurisdiction, federal courts have the constitutional authority to exert
power over persons throughout the country. This is true of defen-
dants and absent class plaintiffs alike.
The only provision of federal law that would limit federal courts to
the jurisdictional reach available to states is Rule 4(k) (1) (A), which
empowers federal courts to "borrow" state long-arm statutes in acquir-
ing jurisdiction over defendants. '2 That provision, however, does not
purport to impose any general limitation on the jurisdictional reach
of federal courts, as courts and commentators frequently assume.
Rule 4(k) (1) (A) is simply one potential source of affirmative authority
that a federal court can draw upon in exercising jurisdiction over de-
fendants. The provision tracks the limitations that would apply to a
state court under the Fourteenth Amendment, to be sure, but it does
so purely as a matter of jurisdictional policy-a self-imposed con-
straint upon this particular source of jurisdictional authority. Rule
4(k)(1) (A) does not impose a general limitation upon exercises of
federal jurisdiction; much less does it reflect a constitutional limita-
tion on the power of federal courts. Rather, the jurisdictional policy
embodied in Rule 4(k) (1) (A) is an expression of the broader proposi-
tion that federal courts, as a general matter, should not create unnec-
essary incentives for vertical forum shopping. That jurisdictional pol-
icy has no constitutional component,2 1 3 and, again, it has been
212 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (1) (A).
213 The Supreme Court made this proposition clear in Hanna v. Plumner, 380 U.S.
460 (1965). The Hanna Court put to rest the false constitutionalization of procedural
questions tinder the Erie line of cases, explaining that Erie set forth no broad constitu-
tional command regarding the applicable procedures in federal court. Rather, Erie
created a default jurisdictional policy-"the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement
of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws"-to gov-
ern in the absence of an applicable federal rule or statute. Id. at 468. Rejecting the
doctrine that Justice Harlan urged in his noted concurrence, the Court found that
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significantly weakened under CAFA, which sets forth a new jurisdic-
tional policy that actively encourages vertical forum shopping in class
action litigation. In addition, Rule 4(k) (1) (A) does not even apply to
absent plaintiffs. By its terms, the Rule speaks only to jurisdiction over
defendants. Thus, the proposition that federal courts are limited to
the jurisdictional reach that would be available to a state tribunal-a
proposition that finds expression only in the limited context of cases
governed by Rule 4(k)(1) (A) in any event-simply has no impact
upon the present question.
It is the All Writs Act that a federal court should look to in assess-
ing its authority to apply antisuit injunctions to absent class members.
The Act provides federal courts with authority to issue all orders that
are necessary to enforce their own judgments or to effectuate their
214own jurisdiction. The obligation of any such injunction operates in
personam as to the original parties to the lawsuit-in a putative class
action, the named plaintiffs and defendants-binding them in all ju-
dicial districts .- , It is also well established that, in appropriate cases,
federal injunctions can be enforced on a nationwide basis against
nonparties as well-and, a fortiori, against quasi-parties like absent
class members. Such enforcement is most clearly available when non-
parties aid in subverting an order or violating its terms. Were it oth-
erwise, as the Fifth Circuit has pointed out, opponents of an injunc-
tion could "enlist the aid of out-of-state individuals in an attempt to
frustrate the orders of the district court." 21 6 This is a danger that reso-
Congress and the federal rulemakers could create divergences between federal and
state procedural practice, even when doing so would violate Erie's "twin aims," without
violating any constitutional principle of federalism. Id. at 471-74.
214 The provision reads, in relevant part, "The Supreme Court and all courts estab-
lished by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (a) (2000).
215 See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932) (finding that a
court in which a consent decree is entered retains jurisdiction over the parties for the
purposes of modifying the decree); Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S.
448, 452 (1932) ("The respondent could not escape the decree by removing from, or
staying without, the District [in which it was issued]. Wherever it might conduct its
affairs, it would carry with it the prohibition. Disobedience constituted contempt of
the court which rendered the decree, and was none the less contempt because the act
was committed outside the district, as the contempt lay in the fact, not in the place, of
the disobedience to the requirement."); see also Pac. Reins. Mgmt. Corp. v. Fabe, 929
F.2d 1215, 1218 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining that injunctions generally cannot be regis-
tered under 28 U.S.C. § 1963, the provision for the cross-district enforcement of fed-
eraljudgments, "because that would be pointless: they act in personam nationwide").
216 Waffenschmidt v. MacKay, 763 F.2d 711, 717 (5th Cir. 1985).
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND DUE PROCESS
nates in the class action context, where seriatim attempts at class certi-
fication are often controlled by a single group of entrepreneurial law-
yers who switch plaintiffs and venues in search of a favorable result.
When a federal court with jurisdiction over both the subject mat-
ter and the original parties in a putative class action denies certifica-
tion, a properly crafted order preventing absentees from obtaining a
second bite at the apple through successive attempts at certification
operates in aid of that original exercise of jurisdiction and in defense
of the order of denial, and therefore falls within the mandate of the
All Writs Act. It is an appropriate extension of that statutory authority
for the federal court to apply its antisuit order to absentees in any ju-
dicial district, just as the court would have the power under Rule 23 to
apply its authority to all class members if it were to grant certifica-
217tion. No limitation in the Constitution or the Federal Rules pre-
vents that exercise of authority.2
8
Courts and commentators have regularly failed to understand
these matters properly. For example, the Third Circuit-ordinarily a
distinguished voice in federal class action jurisprudence-has issued a
noted series of opinions in which it has gotten these issues flatly
wrong. Beginning with Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc.1 9 (one of the
multidistrict asbestos cases that led up to the Supreme Court's Amchem
decision), the Third Circuit has committed two grievous errors: si-
multaneously forgetting the different constitutional frameworks that
apply to exercises ofjurisdiction by state and federal sovereigns and
217 The Seventh Circuit essentially arrives at this conclusion in Bridgestone/Firestone
II, though the course of its analysis is haphazard at best. See In re Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bridgestone/Firestone 11), 333 F.3d 763,
768-69 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing the jurisdictional objection).
218 am speaking here only of the jurisdictional and geographic considerations
surrounding an antisuit order. There are more purely "procedural" considerations
that will attend the enforcement of such an order, which I set forth in the paragraphs
that follow.
219 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993).
220 The court wrote:
International Shoe arose in the state court system and the opinion expressed the
due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment; nonetheless, the
[same] minimum contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction applies to
federal courts having subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of
citizenship as well as cases brought on the basis of a federal claim.
Id. at 199. The inaccuracy of this statement is astonishing. If taken at its word, the
court appears to be saying that exercises of nationwide jurisdiction in federal question
cases are unconstitutional, even when authorized by Congress, if class plaintiffs (or de-
fendants) do not have "minimum contacts" with the state where the judicial district
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committing the classic Shutts fallacy22 of assuming that opt-out rights
operate as a categorical constitutional prerequisite for any federal
222court seeking to exercise power over a class of absentees. 22 The Third
Circuit reiterated these flawed propositions-through a spokesman no
less eminent than the late Judge Edward Becker-in the well-known
223GM fuel tank litigation. Many other courts have also gotten these
issues wrong, and the Third Circuit has placed them in distressingly
good company.
The second question relating to the enforcement of antisuit or-
ders that must be addressed involves the more purely "procedural"
considerations that attend ex parte injunctions. Under Federal Rule
65(d) and basic due process principles, an injunction can be enforced
against nonparties only when they "receive actual notice of the order
by personal service or otherwise. ' '22 Regardless of the precise quasi-
party status that one ascribes to absent class members, due process
would clearly prohibit the application of contempt sanctions against
an absentee who had no actual notice of an antisuit order. Absentees
must indeed be served with individual process before they can be
threatened with the sanction of contempt.
This does not mean, however, that it is necessary to provide indi-
vidual notice to the entire class before issuing an antisuit order. It
merely means that individual notice is a prerequisite to enforcing the
order against any particular class member. If an unaware absentee
files suit in contravention of an antisuit injunction, the injunction's
proponents must notify the absentee of the order, at which point they
can require him to suspend or terminate the proceeding. Contempt
sanctions would not be available for the original act of filing the sec-
hosting the suit is located. The Third Circuit itself obviously does not believe any such
thing. See Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 2002) ("Where
Congress has spoken by authorizing nationwide service of process... the jurisdiction
of a federal court need not be confined by the defendant's contacts with the state in
which the federal court sits.").
221 See supra Part II.A. 1.
222 See Carlough, 10 F.3d at 200 ("Thus, with neither express or inferred consent,
nor minimum contacts, and prior to notice and the commencement of the opt out pe-
riod, the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the [objecting] plaintiffs
and did not have authority to bind their actions when it issued the injunction."); id. at
201 ("Thus, prior to notice and the opt out period, and absent minimum contacts with
the Pennsylvania forum or consent to its jurisdiction, a federal injunction enjoining
state action would violate due process.").
223 See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134
F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998) (Becker,J.).
224 FED. R. Cv. P. 65(d).
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ond lawsuit (unless the absentee in fact had notice of the order), but
the federal contempt power would be available to enforce the order
prospectively following the provision of notice.2
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Bridgestone/Firestone II provoked
a great deal of controversy. Many commentators shared that court's
intuition that any sensible class action policy must surely empower fed-
eral courts to prohibit endless attempts at securing certification in a
hospitable forum, but they expressed uncertainty as to how the appar-
ent formal obstacles could be overcome in order to bind uncertified
class members to an antisuit order. Judge Easterbrook's opinion
made a forceful case on the level of class action policy but did little to
lay the due process foundation for the constitutionality of such an in-
junction. The discussion in this Section should now make clear that
due process imposes no obstacle to a federal order enforcing a denial
of certification, even without the issuance of individualized process,
provided that the order leaves open meaningful remedial alternatives
that class members can employ to pursue their claims. With the pas-
sage of CAFA, it should also be clear that what due process permits,
federal law now authorizes.
III. COLLATERAL ATTACKS AND ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION
When a class action that suffers from collusion or malfeasance
proceeds to a final judgment, the option remains for disgruntled class
members or competing class counsel to attempt a collateral attack
against the objectionable judgment on grounds of inadequate repre-
sentation. Few issues in class action litigation have produced more
heated disagreement than the question of whether, and under what
conditions, absentees should be able to challenge the binding effect
of a judgment collaterally by bringing a second suit and asserting a
lack of adequate representation in the initial proceeding. The ex-
traordinary saga of the Ninth Circuit's Epstein/Matsushita litigation fo-
cused the attention of courts and commentators on this issue. Those
cases began as a pair of parallel class actions, one in California federal
district court raising exclusively federal securities claims and one in
225 One consequence of this nationwide enforceability of federal antisuit injunc-
tions is that absentees who wish to contest such an order will be forced to travel to the
issuing forum to do so, a requirement that some commentators might find objection-
able. See Monaghan, supra note 114, at 1166-68 (arguing that a class member should
enjoy the prerogative to challenge the binding effect of a class judgment in the forum
of her choice). Nonetheless, such a result flows directly from a proper analysis of the
injunctive powers of the federal courts.
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Delaware state court raising state law claims, both arising out of al-
leged improprieties in a tender offer by the Matsushita corporation
for the purchase of shares in MCA, Inc. By the time it was over, the
litigation had produced a settlement and global release in the state
court, an opinion by the Supreme Court of the United States on full
faith and credit, and a series of Ninth Circuit decisions that included a
dramatic opinion authorizing broad opportunities for collateral attack
by class members on adequacy grounds that was promptly vacated by a
reconstituted panel after the retirement of the opinion's author and
was replaced by another dramatic opinion that seemingly foreclosed
any possibility of collateral attack so long as the rendering forum pur-
ported to follow class action procedures similar to those found in
226Federal Rule 23.
Many prominent voices in the academy have weighed in on the
collateral attack question in the wake of Matsushita, - and the circuits
226 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 383-86 (1996) (ruling
that state courts do have the power to release exclusively federal claims in class action
settlements and that the grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction does not constitute an
exception under the Full Faith and Credit Act); Epstein v, MCA, Inc. (Epstein II), 126
F.3d 1235, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that representation in state court proceed-
ings was inadequate, both as a per se structural matter and on the facts, and permitting
collateral attack), vacated on reh'g, 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (permitting collat-
eral attack only in extremely narrow cases of complete process failure).
I should disclose that I come to the question of collateral attacks under the influ-
ence of some personal history. I served as one of the last judicial clerks for Judge Wil-
liam A. Norris, the author of the Epstein II opinion that was vacated following his re-
tirement from the bench, and I worked extensively with the Judge and another co-
clerk on the case. Although the approach that Judge Norris took in his opinion was
not the one that I would have chosen in many respects, the experience of working
closely on the issue with a distinguished jurist who believed strongly that an injustice
had been done in the state court proceeding and that some form of federal remedy
was appropriate and necessary has left a lasting impression.
27 See, e.g., William T. Allen, Response, Finality of Judgments in Class Actions: A
Comment on Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1149, 1159-61 (1998) (arguing that
a state class action judgment should have final preclusive effect when class members do
not exercise a proffered opt-out option and the initial forum adjudicates compliance
with Rule 23 in an adversarial proceeding); Kahan & Silberman, supra note 14, at 786-
92 (urging a restrained approach to collateral attack that would not permit relitigation
of the adequacy question in the absence of a process failure or other compelling cir-
cumstance in the initial forum); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will
Be Lauyers Without Clients or Law, 30 HoFSTRA L. REV. 129, 156-67 (2001) (emphasizing
the desirability of broad and unrestricted collateral attacks in cases where representa-
tion appears to have been inadequate in the initial proceeding); Monaghan, supra note
114, at 1153-54 (arguing for the availability of broad collateral attacks by class members
who have no minimum contacts with the initial forum); William B. Rubenstein, Finality
in Class Action Litigation: Lessons from Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 790, 792-801 (2007)
(employing post-conviction habeas practice as a point of comparison in exploring the
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remain divided on whether and when class members may collaterally
attack judgments on adequacy grounds-a division of authority that
the Supreme Court conspicuously failed to resolve when it split 4-4 on
an appeal from the Second Circuit's decision in the Stephenson case,
which took a much broader view than the Ninth Circuit on the collat-
eral attack question (albeit in the always idiosyncratic context of the
1. • • 221
Agent Orange litigation) .
There are serious arguments on both sides of this collateral attack
debate. Few commentators have argued that collateral attack is cate-
gorically unavailable under a Rule 23 regime. Such a position
collateral attack question); Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for Inade-
quate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383, 388 (2000) ("The argument for
limiting collateral attack contradicts two fundamental principles: first, a court has no
jurisdiction over absent class members who have not been adequately represented;
second, a judgment entered without jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked if the
party bound by the judgment did not appear and had no obligation to do so.").
228 The Stephenson litigation involved the recovery fund established by Judge
Weinstein in resolving the Agent Orange litigation, and the accompanying release of
claims. The fund provided a schedule of payments for individuals exposed to Agent
Orange, but provided that payment was available only to those who filed claims within
twenty years of exposure. Despite this limitation on recovery, the settlement bound all
class members, including those whose injuries turned out not to manifest until after
the expiration of the recovery period and who would thus be denied any recovery. In
essence, the settlement traded off the likelihood that most class members who devel-
oped symptoms would enjoy some recovery against the possibility that some class
members (unidentifiable at the time of settlement) would suffer long-delayed injury
for which they could obtain no relief. The Second Circuit found that the initial pro-
ceeding did not afford adequate representation to the "future plaintiffs" whose injuries
had not manifested at the time of settlement, and hence that individuals who mani-
fested injuries outside the recovery period could escape the release of their claims and
bring suit. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257-59 (2d Cir. 2001), affd
by an equally divided Court, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (per curiam).
229 Professor Monaghan is unfair to Professors Silberman and Kahan when he sug-
gests otherwise. See Monaghan, supra note 114, at 1195-99. In fact, Professors Kahan
and Silberman recognize the appropriate role of the collateral attack in a limited
range of class action scenarios, where the circumstances in F-i give no confidence in
the ability of the court to safeguard adequacy:
We... do not take issue with the holding in Gonzales [v. Cassidy] that a collat-
eral attack on adequacy can be brought challenging the conduct of class
counsel when that conduct is no longer in the purview of the court in F-1.
Moreover, in making its finding of adequacy, the court in F-I necessarily relies
on the accuracy of factual representations made in the fairness hearing.
Those representations include the nature of the investigation undertaken by
class counsel to ascertain the status of a competing class action or the likeli-
hood that such claims will be filed as well as representations about the litiga-
tion value of to-be-released claims and the basis for counsel's assessment. To
the extent these representations are materially false, some avenue must be
provided to reassess the finding of adequate representation.
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would be difficult to sustain in light of the approach that the Supreme
Court has adopted in other circumstances where individuals have
been bound to judgments without being made full parties. In the
context of "divorce jurisdiction," for example, the Supreme Court has
developed a set of doctrines for permitting limited collateral attacks to
ex parte divorce decrees (that is, decrees obtained by one spouse
where the other never appeared and was never served) in cases where
there is evidence that the petitioner in the initial proceeding was not a
true domiciliary of the forum-a condition that the Court has found
to be a jurisdictional prerequisite for such ex parte orders.230 Al-
Kahan & Silberman, supra note 14, at 782 (citation omitted).
Professor Rubenstein also obscures the issue somewhat when he characterizes the
debate as polarized between those who would never permit a collateral attack (whom
he terms "preclusionists") and those who would always permit relitigation of adequacy
questions by absentees (whom he terms "constitutionalists"). Rubenstein, supra note
227, at 795. While there are some who have adopted such categorical positions-
Professor Monaghan, for example, adopts the strong "constitutionalist" position that
absentees with no minimum contacts to F-1 must always be allowed to relitigate ade-
quacy in the forum of their choice-most prominent commentators, including Profes-
sors Kahan and Silberman, have articulated more nuanced views. See also Allen, supra
note 227, at 1159-66 (apparently adopting a "preclusionist" approach to class action
settlements, but speaking only to cases in which "(1) [class members were] afforded
notice of and a right to opt-out of the action and chose not to opt-out, and (2) the
rendering court has, after a hearing on notice, adjudicated compliance with the terms
of Rule 23 in an adversary proceeding"). On the "choice" that class members exer-
cised to opt out, however, see supra Part II.A.1.
230 The seminal statement of the Court's position on this point, the one that
opened the door to the collateral attack, came in the second Williams decision:
As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of domicil, upon which depends
the power to exert judicial authority, a State not a party to the exertion of
such judicial authority in another State but seriously affected by it has a right,
when asserting its own unquestioned authority, to ascertain the truth or exis-
tence of that crucial fact.
Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 11), 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945). The Court soon
placed limits on the doctrine, disallowing collateral challenges in cases where the
complaining party had made an appearance and participated in the initial action:
[T]he requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from collaterally
attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of a sister
State where there has been participation by the defendant in the divorce pro-
ceedings, where the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to contest
the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is not susceptible to such col-
lateral attack in the courts of the State which rendered the decree.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1948); see also Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 383-
84 (1948) (stating the same limit).
This much-noted line of cases appears never to have been discussed in conjunc-
tion with the class action question in any serious way, and it warrants closer examina-
tion. Not surprisingly, some litigants have raised this line of cases in arguing in favor
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though the ex parte divorce problem differs in important respects
from the class action, there are many points of commonality between
the doctrinal problem of binding quasi-parties that each presents,
enough so that the Court's approach in the divorce cases seriously
undermines any claim that the question of collateral attacks by quasi-
parties can be foreclosed on categorical, formal terms. Rather, the
class action cases, like the divorce cases, require an inquiry into sys-
temic values and practical consequences. I aim here to make a
modest contribution along those lines to the collateral attack debate,
using the principles explored in this Article as a point of reference.
Those who advocate making collateral attacks broadly available to
absentees point to notorious instances of seemingly irrefutable mal-
feasance by class counsel, where attorneys have negotiated millions of
dollars in fees for themselves in return for do-little, take-nothing
judgments for class members. The threat of a collateral attack, advo-
cates argue, provides an urgent and necessary check on this type of
self-dealing by irresponsible attorneys."' Skeptics counter that the
of collateral attack, but no court appears to have offered an extended analysis of their
relevance. See, e.g., Hospitality Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 591 S.E.2d 611, 617
n.8 (S.C. 2004) ("Appellants also argue that South Carolina precedent supports the
proposition that the courts of this state may review the jurisdictional underpinnings of
a foreign judgment before granting full faith and credit. We note, however, that na-
tionwide class action lawsuits clearly raise very particularized due process issues, and we
therefore focus our analysis on case law in that context." (citation omitted)).
231 Professor Hensler adopts a similar approach in discussing the proper treatment
of "future" claimants in class action litigation, rejecting modes of analysis that frame
the issue as an abstract question of due process and instead considering the treatment
of future class action claimants in light of the treatment they are likely to receive in the
other remedial arenas currently available to them. See Hensler, supra note 10.
232 See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 11, at 1787-94 (urging the importance of a collat-
eral attack as check on irresponsible representation). Professor Monaghan asserts that
existing doctrine clearly establishes the broad right of out-of-state absentees to attack a
judgment collaterally in the forim of their choice whenever they claim that there has
been a lack of adequate representation in the initial proceeding, pointing to the
Court's decisions in Hansbeny v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797 (1985), and Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996), in support of
that proposition. See Monaghan, supra note 114, at 1149-50 & n.4, 1172-73. That posi-
tion rests on an incorrect reading of these cases.
Hansbery,, of course, permitted a collateral attack to a collusive proceeding that
did not even purport to represent the interests of the objectors who later attacked the
judgment. The opinion establishes an important constitutional principle of adequate
representation in the absence of individual party status, but does not speak at all to the
proper remedy when a proceeding that does purport to represent the interests of ab-
sentees is claimed to have fallen short. Richards is a variation on the same theme. In
that case, the Court applied Hansbeny to invalidate a broad application of preclusion
doctrine by the Alabama Supreme Court. The Alabama court had precluded one
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problem of self-dealing is exaggerated and that, once the collateral at-
tack door is open, it will be impossible to limit the challenges exclu-
sively to "obvious" cases of malfeasance. Every class action, they fear,
will threaten to produce satellite litigation by unsatisfied class mem-
bers or entrepreneurial attorneys, resulting in a loss of true finality in
class proceedings and a concomitant reluctance on the part of defen-
233
dants to enter into efficient settlements. It is better to allow state
supreme courts to impose limits on their outlying trial judges, as many
24
have begun to do.
The concerns sometimes expressed by skeptics over finality and
the impact of collateral attack upon settlement may be overstated.
While there are no comprehensive empirical data on the question,
there does not appear to have been any significant increase in collat-
eral attack proceedings since the Second Circuit's decision in Stephen-
son was issued and left in place by the divided Court. Even so, it is still
early, and Stephenson was an unusual case with unclear implications for
group of citizens from challenging the constitutionality of a tax law on the grounds
that another group of citizens had already brought a similar challenge unsuccessfully
and hadjudgment entered against them. Those earlier litigants, however, "did not sue
on behalf of a class; their pleadings did not purport to assert any claim against or on
behalf of any nonparties; and the judgment they received did not purport to bind any
county taxpayers who were nonparties," Richards, 517 U.S. at 801-02, and it was for that
reason that the Court found the extension of preclusion to violate due process. Again,
the Court did not speak at all to the proper treatment of a proceeding that does pur-
port to bind a properly represented class. Shutts does not address the issue at all, ex-
plaining only that absent class members are entitled to adequate representation "at all
times," but saying nothing about how and where to administer a remedy when such
representation is claimed to be lacking. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812. Whatever the virtues
of Professor Monaghan's position-a position that the Ninth Circuit largely adopted in
Epstein H before that decision was reversed on rehearing-it is not settled law. See also
Koniak & Cohen, supra note 227, at 156-57 (overreading the adequacy of representa-
tion cases in a similar fashion).
233 See, e.g., Fine v. Am. Online, Inc., 743 N.E.2d 416, 421-22 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
(characterizing collateral attack as contrary to the form of relief that class actions aim
to provide to "our judicial system nationwide"); Hospitality Mgmt., 591 S.E.2d at 619
("Without limited review, a nationwide class action could be vulnerable to collateral
actions in the 49 other states in which it was not litigated initially."); Kahan & Silber-
man, supra note 14.
234 See Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother
Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1756-78 (2000) (detailing
increasingly tight controls that state legislatures and courts in some "magnet" jurisdic-
tions have imposed upon class action litigation); see also, e.g., Avery v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 820-21 (Il. 2005) (requiring trial courts to perform a
careful analysis of key issues at the certification stage rather than waiting until trial to
resolve them); Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000) (rejecting the
"approach of certify now and worry later" and requiring trial courts to perform a care-
ful certification analysis).
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collateral attacks generally. 35 If the Supreme Court were to issue a
square holding that collateral attacks on adequacy grounds are poten-
tially available in all cases, the risk-benefit calculation that plaintiffs'
attorneys must make in deciding whether to attempt to raise such
claims would shift significantly, and there is good reason to think that
the number of claims would increase .23 That would be a costly devel-
opment. Any high-stakes class action that is worth litigating might be
worth challenging collaterally if an arguable question of representa-
tional adequacy appears in the record. The question is how CAFA
should be understood to bear upon the availability and administration
of this last-ditch mechanism for policing the actions of irresponsible
class counsel or overreaching trial courts.
Had the absent-plaintiff removal provision been preserved in the
final version of CAFA, that provision would have provided one such
opportunity and could legitimately have been relied on by skeptics in
support of the argument that collateral attacks are not generally nec-
essary to preserve the rights of absentees in cases where the statute
applies. In the absence of that provision, the alternative mechanisms
for interdiction explored above should be viewed as functional alter-
natives to collateral attack. If a preemptive antisuit injunction is avail-
able and can effectively interdict collusion, malfeasance, or opportun-
istic relitigation at an early stage of the state court proceeding, the
institutional and systemic downsides associated with collateral attack
militate in favor of the injunction as the preferred method for polic-
ing the behavior of faithless class counsel. Conversely, if preemptive
injunctions are unavailable or are unlikely to be effective, the case for
collateral attack in extreme cases becomes stronger. The remainder
235 See Hensler, supra note 10 (discussing the distinctive features of the "futures"
problem).
236 As common sense would suggest, sophisticated plaintiffs' attorneys respond to
the doctrinal landscape in makingjudgments about which cases are likely to be finan-
cially viable, just as they do when deciding where to file suit. For example, Willging
and Lee write in their interim report that their
findings suggest that plaintiff attorneys may be anticipating the removal of
class actions on the basis of CAFA's minimum diversity provisions and are fil-
ing them in federal court as original proceedings. In that way, plaintiff attor-
neys retain a choice of forum at least to the extent that, in a given case, juris-
diction and venue rules allow filing in more than one federal forum.
WILLGING & LEE, supra note 3, at 17; see also id. at 16 ("[CAFA's] changes in the law
would be as clear to plaintiff attorneys as to anyone. As removal becomes more pre-
dictable, plaintiff attorneys might decide to file actions initially in federal court to
avoid the costs and delays associated with removal.").
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of this Part will use this systemic perspective to analyze several scenar-
ios in which advocates have urged the availability of collateral attacks,
beginning with the Epstein/Matsushita litigation itself.
What was most frustrating about the Epstein litigation was its capac-
ity to present at once the best and the worst case for a collateral at-
tack. On one hand, the representational problems in the litigation
were profound. As Judge Norris explained in Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Ep-
stein II), class counsel in Delaware used that infamous proceeding as a
vehicle for settling exclusively federal claims that they did not have the
authority to litigate, all for the apparent purpose of offering the de-
fendant a cheap means of achieving global peace so that Delaware
21,7counsel could be the ones to earn a fee award. Had CAFA been in
effect and applicable to the case,238 one can readily speculate that the
supposedly "pro-federal-court" defendants would have chosen not to
remove the litigation to a federal forum even so, preferring instead to
keep the case in state court so that it could serve as the vehicle that it
eventually became for buying a cheap global settlement. In fact, the
functional equivalent of this stay-in-state-court scenario played out in
the case itself. The Delaware trial judge rejected an early settlement
and global release that was proposed by the parties, finding that the
state law claims had "little or no merit" and should not serve as the
vehicle for releasing potentially valuable federal claims (especially
since the proposed settlement offered no real compensation to class
members).'" Despite this blunt assessment by the trial court, the de-
fendants took no action to have the state law claims dismissed and in-
stead allowed the case to lay dormant for over ten months until devel-
opments in the federal proceeding allowed them to try a second
settlement gambit in Delaware. This sequence of events led the Dela-
ware Vice Chancellor to remark that "suspicions abound" of collusion
between the parties, even as he ultimately approved the settlement
240and global release. One cannot study the course of representation
237 Epstein II, 126 F.3d at 1250.
238 The jurisdictional provisions of CAFA do not apply to "any class action that
solely involves a claim ... that relates to the internal affairs or governance of a corpo-
ration or other form of business enterprise and that arises Linder or by virtue of the
laws of the State in which such corporation or business enterprise is incorporated or
organized... ." CAFA § 4, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (9) (Supp. V 2005).
239 Epstein II, 126 F.3d at 1252 (quoting In re MCA, Inc. S'holders Litig., 598 A.2d
687, 689 (Del. Ch. 1991)).
240 Id. at 1253 n.17 (quoting In reMCA, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 11740, 1993 WL
43024, at*5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 16, 1993)).
FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAND DUE PROCESS
in the Delaware proceedings without dismay, and the sequence of
events in that litigation, while extraordinary, was hardly unique.
In response to this performance, the Epstein II court went so far as
to conclude that the very configuration of the litigation in Delaware-
a state class action proposing to release exclusively federal claims
through settlement, despite its inability to adjudicate those claims-
was so compromised that it made the representation of class counsel
per se inadequate, regardless of the actual course of the proceed-
ings. In effect, this holding would categorically have prohibited state
courts from ever releasing exclusively federal claims in class action set-
tlements. That part of the court's opinion appears inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita, which had held that the release
of exclusively federal claims in a state class action does not by itself trig-
ger any categorical exception to the state judgment's entitlement to full
faith and credit. 42 Even so, the configuration of the proceedings in
Delaware certainly indicated a need to view the actual course of class
counsel's representation through a skeptical lens. The resulting picture
of opportunism and apparent collusion is an unattractive one and
makes a powerful prima facie case for a collateral challenge.
But the Epstein litigation also offered extensive opportunities for
objectors to litigate these issues before the Delaware proceeding
reached a final judgment, either by raising them in the proceeding it-
self or by seeking an injunction in the parallel federal litigation. The
record seems to indicate that the Delaware Vice Chancellor was an
engaged and active judicial monitor of the state class action. He re-
jected the initial settlement proposed by the parties as unfair (making
particular reference to the potential value of the federal claims), in-
quired into the nature and adequacy of the representation being of-
fered by class counsel, and approved the revised settlement negotiated
by the parties only after the district court in California granted sum-
maryjudgment against the plaintiffs on their federal claims (a holding
that the Ninth Circuit later reversed). Objectors appeared at the sec-
ond fairness hearing in Delaware and voiced their concerns about
class counsel's motives-concerns that the judge himself reiterated in
issuing his ruling on adequacy. The Vice Chancellor can legitimately
be faulted for substituting his assessment of the overall fairness of the
final settlement for a thorough analysis of the adequacy of the repre-
sentation that produced that settlement-one of the mistakes in class
241 Id. at 1251-55.
242 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1996).
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action administration that the Supreme Court highlighted in Am-
chem.243 Nonetheless, the record seems to indicate that the Delaware
judge took his oversight duties seriously. The Delaware class members
were given the opportunity to opt out of both the initial lawsuit and
the settlement. 24 4 Finally, and importantly, class counsel in the paral-
lel federal proceeding were fully aware of the pending Delaware ac-
tion, yet they took no steps to intervene or otherwise interdict those
proceedings, even after Delaware counsel's first unsuccessful attempt
to include the exclusively federal claims in a global settlement.
If we ask whether permitting a collateral attack was necessary to
safeguard the interests of the Epstein absentees in light of the other
options at their disposal, the answer appears to be that many other
avenues of redress were available before the Delaware proceeding ar-
rived at a final judgment and the mandatory command of the Full
Faith and Credit Act attached. Prominent among these was the op-
tion to seek an antisuit injunction in the federal lawsuit in order to
prohibit the state court from releasing the federal claims and pre-
empting the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction. Following the first,
unsuccessful attempt of the parties in Delaware to release the exclu-
sively federal claims, class counsel in the federal proceeding were
clearly on notice that the state lawsuit posed a direct threat to the fed-
eral court's ability to exercise the targeted grant of exclusive jurisdic-
tion that Congress had enacted in the Securities Act. Neither the les-
sons of CAFA nor the prescriptions of this Article were required to
243 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997) ("[T]he stan-
dards set for the protection of absent class members serve to inhibit appraisals of the
chancellor's foot kind-class certifications dependent upon the court's gestalt judg-
ment or overarching impression of the settlement's fairness."). The problem of ade-
quacy here was not one of conflicting interests within the class, as with Amchem, but
rather the diligence and loyalty with which class counsel approached its representation
in toto. But the imperative to keep the adequacy and fairness inquiries separate re-
mains important nonetheless. As the Ninth Circuit explained, the district court's dis-
missal of the federal claims in the Epstein litigation was at odds with decisions of the
Second and Third Circuits that had recognized the plaintiffs' cause of action. Class
counsel did not point out those precedents to the Delaware court, instead embracing
the district court's dismissal and insisting that the federal claims were worthless. The
Vice Chancellor apparently did not go behind class counsel's briefs to do its own legal
research, but rather relied upon the representations of the settlement proponents in
approving the settlement. As a result, the court'sjudgment about the fairness of the set-
tlement and the propriety of releasing the exclusively federal claims was compromised.
244 Of course, in light of the previous discussion concerning the limited efficacy of
opt-out notice in cases where class members may not have focused attention upon
their claims and may not have much at stake, the significance of the opt-out notice to
the analysis here may be limited.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND DUE PROCESS
indicate the viability of an antisuit injunction at that point. Around
that time (albeit in a somewhat different context), the Ninth Circuit it-
self held that a state court proceeding that threatens to compromise ex-
clusively federal claims operates "in derogation of federal jurisdiction"
and justifies an antisuit injunction as "necessary to preserve exclusive
federaljurisdiction. '24 5 The decision of federal class counsel not to seek
an antisuit injunction to interdict the settlement of the federal claims in
Delaware was strategic, and the consequences of that decision could le-
gitimately affect the options of the claimants whom counsel had been
certified to represent.1
46
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Gonzales v. Cassidy,1' another much-
discussed precedent in collateral attack literature, offers an instructive
contrast to this scenario. Gonzales involved two parallel class actions,
both filed in federal court against the same defendant, that levied
constitutional challenges to a Texas statute authorizing the suspension
of driver's licenses without a hearing. The first suit resulted in a loss
before a three-judge district court panel, but that decision was vacated
by the Supreme Court in light of intervening precedent and sent
back, resulting in a victory on remand. 24s The district court, however,
designated that victory as having retrospective effect (that is, provid-
ing relief for past suspensions) only as to the named plaintiff. As to all
other motorists, the court provided that the judgment would have
only prospective impact, effectively denying relief to the rest of the ex-
245 Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 54 F.3d 535, 540-41 (9th Cir. 1995).
Sycuan Band involved Indian law and the claims of Indian tribes, which may present a
particularly urgent case for exclusive federal jurisdiction, as noted above. See supra
note 53 (discussing the ruling in this case in the context of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion).
246 See Wolff, supra note 110, at 746-51 (discussing the range of strategic choices
that class counsel can make that may have binding consequences for absentees).
Ironically, Epstein I makes this point by negative implication when it rejects the propo-
sition that the appearance of objectors in the Delaware fairness hearing could operate
to constrain the options of class members in the federal proceeding:
[0]bjectors are objectors, not class representatives. The individual objectors
who voluntarily appeared at the fairness hearing were not authorized by the
absentees to represent their interests, nor were they certified by the state to do
so. Their appearance at the hearing did not bind anyone but themselves to an
adjudication of adequacy of representation.
126 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted), withdrawn, 179
F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).
247 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
248 Id. at 70-71.
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isting class. The named plaintiff, content with that outcome, de-
clined to appeal the portion of the order that would deny relief to the
other motorists who had experienced suspensions. The second class
action, Gonzales, was filed while the first was on remand from the Su-
25"0preme Court but before the court arrived at a final conclusion.
When the final order was entered in the first suit and the named
plaintiff declined to appeal, the defendant then raised a defense of res
judicata in the Gonzales proceeding, arguing that the unappealed or-
der barred the request for retrospective relief on behalf of the other
251motorists. In rejecting this argument, the Fifth Circuit held that the
named plaintiffs decision not to appeal the withholding of class-wide
relief in the first proceeding constituted a denial of adequate repre-
sentation that warranted setting aside that judgment on collateral re-
view. 252
As in the Epstein litigation, there were already parallel class actions
in Gonzales at the time the collateral challenge was raised. Unlike in
Epstein, however, the adequacy problem in the first proceeding was
not apparent-neither on the face of the lawsuit nor during the
course of the proceedings-until the last moment, when the named
plaintiff declined to appeal the portion of the district court's order
specifying the effect of its ruling. Indeed, given that attorneys com-
monly submit their notice of appeal late in the thirty-day window for
filing, ' counsel in the Gonzales action may have had no notice at all of
the threat to their clients' interests, unless they were in contact with
counsel in the first proceeding or had otherwise received advance
word of the decision not to appeal. If they did have notice of that de-
cision, perhaps the Gonzales lawyers could have tried to file an emer-
gency request to intervene in the first action for purposes of appeal-
ing, but the failure to attempt such an irregular action can hardly be
deemed a willful decision not to interdict that proceeding.2 54 Much
249 Id. at 71.
250 Id.
21 Id. at 73-75.
252 Id. at 77.
253 See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) (1)(A) (requiring an appealing party to file a notice of
appeal in district court within thirty days of an entry of final judgment).
254 Since the named plaintiff in the first lawsuit no longer wished to participate,
the request to intervene for purposes of appealing would presumably have required
the lead plaintiff and counsel in Gonzales to take over that lawsuit altogether. This
would have been a highly irregular turn of events-switching both plaintiff and coun-
sel between the final judgment at trial and the subsequent appeal. Compare, for ex-
ample, the Court's recent holding in Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002), that
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less could class counsel in Gonzales have sought injunctive relief, as
should have happened in Epstein.2 " In short, a collateral attack was
the only realistic litigation option available to the Gonzales plaintiffs to
redress the last-minute representational problem that arose in the
predecessor litigation. Permitting the attack was clearly appropriate
in that case, even under a highly restrictive view of the role of collat-
eral challenges.2 '
There is a good deal of space between the litigation scenarios pre-
sented in these two precedents. It will often be much more difficult
than it was in either of these cases to make a clear judgment about
whether class members and competing counsel had a realistic oppor-
tunity to protect their interests against faithless behavior while the ini-
tial proceeding was still pending. That very indeterminacy makes the
collateral attack option more costly still, for it makes flawed results
more likely-both false positives, where competing counsel can wait
until a suit ends and then decide whether to threaten the results of a
difficult but fundamentally appropriate proceeding, and false nega-
tives, where competing counsel are unable to demonstrate the flaws of
an objectionable proceeding after the fact or are unwilling to assume
the expense and risk of trying. Because the antisuit injunction inter-
rupts the offending lawsuit at an earlier stage in the proceedings, it
reduces the danger of wasted effort, frustrated expectations, and stra-
those who appear as objectors to a fairness hearing have standing to appeal, even if
they do not formally intervene. In such a case, the original lead plaintiff and counsel
would still be in the lawsuit, defending the settlement that they negotiated before the
trial court. More broadly, where the structure of a class action provides ample oppor-
tLnity for class members to participate, voice their concerns, and protect their inter-
ests, then the obligation to pursue that course rather than attempting a collateral at-
tack becomes concomitantly greater-pace the Epstein Hcourt's excessive reliance upon
the Shults dictum that a class member "is not required to do anything" but "may sit
back and allow the litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there are safe-
guards provided for his protection." Epstein H1, 126 F.3d at 1242-43 (quoting Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shuns, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985) (emphasis omitted)).
25 5 For starters, the parallel actions here were both in federal court, and federal
district courts generally do not exercise injunctive authority against their sibling tribu-
nals. Moreover, an), such injunction would have been mandatory in nature rather than
prohibitory (i.e., an order directing the named representative to remain in the first
proceeding, file the notice of appeal, and continue prosecuting the case), a use of eq-
uity that would be highly inadvisable and might even be unconstitutional under the
First and Thirteenth Amendments.
2.,6 See Kahan & Silberman, supra note 14, at 782 ("We... do not take issue with
the holding in Gonzales that a collateral attack on adequacy can be brought challenging
the conduct of class counsel when that conduct is no longer in the purview of the
court in F-I ."); see also Rubenstein, supra note 227, at 837 (characterizing the collateral
attack in Gonzales as "perform[ing] a necessary corrective function").
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tegic behavior in difficult cases. And because an injunction is subject
to modification in light of subsequent events or an expanded under-
standing of the factual record, it offers a less extravagant and unyield-
ing form of intervention than does the collateral attack. The latter
forces the court to make a one-time, permanent judgment about the
enforceability of a prior proceeding without opportunity for future
reconsideration or modification.
To be sure, an antisuit injunction, like a collateral attack, has the
potential to be used abusively or strategically. But such behavior can
be policed much more effectively through the ordinary standards of
equity that govern requests for injunctions-where questions involv-
ing the nature of the harm sought to be averted, the behavior of the
petitioning party, and the demands of the public interest are a re-
quired part of the analysis-than in the inapt arena of a constitutional
257
challenge to adequacy in a collateral proceeding." Experience sug-
gests that it is much easier to assess the adequacy and propriety of a
contemporaneous or recent proceeding, where all the players are still
active and on the scene, than it is to reconstruct the tale of a litigation
after the fact and attempt to judge its adequacy on a cool record.
Moreover, a lesser, subconstitutional showing of inadequacy or mal-
feasance would be the appropriate standard in administering an anti-
suit injunction. The imperative to protect the specialized grant of
federal jurisdiction in the injunctive proceeding need not overcome
the mandatory command of the Full Faith and Credit Act, as would be
necessary in a collateral attack. Thus, once it is clear that the targeted
grant ofjurisdiction contained in a law like the Securities Act or CAFA
makes an antisuit injunction possible in such a case, competing class
counsel would have a strong incentive to interdict the initial suit while
258it is still pending.
257 Cf Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 283 (7th Cir. 2002) (Pos-
ner, J.) (characterizing as remarkable the decision by a federal district judge to issue
an antisuit injunction halting a parallel state class action "in view of the progress and
promise of the Texas suit relative to the half-hearted efforts of the [federal] settlement
class counsel" and reversing the approval of the federal settlement for failure to make
a sufficient inquiry into adequacy and fairness).
258 The only other opportunity that class members are likely to have to police their
representatives while an action is still pending is to appear as objectors at a fairness
hearing, a step that cannot be relied upon to have any significant impact on the out-
come. See William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regdatory Ap-
proaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, ] 467-81 (2006) (discussing structural and institutional
limitations on the efficacy of the fairness hearing and suggesting reform proposals); see
also Rubenstein, supra note 227, at 807-08 (summarizing procedural and practical im-
pediments to developing a challenge to a settlement at a fairness hearing). Class
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The antisuit injunction is not a complete answer to the collateral
attack question. Competing counsel will not always file a parallel fed-
eral action from which such an injunction might issue, regardless of
the doctrinal incentives for doing so. Class members in a flawed state
court proceeding can hardly be taxed with the failure to pursue an an-
tisuit injunction if no certified representative has ever made the stra-
tegic decision to forgo that option on their behalf. Where no parallel
federal proceeding is ever filed in response to a questionable state
class action, it may be necessary to continue to entertain the possibility
of a collateral attack in cases presenting extreme representational
problems.
In this respect, the antisuit injunction is once again a second-best
solution to absent plaintiff removal. Had CAFA afforded absentees
the opportunity to effect removal, the argument would be stronger
that the failure of class members to pursue that option would fore-
close them from raising a collateral challenge to the representation
that they received in state court. Congress's decision not to include
that provision in the Act means that collateral attack must remain a
part of the class member's potential repertoire of responses to collu-
sion or malfeasance, albeit a disfavored response, in at least some
cases. If courts embrace the prescriptions set forth in this Article re-
garding antisuit injunctions, however, then the occasions for enter-
taining collateral challenges will diminish.
CONCLUSION
Congress legislated indirectly when it enacted CAFA. Seeking to
work a change in the landscape of state law class actions, Congress
vastly expanded litigants' access to federal court, leaving state liability
rules and procedures intact as a formal matter but clearly operating
on the understanding that the change in forum would regularly result
in a change in outcome. The indirect nature of this new law should
not obscure the significance of the action that Congress has taken. In
using access to federal court as its chosen regulatory mechanism for
shaping outcomes in class litigation, Congress has embraced a policy
of federal jurisdiction for those cases that departs dramatically from
the post-Eriejurisprudence of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York and Klaxon Co.
members also have the right to enter an appearance in the lawsuit, but that appear-
ance-as-of-right generally stops well short of an intervention that will allow them to in-
fluence the proceedings, and the cases where true intervention by class members has
been permitted are few.
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v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., as Professor Burbank has correctly
noted . 9 We have truly entered a new dispensation in federal aggre-
gation policy.
60
The excision of absent-plaintiff removal from the final version of
CAFA eliminated the most direct mechanism by which class members
could have sought protection from collusion or malfeasance under
this new dispensation. Hence the jurisdictional paradox of the Act:
class members must now rely upon the intercession of competing class
counsel in parallel proceedings as their primary means of combating
the faithless attorney behavior that CAFA aims to prevent. For absen-
tees, the statute's protections operate at a double remove, with the in-
direct regulatory mechanism of federal jurisdiction accessible to them
only through the indirect source of a parallel federal proceeding from
which state lawsuits operating in derogation of the Act's jurisdictional
policies may be enjoined.
As with any true paradox, however, the seeming contradiction of
the Act, with its strong statement of intent to protect the interests of
class members and its lack of a direct mechanism for achieving that
end, can return us to a larger truth. Our federal jurisdiction jurispru-
dence has moved away from careful analysis of the particular congres-
sional policies that are embodied in specialized jurisdictional provi-
259 See Burbank, supra note 12, at 193942 (offering a detailed description of the
shift in jurisdictional policy, away from York and Klaxon, that CAFA represents). In the
years following Erie, the Court adopted a policy of federal jurisdiction according to
which the choice of the federal forum should not have any predictable ex ante impact
upon the outcome of a lawsuit based on state law. In Guaranty Trnst Co. v. York (a case
that was not based on the Rules of Decision Act), the Court suggested that a diversity
action in equity should conform judge-made procedures to the contours of state prac-
tice in order to discourage vertical forum shopping. 326 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1945). In
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., the Court relied upon the same princi-
ple-discouragement of vertical forum shopping-in denying federal courts the au-
thority to develop an independent body of choice of law rules. 313 U.S. 487, 496-97
(1941). CAFA, of course, offers vertical forum shopping as the primary mechanism for
altering outcomes in class proceedings.
260 Professor Nagareda has expressed skepticism at the suggestion that CAFA in-
vites an overruling of Klaxon, as Professor Issacharoff has argued that it does. "To say
that CAFA turns off Klaxon when the statutory text says no such thing, when the legisla-
tive history actually speaks of preserving Erie, and when the Senate rejected a much
more modest amendment on choice of law, is to press hard at the boundaries of statu-
tory inference." Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement
Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1919 n.198 (2006)
(discussing S. Amendment 4 to S. 5, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REc. S1215 (daily ed.
Feb. 9, 2005)). While the ultimate impact of CAFA on Klaxon is a difficult question as to
which I do not yet have a firm view, I think that Professor Nagareda underplays the shift
in jurisdictional policy that the statute represents, legislative history notwithstanding.
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sions-an analytical drift that is both exemplified and aggravated by
the misdirected approach to AIA doctrine that has predominated for
several decades. In pushing back against the unsustainable implica-
tions of that doctrine in the new era of the nationwide class action,
lower federal courts have adhered to an artificial and limited vocabu-
lary when seeking to protect their jurisdictional prerogatives.
Given the Supreme Court's early deference to the principle of
concurrent jurisdiction, perhaps these half measures were inevitable
in the absence of clearer congressional direction. CAFA now provides
that direction, for those able to see it. The grant of targeted jurisdic-
tion contained in Congress's first general policy statement on class ac-
tion litigation provides the occasion to reclaim from its desuetude a
key insight: Congress sometimes uses the jurisdiction of the federal
courts as its primary tool for giving voice to regulatory policies. Now
that CAFA is upon us, the most faithful reading of the statute is one
that will make the benefits of those regulatory policies available to all
participants in contested class-action proceedings.
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